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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the effect of directors’ experience on stock price synchronicity, 
cash holding and payout policy by focusing on two financial related experiences: 
namely, accounting and non-accounting financial experience. Using non-financial 
firms from the S&P 1500 database between 1999 and 2017, this study provides new 
evidence that stock price synchronicity reduces with more accounting financial 
experience on board, supporting the argument that directors with accounting financial 
experience enhance the disclosure of firm-specific information, thereby, enhancing 
firms’ informational environment. The relationship is reported to be non-
heterogeneous across different types of corporate governance. Furthermore, a 
difference-in-difference test concludes that the study results are not driven by 
endogeneity. Moreover, the relationship between financial-experts on board and stock 
price synchronicity is robust to other board characteristics and sample settings. The 
study also reveals the ability of financial-expert directors to reduce firm cash holding 
in support of the flexibility hypothesis. Financial experts on board also enhance firm 
excess cash profitability and market-to-book value. This finding is robust to 
controlling board characteristics and different cash holding measures. However, the 
relationship varies in terms of firms different measures of corporate governance and 
levels of financial constraint. Accounting financial-experts were also found to increase 
firm payouts in support of the outcome hypothesis. The results are robust to controlling 
board characteristics and sample setting. In addition, results also show the effect of 
accounting financial-experts on payout to be more prominent in firms with weak 
corporate governance mechanisms and those facing financial constraints. Finally, 
additional investigation reveals that accounting financial-experts on board are more 
likely to pay shareholders in the form of repurchase, rather than dividends, in which 
emphasis is on the financial-experts’ role in enhancing board monitoring through the 
influence of distributing free cash flow through non-pre-committed shareholders’ 
payments. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Rationale of thesis 
Following several accounting scandals in the US, the Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) Act 
emphasises the need for financial experts to serve on the boards of directors  under the 
assumption that “an understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and 
financial statements” enhances the competence of the board and its ability to protect 
shareholders’ interests1. Specifically, the Sarbanes-Oxley (2002, Sec. 407) requires 
“each issuer (...) to disclose whether or not, and if not, the reason, therefore, the audit 
committee of that issuer is comprised of at least one member who is financial expert”2. 
While regulations of countries mainly focus on increasing financial experience in 
firms’ audit committees, recent empirical evidence highlights that the trend of 
financial-experts in firms increases not only on audit committees, but also on boards 
of directors (Huang et al. 2012; Minton et al. 2014)3.  
In the event of a corporate scandal or financial crisis, blame is first generally 
attributed to the corporate governance system of a firm. Given their highest authority 
in the firm governance system, the board of directors play a significant role in 
establishing the firm policies and in decision-making (Adams and Ferreira 2007). 
Recent corporate governance literature highlight the most effective board composition 
mainly targeting directors’ independence and diversity (in terms of professional 
background, age, gender and ethnicity) (Klein 2002; Ryan and Wiggins 2004; Brick 
et al. 2006; Fich and Shivdasani 2006; Fernandes 2008; Belkhir 2009). As the fraction 
 
1 See Section 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) Act (definition of audit committee financial-
experts). Similarly, all major stock exchanges have introduced listing requirements on director 
financial literacy. See also the governance survey by Jensen, Murphy, and Wruck (2004), e.g. 
recommendation R-36. 
 
3 For example, Huang, Q. et al., 2014. The role of investment banker directors in 
M&A. Journal of Financial Economics 112(2), pp. 269-286 show that the number of non-
financial firms appointing investment bankers on board rises monotonically over time. 
Specifically, they show that the percentage of firms that has at least one investment banker on 
board jumped from 17.3% in 1998 to 29.7% in 2008. Moreover , Minton, B. A. et al., 2014. 
Financial expertise of the board, risk taking, and performance: Evidence from bank holding 
companies. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 49(02), pp. 351-380 indicate that, 
in their sample of financial institutions, including all US banks, there is an increase in banks 
independent directors with financial experience from 20% in 2003 to 26% in 2008.  
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of financial expertise on the board of directors increases, studies examining the board 
of directors’ financial experience are generally very limited and concentrated largely 
in the banking and financial services industry (Fernandes and Fich 2009; Minton et al. 
2011; Tseng et al. 2012; Minton et al. 2014) or commercial banking and investment 
banking experience (Kroszner and Strahan 2001; Byrd and Mizruchi 2005; Tseng et 
al. 2012; Huang et al. 2014; Kang and Kim 2016). Exploring how directors’ financial 
expertise effect on firms’ outcome is an important topic in the modern corporation, 
yet there are very few studies in this area. This study, therefore, investigates, for the 
first time, financial experience on the board of directors and its effect on stock price 
synchronicity along with two main board financial decisions relating to cash holding 
and payout policy.    
Prior literature on corporate governance also highlights that directors with 
financial experience on board can affect board monitoring and control (McMullen and 
Raghunandan 1996; Xie et al. 2003; Abbott et al. 2004; Agrawal and Chadha 2005; 
DeFond et al. 2005; Güner et al. 2008; Fernandes and Fich 2009; Huang et al. 2014). 
On this issue, previous studies delineate that directors with financial experience 
provide better financial reporting (McDaniel et al. 2002; Mangena and Pike 2005; 
Mangena and Tauringana 2007), forecasting (Karamanou and Vafeas 2005), earning 
management (Klein 2002; Bédard et al. 2004), finance and investment policies (Güner 
et al. 2008) and firm performances (Davidson et al. 2004; Fernandes and Fich 2009; 
Minton et al. 2011; Francis et al. 2012a; Minton et al. 2014) and link negatively to 
firm engaging in earnings management (Xie et al. 2003), accounting scandals 
(Agrawal and Chadha 2005) and financial restatements (Abbott et al. 2004).  
Pertinently, in recent financial and economic literature, the discussion around 
what determines firms’ stock price synchronicity has attracted considerable attention 
(Francis et al. 2012b). For example, Roll (1988) argues that the degree to which share 
prices move together depends on a number of factors relating to the way in which 
firm-specific information, as well as industry- and market-wide information, is 
incorporated into the share price. He also argues that market- and industry-wide news 
explains only a small part of stock price variations. According to Bushman et al. 
(2004), the amount of firm-specific information available to those outside publicly 
traded firms defines the level of corporate transparency and, thus, firms are less 
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synchronised when adopting superior disclosure strategies (Song 2015). Interestingly, 
Roll (1988) study has motivated numerous follow-up studies to examine the 
relationship between stock price synchronicity and earnings effectiveness (Durnev et 
al. 2003), capital budgeting (Durnev et al. 2004), corporate transparency (Jin and 
Myers 2006), voluntary disclosure (Haggard et al. 2008), earning management 
(Hutton et al. 2009), audit quality (Gul et al. 2010), International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) adoption (Kim and Shi 2012), institutional investors (An and Zhang 
2013), liquidity (Chan et al. 2013b) corporate governance (Farooq and Ahmed 2014) 
ownership structure (Gul et al. 2010; Boubaker et al. 2014) and mutual-fund (Jiang et 
al. 2016).   
A large body of research also indicates that composition of the board of 
directors affects firms’ information environment (Vafeas 2000; Cheng and Courtenay 
2006; Kanagaretnam et al. 2007; Lim et al. 2007; Rutherford and Buchholtz 2007; 
Ferreira et al. 2011; Gul et al. 2011) and decision making (Stearns and Mizruchi 1993; 
Ahmed and Duellman 2007; García Lara et al. 2007; Fields et al. 2012). An effective 
board makes well informed and high-quality decisions (FRC 2011) and directors with 
financial expertise are able to obtain financial information at lower costs and may, 
therefore, be more capable of monitoring the firm’s top management more effectively 
(Harris and Raviv 2008). Previous studies show that the effect of financial expertise 
on firm’s outcome extends beyond being better monitors. According to Adams and 
Ferreira (2007), directors consume most of their time in the firm serving on their 
advisory role rather than their monitoring role. When studying the board of directors 
advisory role, Huang et al. (2014) conclude that directors with financial-expertise are 
associated with better Mergers and Acquisition (M&A) opportunities and lower costs 
of the deals. Moreover, Dionne and Triki (2005) show that financial expertise 
encourages firm risk hedging. This study contends that for financial-experts to govern 
and advise effectively, it is essential to develop a more robust corporate and financial 
information environment. Thus, over time, the firm will experience improvement in 
the quality of their information environment. Hence, the study hypotheses that the 
fraction of financial-expert directors on board are negatively related to firm stock price 
synchronicity. This study, therefore, aims to address an important, but still 
unanswered, question of whether the financial expertise of board directors explains 
the firms’ stock price synchronicity. 
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Board of directors also has a major role in monitoring managerial decisions on 
cash management and the distribution of profit to shareholders. During periods of 
economic growth, a firm’s cash holding increases and it is the duty of managers to 
make strategic decisions about the appropriate way to manage the firm cash reserves, 
whether to distribute it to shareholders, use it internally or to use it for external 
acquisition or continue holding their extra cash (Harford et al. 2008). From a logical 
economic perspective, excess cash holds benefit firms by limiting their transactions 
cost and funding their capital investment. This results in reducing firms’ loss from 
underinvesting due to shortage in free cash flow (Kim et al. 1998; Opler et al. 1999; 
Mikkelson and Partch 2003; Ozkan and Ozkan 2004). Cash holding provides firms 
with access to liquidity (Almeida et al. 2014) mainly during a financial crisis or in 
times of shortage of access to credit (Campello et al. 2011). Over recent years, firms 
worldwide have shown an extraordinary increase in their cash holding. According to 
Bates et al. (2009), in the US, the cash to assets ratio for industry firms more than 
doubled during the period between 1980 and 20064. 
However, from the perspective of the agency theory, where ownership and 
control are separated, a firm’s corporate governance plays a vital role in the amount 
excess cash held by firms. After all, theory suggests that better-governed firms will be 
more keen to distribute free cash to shareholders to limit the appearance of agency 
problem due to managers’ misuse of free cash flow (Jensen 1986; Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith 2003). Managers have a strong incentive to hold more free cash flow. Thus, 
corporate governance strength was found to have a direct effect on excess cash 
holdings in a firm (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2003). Extended studies provide 
sufficient evidence on the relationship between shareholders’ right and corporate cash 
holding (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2003; Lee et al. 2003; Kalcheva and Lins 2007; 
Al-Najjar 2013) and show that countries with low shareholder protection retain more 
 
4 The concept of building up a large cash reserve is also seen in the UK market (Florackis, C. 
and Sainani, S., 2018). How do chief financial officers influence corporate cash 
policies? Journal of Corporate Finance 52, pp. 168-191. note an increase in the average cash 
holdings of UK firms from the period between 1999-2011. Moreover, Iskandar-Datta, M. E. 
and Jia, Y., 2012. Cross-country analysis of secular cash trends. Journal of Banking and 
Finance 36(3). cross country analysis shows an increase of cash holding in France, Australia, 
Canada and Germany for the period between 1991and 2007.  
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cash. However, when studying the US market, a country with high shareholder 
protection, Harford et al. (2008) show that weak corporate governed structured firms 
have lower cash reserves. Nevertheless, firms with excess cash and weak corporate 
governance are found to increase their capital expenditures and acquisitions and 
reduce their profitability and valuation.  
Board of directors is also mainly responsible for corporate governance. The 
demography of board of directors reveals a direct effect on firm cash holding. (Ozkan 
and Ozkan 2004; Chen 2008; Harford et al. 2008; Chen and Chuang 2009; Kusnadi 
2011; Boubaker et al. 2015; Al-Najjar and Clark 2017). Previous studies also 
demonstrates the effect financial expertise on board has over firm financial decisions 
(Güner et al. 2008; Minton et al. 2011; Minton et al. 2014). Hence, this study focuses, 
for the first time, on how financial-experts on board affect the propensity to stockpile 
cash. In doing so, the study raises the following questions: (1) Do financial-expert 
directors lead managers to reduce their stockpile cash reserves? (2) How does the 
presence of financial-experts on board affect the managers’ deployment of free cash? 
(3); Are the differences in cash deployment reflected in differences in firm profitability 
and, eventually, firm valuation? 
Previous studies in relation to mitigating agency conflict of interest and firm 
management of cash holding focused on two main contradicting hypotheses; the 
flexibility hypothesis and the spending hypothesis. On one hand, according to the 
financial flexibility hypothesis, finance flexibility allows managers to have substantial 
financial reserves to quickly finance suitable investments (Jensen 1986). However, 
self-interested managers withhold excess cash to help survive unexpected adversity 
(Easterbrook 1984; Jensen 1986). According to the flexibility hypothesis, the less 
effective control is over managers, the more managers stack cash reserves. Thus, the 
study hypothesises that the fraction of financial-expert directors is negatively linked 
to cash holding. On the other hand, The spending Hypothesis argue in line with the 
agency theory that self-interested managers prefer spending firm excess cash flow 
rather than holding it (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Contradicting the flexibility 
hypothesis, it suggests that the more effective monitoring is over managers, the more 
firm will retain cash. In light of the spending hypothesis the study hypothesises  that 
the fraction of financial-expert directors is positively linked to cash holding.  
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Conversely, on the other side of managerial cash holding decision, managers 
also decide on firm payout policy. Payout policy is a strategic plan used by directors 
where they decide on whether to distribute cash to shareholders or accrue it for future 
investment. In line with agency theory, dividend policy can be used as a mechanism 
to mitigate agency problem. According to Jensen (1986), dividend limits the ability of 
managers to misuse excess cash. Moreover, Easterbrook (1984) argued that dividend 
payment reduces managers and shareholders agency problem through subjecting the 
firm to external market analysis. According to Jiraporn et al. (2011), dividend 
payments are positively associated with governance quality. The board of directors is 
another governance mechanism to control agency problem. According to Boumosleh 
and Cline (2015), maximised firm value requires a control system of combining 
governance mechanism and dividend policy. 
According to John and Knyazeva (2006), firms with strong internal and 
external governance are found to pay fewer dividends. Moreover, Hu and Kumar 
(2004) studied management entrenchment and payout policy and discovered that firms 
with less control over managers pay more dividends. Additionally, Jiraporn and Ning 
(2006) propose that firms pay higher dividends where shareholder rights are more 
suppressed. However, other studies argue on the basis of a positive relationship 
between firm corporate governance strength and payout policies. For example, 
Adjaoud and Ben‐Amar (2010) found firms with stronger corporate governance pay 
more dividends. Moreover, Jiraporn et al. (2011) finding implies that investors in firms 
with strong corporate governance are more able to force managers to distribute cash 
through dividend payout, in view of the conflict arises on the relationship between 
firm corporate governance strength and payout policy.   
Extant literature also delineates that one of the main determinants of the firm 
payout policy lies in their internal governance being applied through the effectiveness 
of the board of directors composition (Hu and Kumar 2004; Jiraporn and Ning 2006; 
Setia-Atmaja 2010; Abor and Fiador 2013; Yarram and Dollery 2015; Chen et al. 
2017). This study investigates board demography, focusing on how directors’ 
financial experience influences the firm payout policy.  
In addition, determining the impact of financial-experts on board in deciding 
payout policy is undoubtedly significant. The study contributes to the steadily growing 
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literature on the role of financial-experts in corporate governance, particularly, how 
financial-experts affect the firm decisions on firm monitoring policy. Specifically, this 
study explores whether having financial-expert directors influences firm long-term 
payout decisions.  
There are two conflicting views, grounded on the agency theory, explaining 
the relationship between firm corporate governance and payout decisions: the outcome 
view and the substitute view. The outcome view highlights the managers’ incentives 
to retain more cash to serve their own interests and emphasises the role of strong 
governance to induce dividend payments (Jensen 1986; La Porta et al. 2000). Where, 
the substitute view argument is based on the need for firms to establish reputation is 
higher for firms with weak shareholder protection (La Porta et al. 2000). A follow up 
study by Jiraporn and Ning (2006) investigating the relationship between 
shareholders’ right and dividend policy, establish that firms with weak shareholders’ 
right pay more dividend. Based on the two conflicting arguments on the effect of 
corporate governance on dividends payouts the study hypothesis that there is a positive 
relationship between the fraction of financial-expert directors on board and payout 
policy (outcome theory) and there is a negative relationship between the fraction of 
financial-expert directors on board and payout policy (substitute theory). 
Using US stock market S&P 1500, this thesis empirically tests the relationship 
between financial-experts on board and firm stock price synchronicity, cash holding, 
and payout policy. Following prior studies (see, e.g., Güner et al. (2008); Minton et 
al. (2014); Fernandes and Fich (2016), financial-expert directors are defined as those 
who (1) have prior experiences as executives in banking and financial institutions, 
finance-related positions in nonfinancial firms, or professional investors (henceforth, 
“accounting financial directors”) and (2) those who have non-accounting positions 
supervising the financial reporting functions, such as Presidents and CEOs 
(henceforth, “non-accounting financial directors”).  
The remainder of this chapter provides a summary of the study’s main findings 
and contribution to the literature, where it highlights the main results and contribution 
of the relationship between financial-experts on board and firm stock price 
synchronicity, cash holding and payout policy.  
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1.2. Structure of the thesis 
The study is structured into six chapters as follows:  
Following the introduction in this chapter, Chapter 2 presents the relevant literature to 
this thesis on board of directors’ main role, stock price synchronicity, cash holding 
and payout policy. Chapter 3 presents the first empirical chapter of the thesis on 
financial experience effect on firm stock price synchronicity. Chapter 4 presents the 
second study of the thesis on financial experience role in explaining firm cash holding. 
Chapter 5 offers the third and final study of the thesis on the financial experience and 
payout policy. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by summarising the main 
research findings, limitation of the thesis and offers recommendations for future 
empirical research. 
 
Figure 1: Thesis Outline 
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1.3. Findings and contribution to literature 
1.3.1. Financial experience and stock price synchronicity 
Chapter 3 focuses on empirically investigating the relationship between directors’ 
financial experience and firm stock price synchronicity using a sample of 1,078 US 
publicly traded non-financial firms between 1999 and 2016. The main findings in the 
chapter conclude that the proportion of financial-experts on board has a negative effect 
on firm stock price synchronicity. The adverse effects particularly appear when 
financial-expertise is measured by directors’ previous accounting financial 
experience, where directors’ non-accounting financial experience has no significant 
effect. Moreover, the study applies several robustness checks to validate the study’s 
main results. The study’s main results are robust to other board attributes, stringent 
sample (minimum of 50 weeks of observations per year instead of 30), the presence 
of top firms in the sample and the presence of unusual stock price behaviour due to 
the recent financial crisis. 
A major concern arising from this study is that the relationship between 
directors’ financial experience and firm stock price synchronicity could be 
endogenous. For example, the estimates could be biased by omitted variables that 
affect both the appointment of financial-expert directors and stock price 
informativeness. The results could be subject to the reverse causality concern if firms 
with superior information environment are more attractive and capable of employee 
directors with higher qualifications and financial experience. This study uses the 
difference-in-difference approach to address this concern. The study tests the plausibly 
exogenous increase in the fraction of financial-expert directors on boards brought by 
the 2003 NYSE and NASDAQ listing rules, instructing that boards without majority 
independence must appoint new independent directors. Since boards without 
financial-expert directors prior to the enactment are more likely to appoint new 
financial directors following the obligatory changes, the study found that in the one 
and two years after the new listing rules took place, such boards experience a 
marginally significant reduction in price synchronicity. This evidence suggests that 
endogeneity is unlikely to fully explain the study results. 
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To obtain further insight into financial-experts’ effect on firm stock price 
synchronicity, the study then explores the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the relation 
in question across firms with different governance characteristics. Interestingly, the 
study found that the relationship between directors with financial experience and stock 
price synchronicity is stronger among firms with a chairman-CEO (duality), low 
institutional ownership, and a low threat of takeover (measured by the antitakeover 
index), where governance and monitoring are most needed. This evidence is in line 
with better monitoring by financial-expert directors improving firms’ information 
environment. Additionally, the study examines the types of directors’ effect on the 
relationship between financial-experts and firm stock price synchronicity and shows 
that the significant relation stems from those financial-expert directors who are 
independent and have many outside directorships. Finally, according to Kothari et al. 
(2009), managers tend to delay the disclosure of bad news to investors in the presence 
of a conflict of interest, which results in stock crash risk when all bad news is suddenly 
released (Jin and Myers 2006). They argue that better transparent environment reduces 
firm crash risk. However, the study failed to obtain any effect of financial-experts on 
reducing the managers’ incentive on withholding bad news.   
This study contributes to the financial literature on the effectiveness of 
financial-expert directors in several ways. First, the new trend of increasing financial 
expertise on the board of directors provides an opportunity to embed the financial 
expertise perspective into the corporate board of directors. Recent studies have also 
considered the financial expertise of corporate audit committees (McDaniel et al. 
2002; Davidson et al. 2004; Mangena and Pike 2005; Carcello et al. 2006b) or on 
banks’ boards (Fernandes and Fich 2009; Minton et al. 2014). However, it is the board 
of directors who have main responsibility of supervising the firm’s financial reporting 
process (Klein 2002). In view of these responsibilities, this study contributes to 
corporate board composition effectiveness to enhance firm information environment 
through the appointment of directors with financial experience to serve on the board.  
Second, the study also adds to the literature on the effect of board compositions on 
stock price behaviour. The results of prior studies on the relationship between board 
composition and firm performance are inconsistent and the effectiveness of any board 
composition (e.g. board size, board independence, duality and ownership) is vague 
(Byrd and Hickman 1992; Wen et al. 2002; Dahya and McConnell 2005; Lien et al. 
 11 
2005; Abor 2007; Harford et al. 2008; Agrawal and Nasser 2012). The study, 
therefore, contributes to this field of literature by providing valuable insight into the 
effect of directors’ financial expertise on stock price behaviour. To the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, this study is the first to address the linkage between board 
financial experience and stock price synchronicity. Third, the study challenges the 
SOX Act definition of financial experience, which includes “supervising” employees 
with financial reporting responsibilities. Directors with CEO- and Chairman-
experiences failed to have the same positive influence of those with prior financial 
reporting responsibilities. Finally, the results obtained in this study offer empirical 
justification to increasing calls by academics and regulators for more financial-expert 
directors to serve on boards to avert accounting manipulations and frauds. 
1.3.2. Financial experience and cash holding 
Chapter 4 of this thesis empirically tests the relationship between directors’ financial 
experience and firm cash holding. Using a sample of 965 US publicly traded non-
financial and non-utilities firms between 2000 and 2017, the study report an inverse 
effect between financial experience on board and firm cash holding. Specifically, the 
relationship was only found when the financial experience is measured by the 
directors’ accounting financial experience. Results show the effects disappear when 
directors’ financial experience is measured by directors’ non-accounting financial 
experience. The study further tests the linearity of the relationship between accounting 
financial-experts and firm cash holding by taking the quartile of the high and low 
fraction of accounting financial-experts and test them against firm level of cash 
holding. This effort revealed that the relationship was driven from the high fraction of 
accounting financial-experts reducing the firm level of cash reserves but not from low 
fraction of accounting financial-experts on board increasing firm cash holding. 
The study also explores the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the study’s main 
results in question across firms with different financial constraints and governance 
characteristics. The cross-sectional test found that the effect of director financial-
experts on limiting firm cash holding appears in financially constrained firms (small 
firm size and low payout ratio). However, using the KZ Index, the effect of financial-
experts on firm cash holding appears in financially unconstrained firms (i.e., those 
with low KZ Index). With regard to firm corporate governance, the effect of 
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accounting financial-experts is more pronounced in firms with better board structure 
in terms of independence and board size. However, for CEO duality and E-Index 
measure, the result of the fraction of accounting financial-experts on board are found 
in firms with CEO duality and high E-Index measure (high governance needs).  
To gain understanding on how financial-experts’ interaction affects firm 
investment decision and performance, the study also investigates the effect of board 
financial experience on firm investment decision and performance regarding the 
amount of cash holding. The study found insufficient evidence that the fraction 
financial-experts’ excess cash holding affects firm investment decisions (capital 
expenditure, R&D or acquisition). However, the fraction of accounting financial-
experts explains, positively, a great deal of the change in firm dividend payments from 
firm excess cash holdings. Moreover, testing the effect of firm excess cash holding on 
firm market-to-book ratio shows accounting financial-experts’ ability to enhance firm 
profitability and market-to-book ratio from the firm change in excess cash holding. 
To allow greater understanding of the effect of financial-experts on firm cash 
holding, the study examines the relationship of firm financial-experts on the value of 
cash holding. The study follows Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith (2007) models on measuring the firm value of cash holding and found that there 
is insufficient evidence that financial-experts on board have any effect on firm value 
of cash holding. Results show no significant effect between the fraction of accounting 
financial-experts on board and firm value of cash holding and very weak evidence that 
non-accounting financial-experts matter. This finding implies that investors would not 
value cash holding any differently in the presence of financial-experts on board. 
As a result of this research effort, this study makes several contributions to 
previous literature on the effectiveness of board financial expertise. First, it adds to 
the literature on the board of directors’ attributes and how firm cash holding is 
affected. The literature on the effect of board composition and firm cash holding 
mainly focuses on board independence, board size, CEO duality and board gender 
diversity (Chen 2008; Gill and Shah 2012; Boubaker et al. 2015; Atif et al. 2019). This 
study widens the range of board composition by adding the directors’ financial 
experience as a determinant on the level of firm cash holding. Moreover, this study 
adds to the literature on board of directors’ effect on firm profitability. Previous 
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studies show the effectiveness of board of directors’ influence on firm performance is 
mainly focused on board independence, board size, CEO duality and board gender 
diversity (Rechner and Dalton 1991; Erhardt et al. 2003; Krivogorsky 2006; Yan Lam 
and Kam Lee 2008; Belkhir 2009; Yang and Zhao 2014; Kakabadse et al. 2015). This 
study adds financial-experts on board ability to enhance firm profitability and market-
to-book ratio from the firm excess cash holding. Second, this study challenges the 
SOX Act definition of financial expertise on board by adding “supervising” employees 
with financial reporting responsibility, as results show that directors with non-
accounting financial experience fail to obtain the same effectiveness of directors with 
prior accounting financial experience.  
1.3.3. Financial experience and payout policy 
The third empirical chapter (Chapter 5) is intended to investigate the impact of 
directors with financial experience on firm payout policy. This chapter shows that in 
the case of enhanced corporate governance through the appointment of financial-
experts on board, using three different payout measures, financial-experts were found 
to have a positive effect on motivating managers to payout more to shareholders. 
However, this result is only found when the financial experience is measured by 
directors’ accounting financial experience. The results show that non-accounting 
financial-experts have no significant effect. To verify the study’s main results, several 
robustness checks were conducted controlling for other board of directors’ 
composition (which also affect board monitoring and payout policy) and excluding 
utility firms, as they are subject to different financial policies and governance 
regulations that might affect their payout policy. The study’s main findings are robust 
to controlling for board composition and excluding utility firms. 
Moreover, to gain a thorough understanding of the effect of financial-experts 
on board on firm payout policy, the study tests the heterogeneity of the main results 
regarding the strength of firm’s corporate governance and financial constraint level. 
The results show that the effect of accounting financial-experts on increasing firm 
payouts are more prominent in firms with weak corporate governance mechanism 
(firm with high E-Index, CEO duality and large board size). However, the results are 
mixed, based on firm board independence, depending on different payout measures. 
Moreover, in highly financially constrained firms, accounting financial-experts on 
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board play a major role in increasing firms payout level. This is in line with the study’s 
main argument that directors’ financial experience enhances board monitoring; 
reducing agency conflict of interest by increasing firm payouts when corporate 
governance is weak and financial constraint is high -- more specifically, when 
managers’ incentive is to retain more cash high. Finally, the study further investigates 
the effect of financial-experts in the form of firm’s payout (i.e., dividends and 
repurchase). The fraction of accounting financial-experts on board would not only 
increase firm payout level, but would be more likely to pay shareholders in the form 
of repurchase. This emphasises the role of financial-experts’ in enhancing board 
monitoring through the influence of distributing free cash flow through non-pre-
committed shareholders’ payments (repurchase).   
Overall, this study makes several contributions to financial literature on the 
role of financial-experts on board effectiveness. These contributions can be 
summarised as follows: first, the study adds to the literature on the board of directors’ 
composition effectiveness on firm payout policy. Previous literature on the 
determinants of payout policy mainly focuses on board independence, board size, 
CEO duality and board gender diversity (Schellenger et al. 1989; Al-Najjar and 
Hussainey 2009; Byoun et al. 2016; Chen et al. 2017); this study elucidates the board 
effectiveness, measured by the effect of board financial experience on firm payout 
level and different policies (dividend and repurchase). Particularly, partially justifying 
the recent increase of firm share repurchase trend (on the expense of dividend payouts) 
through the appointment of financial-experts on board. Second, this study challenges 
the SOX Act definition of financial expertise on board by adding “supervising” 
employees with financial reporting responsibility, as results show that directors with 
previous CEO- and Chairman-experiences fail to obtain the same effectiveness of 
payout policy decisions when compared to directors with prior accounting financial 
experience .  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter outlines the relevant literature relating to the role of board of directors, 
stock price synchronicity, cash holding and payout policy. In the event of corporate 
scandal or financial crisis, blame lies first with the corporate governance system. 
Given the nature of modern corporation based on a separation of ownership and 
management, firms establish corporate governance mechanisms to ensure shareholder 
objectives are met. In addition, it is the board of directors’ who hold the highest 
authority in a firm’s governance system. Thus, in the finance literature, the board of 
directors’ role captures the attention of many researchers. Many theories have, indeed, 
attempted to explain the main role of the board of directors, including the agency 
theory, resource dependency theory and stewardship theory. 
As widely accepted, it was the study undertaken by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) which was the first to develop the agency theory. They outlined the existence 
of the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers and provided argument 
that a firm’s agency problem arises from the conflict of interest and the information 
asymmetry between managers and shareholders. They highlighted that the only way 
to mitigate the agency problem is by monitoring managers. Agency theory labels the 
role of the board, including linking managers’ interests to those of shareholders 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Klein 1998) and validate managers’ behaviour by acting 
as an “information system” used by shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Unlike agency theory, however, resource dependency theory argues that the 
boards’ major role is as provision resources. The role indicates the directors’ ability to 
add resources to the firm (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). According to Pfeffer and 
Salancik (2003), under the resource dependency theory, there are two primary 
contributions of the board of directors to provide advice and legitimacy to a firm’s 
image. In contrast, stewardship theory argues on the nonexistence of shareholders’ 
and managers’ conflict of interest. According to the theory, directors’ main role is 
developing firm strategy, rather than monitoring managerial performance (Cornforth 
2003). 
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Considering the board of directors’ play a crucial role in a firm, prior studies 
have widely investigated board of directors’ composition. In the financial literature, 
studies have linked board of directors’ composition to firm cross-section variations in 
stock return ((Byrd and Hickman 1992; Fich and Shivdasani 2006; Francoeur et al. 
2008), firm informational environment (Cheng and Courtenay 2006; Ferreira et al. 
2011; Upadhyay and Sriram 2011; Upadhyay and Zeng 2014) and firm decision 
making, including cash holding (Chen 2008; Gill and Shah 2012; Boubaker et al. 
2015; Atif et al. 2019) and payout policy (Schellenger et al. 1989; Al-Najjar and 
Hussainey 2009; Byoun et al. 2016; Chen et al. 2017). Following the demand by policy 
makers to establish financial expertise on board, directors’ financial experience has 
become an interesting topic for academics. Studies on board of directors’ effectiveness 
found that financial-expert directors are linked to market value (DeFond et al., 2005), 
financial decisions (Güner et al., 2008), stock return performance (Fernandes and Fich, 
2009) and risk taking (Dionne and Triki 2005; Sun et al. 2014; Fernandes and Fich 
2016; García-Sánchez et al. 2017). 
In relation to the information environment of firms, previous studies have use 
stock price synchronicity as a proxy of the level of firm-specific information 
incorporated into the share price. Roll (1988) argues that the extent to which stock 
prices move in the same direction related to firm-specific and market-wide 
information embedded in the share price. Roll (1988) propose that a large proportion 
of stock price variation cannot be justified by systematic factors5 and considers that 
high stock variation might reflect on privet information capitalised into the stock price 
via informed trading. Roll (1988) concludes that higher levels of firm-specific 
information in the market results in lowering a firm stock price synchronicity.  
Built on Roll (1988) findings, Morck et al. (2000) was the first to implement 
stock pricy synchronicity as a measure of the amount of firm-specific information 
imbedded in the share price. Morck et al. (2000) used the market model !! value on a 
country-level and conclude that share prices in countries with low shareholder 
protection (reflected in the country equity market development, investors right and 
 
5 Roll, R. 1988. R2. The Journal of Finance 43(3), pp. 541-566. U.S. sample show that 
market model !!explains only a small portion of stock movement, about only 35%(20%) of 
a firm’s monthly (daily) stock returns. 
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legal regimes) tent to move in the same direction, indicating a high stock price 
synchronicity level.   
Following Roll (1988) and Morck et al. (2000) findings, several studies linked 
low stock price synchronicity to other factors, such as: shareholder protection 
(Fernandes and Ferreira 2008; Kim and Shi 2010) developed financial analysis 
industry (Bushman et al. 2004) enhanced disclosure (Shi and Kim 2007; Haggard et 
al. 2008; Song 2015) and better audit quality (Gul et al. 2010). Bearing in mind that 
the level of firm-specific information embedded in the share price is affected by a wide 
range of variables, the study argued that financially sophisticated boards could be a 
major determinant to a firm’s information environment in two ways. First, by 
increasing the monitoring effectiveness over managers which makes managers more 
transparent. Second, by changing the nature and dynamic of the board, this makes 
members of board of directors pay more attention to the quality of information 
reported. 
Moving to firm cash holding, decision on the amount of access cash should be 
held and how the excess of cash should be used are made by top management 
inconsistent with either firm objectives or personal goals. Managing cash holding has 
a direct implication on investors (e.g., dividend payments and investments 
opportunities). Thus, it is in the best interests of shareholders that the firm’s 
governance is appropriate to ensure managers’ behaviour towards firm cash holding 
serves shareholder interests rather than their own. With regard to firm cash holding, 
three dominant theories aim to explain the determinants of firm cash holding: namely, 
the pecking order theory, the trade-off theory and the free cash flow theory. 
The pecking order theory of finance argues that a firm’s internal financing is 
the least costly and more preferred choice of financing. It limits the firm exposure of 
firms to capital market transaction costs and the asymmetric information problem 
(Myers and Majluf 1984). According to this theory, firms’ preference on investments 
financing relies on their retained earnings, than debt or equity (Al‐Najjar and Belghitar 
2011). The theory assumes the non-existence of optimal level of cash and firm cash 
holding changes in relation to firm earnings and profitability only (Opler et al. 1999). 
On the other hand, the trade-off theory proposes the idea of a unique optimal level of 
capital structure, using a cost-benefit analysis, for firm value-maximisation objective 
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(Kraus and Litzenberger 1973). Both theories (the trade-off theory and the pecking 
order theory) assume no agency conflict of interest. Thus, Jensen (1986) and Stulz 
(1990) develop the free cash hypothesis, claiming that substantial amounts of cash 
holding lead to entrenched managers raising the agency conflict of interest between 
shareholders and cash holders. They argue that to mitigate agency problem, 
shareholders prefer to minimise managers’ access to free cash flow, offering sufficient 
free cash flow for firms to invest in all positive net present value investments and 
insufficient for management misuses. The theory suggests that strong corporate 
governance plays a vital role in mitigating managers’ misuse of cash (Jensen 1986; 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2003). This part of the study uniquely links board of 
directors’ financial expertise role with enhancing managers’ behaviour towards firms 
cash holding. 
Payout policy is also another major financial decision taken by the board of 
directors on which the study incorporates. In the literature, several theories explain 
firm’s dividend payout policies. For example, signaling theory assumes that managers 
use dividend policy to signal information regarding firm future earnings since 
managers know more than shareholders about a firm’s financial wellbeing 
(Bhattacharya 1980; Healy and Palepu 1988; Gugler 2003). Under the agency theory 
perspective, firm dividend payments are used as an essential controlling mechanism 
to mitigate firm agency cost (Jensen 1986; Fenn and Liang 2001; Byoun et al. 2016). 
Arguably, to avoid management misuse of excess cash, shareholders prefer dividend 
payments instead, or firm retained earnings as a result of the separation of control 
(Rozeff 1982). Using board of directors as a monitoring mechanism, the relationship 
between the board of directors’ composition and payout policy is well established in 
the literature (Schellenger et al. 1989; Abdelsalam et al. 2008; Adjaoud and Ben‐Amar 
2010). However, the relationship between financial-experts and firm payout policies 
is still unclear. This study investigates the relationship between directors on the board 
financial experience and firm payout policy.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 discusses 
the theories underpinning financial experts serving on the board of directors; Section 
2.3 discusses the literature review behind the primary role of board of directors; 
section 2.4 discusses the literature review behind the firm stock price synchronicity; 
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Section 2.5 discusses the literature review behind the firm cash holding; Section 2.6, 
2.7 and 2.8 discusses the literature review behind the firm payout policy; and section 
2.9 concludes the chapter. 
2.2. Role of the board of directors 
A wide range of theories have been developed to explain the primary role of the board 
of directors. These include agency theory, resource dependency theory and 
stewardship theory. The following sections discuss the literature review related to 
these theories.  
2.2.1. Agency Theory 
The root of the traditional agency theory is based on the separation between the 
ownership and control of corporations, which illustrates the existence of firms. In 
1776, Adam Smith cited managers’ ability to waste firms resources; he was the first 
to suggest that firm assets would suffer at the hands of managers providing the 
separation of ownership and control. Following the study, Dodd et al. (1933) showed 
that managers tend to focus on their best interest rather than the shareholders’ interest. 
According to Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990), in June 1959, Simon Herbert state that 
managers might be “satisfiers” rather than “maximisers”. That is, they are not seeking 
ultimate growth, but rather play it safe and seek a reasonable amount of growth, having 
more concerned with maintaining their presence in the firm than maximising 
shareholder wealth. However, shareholders do appoint managers and delegate 
decision-making to them, assuming they will act in their best interest. 
Agency theory was developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) who looked at 
the contractual environment between firm stakeholders. In a contractual environment, 
they outlined the shareholders, debt holders and managers to be conflicting parties. 
The modern corporation is built based on the separation of ownership and control; 
thus, owners must appoint experts to undertake corporate matters on their hands. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) conceptualised this as “agency relationship”. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) defined the latter as an agreement where the principal(s) 
(shareholders) delegate firm decision making authority to the agent (managers) to act 
on their behalf. Given the modern corporation environment, as suggested by Dodd et 
al. (1933), managers are highly authorised where shareholders are relatively inactive 
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party towards corporate affairs. This setting boosts managerial control and their 
temptation to act in self-interest, scarifying shareholders interest, forming the agency 
problem (Jensen and Meckling 1976) 
The agency theory assumes non-existence in a well-developed market for 
corporate controls. Consequently, the study experiences the existence of market 
failures, non-existence of markets, moral hazards, asymmetric information, 
incomplete contracts and adverse selection, among others (see Bonazzi and Islam 
(2007). In the literature of financial corporate governance, the most effective 
mechanism for corporate control i.e.,(to influence managers to act in the best interest 
of shareholders) is a topic of significant concern (Allen and Gale 2000). Research 
studies promote different governance mechanisms, including monitoring by financial 
institutes, healthy market competition, executive compensation, debt, implementing 
an effective board of directors, markets for corporate control, and concentrated 
holdings (see Bonazzi and Islam (2007) However, increasing the board effectiveness 
continues to be a vital and practical option to improve corporate governance 
mechanisms.  
2.2.1.1. Agency theory and the role of board of directors 
In the attempt of mitigating agency issues, the corporate board of directors provides 
the primary corporate governance internal control mechanism to monitor managers. 
From the agency theory perspective, the board of directors is an “information system” 
used by principles to validate agents’ behaviour (Eisenhardt 1989). Agency theory 
labels the role of the board, including linking managers’ interests to those of 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Klein 1998). According to Garratt (1997) 
definition, the board of directors’ primary functions are: the mutual responsibilities 
of governing the company’s drives and “ethics”; forming firm strategies and plans; 
monitoring and control the CEO; and inform and make recommendations to 
shareholders. According to Muth and Donaldson (1998), in principle, the board are 
shareholders’ representatives in the firm. Studies like Adams and Ferreira (2007) and 
Raheja (2005) propose that boards take the two roles of monitoring and advising 
managers. Fama and Jensen (1983) propose that to meet firm efficiency, the board 
should act on employing competent managers, relinquish poor performers and set 
managerial incentives based on meeting firm strategy. 
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2.2.1.2. Agency theory and board composition 
The monitoring and advisory role of board of directors is to ensure firm decisions are 
taken based on shareholders’ interest. Fama (1980) proposed that the board 
composition is an important mechanism that ensures board maintain its role in 
providing guidance and direction. He argues that the existence of non-executive 
directors is an indicator of monitoring executive directors’ decision and ensuring 
executive directors pursue policy dependent on shareholders’ interest. Bonazzi and 
Islam (2007) argue that directors should approach discriminating questions with the 
independence of thoughts until they receive answers that they and other board 
members comprehend. Studies as to what determines better corporate governance 
show that the board of directors’ composition directly affects firm performance. 
However, there is no clear answer as to the type of directors ideal for serving 
shareholders’ interest and studies conclude mixed results. Previous research on 
directors’ type focuses on directors’ independence and board diversity (including 
gender, experience and background). Looking at directors’ independence, Weisbach 
(1988) documents a relationship between independent directors dominating boards 
and CEO turnover based on performance. Klein (2002) found that more independent 
board is associated with higher efficiency in CEO performing their monitoring role in 
the financial accounting process. Similarly, Jaggi et al. (2009) show that board 
independence ensures high-quality financial reporting. Bhagat and Bolton (2008) also 
show that board independence is associated with the probability of disciplinary 
management turnover. These studies suggest that board independence is associated 
with better board monitoring and thus improving firm decision-making and 
performance.  
In contrast, other studies challenged the conventional wisdom of board 
independence and improving monitoring. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) documented a 
negative relationship between the percentage of outside directors and firm 
performances for 800 firms in 1987. Bhagat and Black (2002) studied the first large-
sample, a long-horizon study of large American firms that found no relationship 
between board independence and measures of long-term performance. They, instead, 
explained that law-performance firm increases the independence of the board. Dalton 
et al. (1998), Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), De Andres et al. (2005) and Jackling 
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and Johl (2009) also found the percentage of outside directors to have no effect on 
firm performance or market value.  
Focusing on directors’ diversity, Beasley (1996) proposed that directors’ 
experience or occupation could affect directors’ ability to monitor CEO effectively. 
Similarly, Hillman and Dalziel (2003) argued that board capital (i.e. experience, 
expertise and reputation) affects board monitoring and provisioning of 
resources. Wang et al. (2015) found that industrial experience enhances independent 
directors’ ability to implement their monitoring role. Moreover, Gray and Nowland 
(2015) found that directors’ specialist business experience (i.e. lawyer, accountants, 
consultants bankers and independent CEOs) is associated with higher shareholders’ 
value. When studying market reaction to employing new financial experienced 
directors on board, DeFond et al. (2005) found a positive market reaction following 
appointment of financial-experts on the audit committee. Their results suggest that 
directors’ experience plays a significant role in improving corporate governance. On 
the other hand, Grace et al. (1995) studied Australian listed firms and found that 
despite most non-executive directors hold degrees, it appears unrelated to different 
financial performances.  
Agency theory is relevant to this study in several ways. First, given the 
separation of ownership and control between shareholders and managers, improving 
board of directors’ monitoring and advisory role through the appointment of financial-
experts on board might well affect board outcome in terms of reducing firm 
information asymmetry. This directly affects the firm information environment and, 
therefore, firm stock price synchronicity. Moreover, linking managers’ interest to the 
shareholder would also affect managerial financial-decisions related to firm cash 
holding and payout policy.  
2.2.2. Resource Dependency Theory 
Unlike the agency theory, the resource dependency theory is less well explored in prior 
literature. In addition to the board monitoring role, according to the theory, the board 
plays a significant role in providing resources (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). This 
perception was the central concept behind studies on the resource dependency (Pfeffer 
1972; Boyd 1990; Daily and Dalton 1994; Gales and Kesner 1994; Hillman et al. 2000; 
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Hillman and Dalziel 2003; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). Board provision resources role 
indicates the board ability to add resources to the firm (Hillman and Dalziel 2003). 
The theory concept was developed by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) work, which 
suggests that firms assign individuals to the board assuming they will always support 
the organisation, be concerned with its difficulties and always try to assist. 
According to the Oxford Dictionary, experience is “The knowledge or skill 
acquired by a period of practical experience of something, especially that gained in a 
particular profession”. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) outline two primary contributions 
from the board of directors to the firm: counsel/advice and legitimacy of firm image. 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) then added the role of being the means for communicating 
information between firms and external environment and the channel to access 
commitments or support from critical resources outside the firm. Thus, experience 
may allow directors to contribute to firm provision resources through sophisticated 
counsel/advice and more accurate information representing the firm image. The theory 
is directly related to the research as it questions the effect of directors’ financial 
experience on the firm information environment and decision making. 
2.2.3. Stewardship theory 
Stewardship theory is a theory that holds contrary perspective to the agency theory. 
Stewardship theory addresses the agent-principle relationship; however, it assumes 
that the relationship between managers (agent) and directors (principal) based on trust 
and collaboration (Donaldson 1990; Donaldson and Davis 1991, 1994). Davis et al. 
(1997) defined the Stewardship theory as “Maximising shareholder wealth through 
firm performance because by so doing, the steward’s utility functions are maximised”. 
From this concept, stewards, being firm executives’ directors and managers, work to 
protect and maximise shareholders’ wealth. The theory suggests that they can act on 
the sincerity of interest on their own. It argues that executives’ directors and managers 
integrate their goals as part of the organisation, and their satisfaction and incentive are 
based on organisation success (Donaldson and Davis 1991) Moreover, Daily et al. 
(2003) argue that managers and directors are inclined to protect their reputation as 
corporate decision-makers. Thus, they are motivated to work based on protecting 
shareholders interest. According to the theory, rather than monitoring managers’ 
performance, directors’ primary role is developing a firm strategy (Cornforth 2003).  
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In contrast to the agency theory, that drew the attention on directors’ 
monitoring role onto managers, stewardship theory embraces the non-existence of 
conflict of interest. Thus, the implications of stewardship theory to the current research 
are as following: if stewardship theory applies, corporate performance should not be 
affected by the difference in directors’ characteristics. Thus, experience of all types of 
directors should be equally affecting firm performance. However, not differentiating 
between directors could deviate results from the real effect on performance. 
2.3. Financial-experts serving on the board of directors 
Following recent demand from policymakers for more financial-experts on audit 
committee (e.g. SOX Act), the role of financial-experts on board attracts the attention 
of academics. This section discusses the main studies focusing on the principal role 
and the effects of financial-experts in firm monitoring and advisory role and the main 
determinants of directors’ financial experience in the literature. Moreover, this section 
outlines the way this thesis measured directors’ financial experience as this measure 
is applied in all three topics under investigation in this research effort.  
2.3.1. The role of financial-experts on board of directors  
Board composition is one of the primary topics when assessing a firm’s corporate 
governance. Following a recent increase in firm appointments of financial-expert 
directors, recent studies, have indeed, investigated the role of directors’ financial 
experience effectiveness. DeFond et al. (2005) studied the effect of the appointment 
of financial-experts on the audit committee in firm market value. Using accumulative 
abnormal return, they found a positive market reaction following the appointment of 
accounting financial-experts serving on board of directors. However, they report no 
significant reaction following non-accounting financial-experts and maintain that this 
is in line with the argument that accounting-based financial skills enhance the quality 
of firm financial reporting. Güner et al. (2008), on the other hand, empirically tested 
the extent to which financial-experts on the board effect corporate decisions on US 
public traded firms and found that not all financial-experts are beneficial to the board 
of directors. Specifically, many affiliated directors (commercial and investment 
bankers) do not act in shareholders’ best interest, rather, they act on their banks’ 
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interest. Other studies also link directors’ financial experience to risk-taking (Dionne 
and Triki 2005; Sun et al. 2014; Fernandes and Fich 2016; García-Sánchez et al. 2017) 
On the main determinants of the board financial experts, Jeanjean and Stolowy 
(2009) studied evidence of non-financial listed firms in France. On average, financial 
experience is found on firms with high board independence, high ownership 
concentration and high institutional ownership. According to Jeanjean and Stolowy 
(2009), these are in line with stronger boards characteristics. When studying firms’ 
board financial-experts’ advisory role free of potential conflict of interest, Huang et 
al. (2014) establish that financial-experts are able to identify better mergers and 
acquisition opportunities and reducing costs of the deals. 
 Regarding the interest in financial expertise in recent literature, studies on the 
dynamics of relationship between financial expertise on board and board effectiveness 
show mixed results. Following the recent rise in financial expertise on board of 
directors, it is essential to investigate how financial-experts serving on board of 
directors affect firm stock price synchronicity (a measurement of firm information 
environment well-being) and top management’s main financial decisions regarding 
cash holding and payout policy.  
2.3.2. Determinants of directors’ financial expertise 
According to the Oxford Online Dictionary definition, “experiences” is defined as 
“The knowledge or skill acquired by a period of practical experience of something, 
especially that gained in a particular profession”. Thus, the experience is weighted by 
the criteria conferring an individual’s ability to carry out a professional task. In the 
US, some guidance on how to determine financial expertise criteria on the board of 
directors was presented in the Blue-Ribbon Committee report and the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act. Not only in the US, but the Smith Committee Report also guides other countries, 
such as the UK and France, by the Vienot I and Vienot II and the Bouton Report.  
In France, because financial expertise on board is voluntary, the corporate 
governance “best practice”, the Vienot I report (1995) and Vienot II report (1999) did 
not refer to the board of directors’ financial experience of the board of directors. 
However, in the Bouton report (2002 p.12) financial experience was specifically 
mentioned once:  
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The member of the audit committee, in addition to their existing financial 
management and/or accounting experience, should upon appointment be 
informed about company-specific accounting, financial and operation features.  
Nevertheless, the report did not specify the way to identify financial experience.  
In the US, the Blue-Ribbon Committee (1999 p.25) the perception of 
accounting and/or related financial experience – where “experience” signifies as: 
past employment experience in finance or accounting, requesting professional 
certification in accounting or any other comparable experience or background 
with results in the individual’s financial sophisticated including being or 
having been a CEO or other senior officer with financial oversight 
responsibility.  
Moreover, in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (US Congress, 2002), the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) first describes the financial-expert directors as directors 
with prior experience in the SEC financial reporting, suggesting that directors with 
SEC financial reporting experience will be experts in public accounting, auditor, 
principal financial officer, principal accounting officer or controller (DeFond et al. 
2005). Facing criticism claiming that SEC definition of financial experience limits the 
pool of qualified directors, the SEC then added experience in “supervising” employees 
with financial reporting responsibilities, “overseeing” the performance of the 
companies and other relevant experience as a determinant of accounting experience. 
Although the SEC does not specify any job titles that under this broader definition are 
qualified, the definition is extended to include directors with prior experience as 
Company Presidents Chief and Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) (DeFond et al. 2005; 
Jeanjean and Stolowy 2009).  
Interestingly, previous studies measured financial expertise differently. Table 
2.1 provides an overview of how the financial experience was measured in the 
literature. The following section emphasises how this study measured directors’ 
financial expertise. 
2.3.3. Measuring directors’ financial experience 
Following previous discussion on how to determine financial experience, this study 
measures financial experience in two ways:  
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(1) Accounting financial experience: following Güner et al. (2008); Minton 
et al. (2014); Fernandes and Fich (2016), the study defines directors with financial 
expertise as those who have worked as a: (1) banking institution executive; (2) 
financial institution (non-bank) executive; (3) finance related position of non-financial 
firms (CFO, Accountant, Treasurer, Vice President for Finance. etc.); and (4) as a 
professional investor.  
(2) Non-accounting financial experience: following the SOX Act later added 
financial definition, the second measure includes all directors with (5) experience as 
either a CEO or President of profit corporations experience.  
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Table 2. 1 Measuring financial experience in the literature 
 
Author Topic  Sample size Way of measuring financial experience  Database 
 This research non-financial 
firms from the 
S&P 1500 
database from: 
1999-2017 
(1) accounting financial experience: following Güner et al. (2008); Minton et 
al. (2014); Fernandes and Fich (2016), the study defines directors with 
financial expertise as those who have worked as a: (a) banking institution 
executive; (b) financial institution (non-bank) executive; (c) finance related 
position of non-financial firms (CFO, Accountant, Treasurer, Vice President 
for Finance. etc.); and (d) as a professional investor.  
(2) non-accounting financial experience: following the SEC later added 
financial definition, the second measure includes all directors with (e) 
experience as either a CEO/President of profit corporations experience.  
BoardEx. 
(Fernandes 
and Fich 
2016) 
Are outside 
directors with 
greater board 
tenure valuable? 
Evidence from 
the last credit 
crisis 
479 publicly 
traded US 
banks from:  
2002-2008 
Use three different proxies following; 
(1) DeFond et al. (2005), (2) Hau and Thum (2009) and (3) Güner et al. (2008)6 
BoardEx and director bio-
sketch data disclosed by each 
bank to the SEC in form 14-
DEF. 
Also, corporate annual 
report, alumni website, and 
publication issued by various 
charitable foundation. 
 
6 The three methods are further explained down in this table.   
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(Minton et 
al. 2014) 
Financial 
Expertise of the 
Board, Risk 
Taking, and 
Performance: 
Evidence from 
Bank Holding 
Companies 
 
all US banks 
along with 
specialty 
and other 
finance firms. 
(around 150 
firm)  
from: 
 2003-2008 
Classify an independent director as a financial expert if he or she (1) has 
worked within a banking institution, or (2) currently works at a non-bank 
financial institution, or (3) has a finance-related role within a non-financial 
firm (e.g. CFO, accountant, treasurer, or VP finance), or (4) academic 
institution (e.g. professor in finance, accounting, economics or business), or (5) 
is a professional investor (e.g. hedge fund, private equity). 
 
BoardEx. 
(Jeanjean 
and 
Stolowy 
2009) 
Determinants of 
board financial 
expertise – 
Empirical 
Evidence from 
France  
Sample of 95 
non-financial 
French listed 
firms.  
-Educational Background: (1) Qualification in management education 
(University or Business school degrees, MBAs, CPA qualification etc.). 
-Career History: (1) Chief Financial Officer, or (2) Chief Accounting Officer, or 
(3) Management controller, or (4) External auditor, or (5) member of financial 
state agency, or (6) Banker, or (7) Business lawyer, or (8) Other financial 
functions (investment advisor, accounting or financial academic, political 
function in the field of accounting, etc.). 
Financial experience was measured by coding the experience as following; 1 for 
financial educating, 2 for financial experience and 3 for financial education and 
financial experience. 
Annual reports 
Who’s who 
Factive 
Internet 
Diane 
(Fernandes 
and Fich 
2009) 
Does Financial 
Experience Help 
Banks During 
Credit Crises?” 
398 US banks 
from:  
2006-2007  
 
Financial expertise of the board as the average number of years of banking 
experience among board directors. As a robustness test the financial experience 
was measured by the average number of years of serving the financial industry 
among board directors. 
BoardEx.  
 
(Hau and 
Thum 
2009) 
Subprime Crisis 
and Board (In-) 
Competence: 
Private vs. 
Public Banks in 
Germany. 
 
29 largest 
German 
banks 
from:  
2007-2008 
Financial experience was defined by; 
(1) Banking Experience, or (2) Financial market experience. previous 
occupation related to asset market trading or investment.  
publicly available sources 
(the annual statements and the 
web sites of the banks) 
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(Güner et 
al. 2008) 
Financial 
Expertise of 
Directors 
 
largest US 
publicly 
companies 
traded 
companies 
exclude 
financial firms. 
(282 firms). 
 from: 
1988-2001 
 
Outside directors were categorised by their previous experience as; (1) 
commercial bank executive. (2) investment bank executive. (3) executive of a 
nonbank financial institution. (4) finance executive (CFO, Accountant, 
Treasurer, or Vice President for Finance). (5) “finance” professor (i.e., finance, 
economics, accounting, and business). (6) consultant. (7) lawyer. (8) executive 
of a non-financial firm that falls outside these groups. (9) non-corporate worker 
(including careers in academia, non-profit or civil activist organizations, and 
politics). 
hand-collect biographical 
information on all board 
members of these companies 
using annual proxy 
statements (1988−1997) and 
the IRRC database 
(1998−2001). 
 
(DeFond et 
al. 2005) 
Does the Market 
Value Financial 
Expertise on 
Audit 
Committees of 
Boards of 
Directors? 
 
592 US 
corporations 
 firm  
From: 
1993-2002 
 
 
Following the final version of SOX Financial Expert definition– All directors 
who are financial-experts are categorised into one of the following two 
categories: 
a) Accounting Financial Expert – Inferred from the suggestions included in 
the early version of SOX proposed by the SEC – All directors with experience 
as a public accountant, auditor, principal or chief financial officer, controller, 
or principal or chief accounting officer. 
b) Non-Accounting Financial Expert – Based upon the final version of SOX 
drafted by the SEC – All directors with experience as the chief executive 
officer or president of a for-profit corporation.  
Corporate Library database 
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2.4. Board of directors and stock price synchronicity 
In an efficient market, share prices incorporate and reflect all information related to a 
firm. It assumes that all market participants share the same information and the cost 
of production and gathering this information in the market is relatively low. However, 
as Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue, firm-specific information is costly and 
investors will only expand resources spent on acquiring information if they believe 
that the benefit will outweigh the cost. Roll (1988) argues that the extent to which 
stock prices move in the same direction is related to the fraction of firm-specific 
information to market and industry-wide information embedded in the price.  
Under the price synchronicity topic, Roll (1988) was the first to look into the 
value from asset pricing regressions investigated across corporations. He considered 
the reasons underpinning low price synchronicity and whether it is caused by private 
information or as a result of other pricing errors. He concluded that higher levels of 
firm-specific information in the market result in lower stock price synchronicity.  
Following the Roll (1988) findings, studies widely researched the topic of 
stock price synchronicity in the financial and economic literature, on a country- and 
firm-wide level. For instance, at the country level, Morck et al. (2000) found that stock 
price synchronicity is higher in emerging markets than in developed markets. They 
note that the main reason behind high market synchronicity in emerging markets is 
due to lack of shareholder protection. Morck et al. (2000) findings were later 
confirmed by studies by Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) and Kim and Shi (2010). 
Moreover, Beny (2005) added that countries adopting laws which prohibit insider 
trading have more asynchronous share returns, stating that shares are more informative 
when strict insider trading laws are adopted. Also, according to Bushman et al. (2004), 
more significant firm-specific return variations were spotted in countries with more 
open media and developed financial analysis industries compared to countries with a 
constrained media and a less developed financial analysis industry. Shi and Kim 
(2007), find that enhancing disclosure through the adoption of IFRS would encourage 
informed traders to trade based on private information, which would increase the price 
informativeness and thus reduce stock price synchronicity. Other studies also show 
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that low stock price synchronicity is related to better capital market governance 
(Daouk et al. 2006) and better country transparency (Jin and Myers 2006).  
Examining stock price synchronicity at a firm level, Piotroski and Roulstone 
(2004) study on the US market investigates the effect of the three most informed 
market participants on the amount of firm-specific, market-level and industry-level 
information available in the market. Their results indicate a positive relationship 
between investors’ activities and stock price synchronicity as a result of increasing 
industry-wide information in the market. They also find that insider trading and the 
presence of institutional investors increase the share price informativeness, decreasing 
the firm’s stock price synchronicity. Other studies also link stock price synchronicity 
to ownership concentration, foreign shareholders (Gul et al. 2010), large controlling 
shareholders (Boubaker et al. 2014) and corporate investment efficiency (Durnev et 
al. 2004). 
Song (2015) investigates the relationship between accounting disclosure 
policies and the level of firm stock price synchronicity. She finds a negative 
relationship between superior accounting disclosure policies and shares price 
synchronicity. Haggard et al. (2008) studied the effect of voluntary disclosure on the 
level of stock price informativeness. They found that increasing firms’ voluntary 
disclosure enhances the amount of firm-specific information embedded in the price. 
However, Dasgupta et al. (2010) argue that when firm transparency improves 
information flow about a future event, future synchronicity will rise, as when the 
“future event” actually occurs, shareholders are not expecting any surprises, 
concluding that more transparency today results in high synchronicity in the future. 
Gul et al. (2010) found that improving audit quality has a positive effect on reducing 
firm stock price synchronicity.  
Recent studies document the role of the board of directors’ composition, 
improving firm informational environment. Vafeas (2000) examined the firm earning 
informativeness and found that earnings of firms with small boards (with a minimum 
of five directors) are seen as being more informed by market participants, consistent 
with Ahmed et al. (2006) study which focused on the level of public released-
information and found that firm board size is inversely related to firm earnings 
information. Other studies, such as Firth et al. (2007), found the board of directors’ 
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independence effect earning informativeness in respect of the earnings’ response 
coefficients and discretionary accruals in China-listed companies, contrary to Ferreira 
et al. (2011) study which found a negative relationship between board independence 
and price informativeness. Moreover, Ahmed et al. (2006) and Vafeas (2000) found 
that board independence does not affect firm earnings’ informativeness. Their results 
are consistent with the argument that board monitoring and information environment 
are a substitute. 
Studies on board of directors’ composition effect on firm information-
environment show mixed results and the dynamics of relationship are vague. Previous 
studies on board financial-experience show financial-experts’ ability to improve firm 
disclosed information. Felo and Solieri (2009) study directors on audit committee 
financial experience and found that independent financial-experts improve the quality 
of firm financial disclosure. On the other hand, Carcello et al. (2006a) focused on firm 
earning management and found that independent financial-experts on the audit 
committee are the most effective in mitigating earning management. Huang and 
Thiruvadi (2010) study financial-experts’ effect on corporate fraud and found that 
financial-experts on audit committee are significantly associated with fraud 
prevention. Their results suggest the financial-experts play a significant role in firm 
corporate governance practices and financial reporting.   
Following previous literature on the role of financial-experts in improving firm 
information environment, mainly focusing on financial-experts on the audit 
committee, and as the appointment of financial-experts on board has increased in 
recent years, there is a gap in the literature on the effect of financial-expert directors. 
This study looks empirically into the directors’ financial experience effect on firm 
stock price informativeness, measured by firm stock price synchronicity.  
2.5. Board of directors and cash holding 
Several theoretical perspectives aim to explain corporate cash holding, namely the 
pecking order theory, the trade-off theory and the free cash flow theory. Emerging 
from Myers and Majluf (1984) study, pecking order theory (or financial hierarchy 
theory) of financing argues that firm internal financing is the least costly and more 
preferred choice of financing. The availability of internal funds limits firm exposure 
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to the capital market, which is largely implicated in transaction costs and asymmetric 
information problem. According to the theory, firms follow a strict pattern which relies 
on financing investments through retained earnings, rather than debt or equity (Al‐
Najjar and Belghitar 2011). As firms’ cash holding changes with firm performance, 
the theory assumes the non-existence of optimal level of cash (Opler et al. 1999). 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2003) studied cross-countries corporate governance (more 
than 45 countries) and found that countries with low shareholder protection hold a 
substantial amount of cash in comparison to firms located in countries with reliable 
shareholder protection. 
Contrary to the prediction of pecking order theory, the trade-off theory 
proposes the idea of a unique optimal level of capital structure, using a cost-benefit 
analysis, for firm value-maximisation objective (Kraus and Litzenberger 1973).The 
marginal benefit arising from holding cash is because cash holding firms can limit the 
firm financial cost rising from relying on external funding or liquidating firm assets. 
Moreover, cash holding prevents firms from going into financial distress, leading to 
bankruptcy. In contrast, the marginal cost of holding cash arises from the opportunity 
cost due to precautionary reasons for cash holding (Opler et al. 1999). 
The trade-off theory and the pecking order theory assume no agency conflict 
of interest between shareholders and managers. As a result, Jensen (1986) and Stulz 
(1990) developed the free cash hypothesis, claiming that substantial amount of cash 
holding leads to enchanted managers raising the agency conflict of interest between 
shareholders and cash holders. With excess cash in hands, managers avoid external 
financing to escape capital market monitoring and thus, investment decisions might 
not be in line with shareholders’ interest. To mitigate the agency problem between 
shareholders and managers, shareholders prefer to minimise managers’ access to free 
cash flow. The main trade-off in these two studies is offering enough free cash flow 
for firms to invest in all positive net present values investments and not enough for 
management misuses. Internal control mechanism drives self-interested managers to 
deploy cash reserves in the interest of shareholders. The theory suggests that strong 
corporate governance encourages the distribution of free cash to shareholders to limit 
the amount of free cash flow available to managers (Jensen 1986; Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith 2003). 
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Following leading studies on the optimal level of firm cash holding by Kim et 
al. (1998) and Opler et al. (1999), many other studies have been conducted on the main 
determinants of firm cash holding policy. Decisions on the amount of access cash 
should be held and uses of the excess of cash are made by firm top-management, 
consistent with either the firm objectives or private aims. Managing cash holding has 
a direct implication for investors (such as dividend payments and investments 
opportunities). Thus, it is in the best interest of shareholders that the firm’s governance 
is put in place to ensure managers’ behaviour towards firm cash holding serves 
shareholders’ interest rather than managers’ intentions. According to agency theory, 
the firm’s corporate governance plays a significant role in firm cash management. 
When investigating the determinant of cash holding in the Europe, Ferreira and Vilela 
(2004) found that firms located in countries with a highly developed capital market, 
and high shareholder protection, retained less cash. Moreover, Harford et al. (2008) 
focussed on the effect of corporate governance on cash holding in the US and found 
that cash-rich firms with weak corporate governance choose to spend cash quickly on 
non-profitable acquisition and capital expenditure. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) 
emphasised on the importance of enhancing corporate governance structures to control 
managers’ misuse of cash holding; thus, enhancing the contribution of excess cash to 
firm value.  
The role of the board of directors is one of the increasingly vital issues in 
effecting managerial incentives (see Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) for a 
comprehensive survey). A widely known interpretation in the literature is that 
composition of the board of directors affects the level of association between managers 
and shareholders’ interest. Board of directors’ composition plays a significant role in 
decisions related to corporate cash policy. For example, Boubaker et al. (2015) show 
the direct effect of board independence and CEO duality on firm cash holding. Other 
studies document a relationship between board composition (e.g. board size, 
independence, gender diversity and CEO duality) and firm cash holding and 
emphasise the role of more effective board structure as a disciplinary mechanism on 
firm cash management (Kusnadi 2003; Drobetz and Grüninger 2007; Chen 2008; 
Isshaq et al. 2009; Gill and Shah 2012; Al-Najjar and Clark 2017; Atif et al. 2019; 
Hassanein and Kokel 2019). Considering the extensive research into board 
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demography on firm cash holding, to the researcher’s knowledge there are no studies 
yet into the effect of board financial experience on firm cash holding. 
Previous studies show financial-expert’ directors’ ability to improve board 
monitoring role (Xie et al. 2003; Abbott et al. 2004; Agrawal and Chadha 2005). 
Improving monitoring reduces the information asymmetry problem between 
shareholder and managers. Arguably, this would ease borrowing constraints, 
increasing the firm ability to raise money externally (Ozkan and Ozkan 2004), which 
suggests a negative relationship between board financial experience and firm cash 
holding. Moreover, according to the agency theory, improved board monitoring role 
over managers gives shareholders more power over managers, mitigating managers’ 
incentive to retain more cash. On the other hand, improving board efficiency can 
provide shareholders with better protection. According to Opler et al. (1999), 
consistent with the financial hierarchy hypothesis, with strong shareholder protection, 
shareholders would be more willing to ease restrictions on managers allowing them to 
retain more cash. This suggests that, as financial-expert directors improve board 
efficiency, financial-expert directors have a positive effect on firm cash holding. 
Regarding the conflicting view on corporate governance effect on firm cash holding, 
this study sheds light on the effect of financial-expert directors’ effectiveness on the 
level of firm cash holding.  
2.6. Payout policy 
Since Miller and Modigliani (1961) established their famous “irrelevance of dividend” 
theory, arguing that firm dividend policy is irrelevant to its stock price, dividend policy 
has become an intriguing topic among researchers. However, Miller and Modigliani’s 
theory is based on the assumption of; (1) perfect capital market, (2) investors’ rational 
behaviour, (3) no existence of tax or transaction cost and (4) perfect certainty of the 
firm future investment policy and market price. Miller and Modigliani argue that share 
price is mainly determined by the firm earnings and investment decisions, rather than 
their dividend payments and policies. Under the assumption of perfect capital market, 
firms with fixed investment policy, the firm dividend policy will only disturb the 
amount of capital needed to be raised for new investments. According to Miller and 
Modigliani’s conclusion, firm investment policy is the main determinant of a firm 
share price and profitability. From the investors’ perspective, they argue that firm 
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dividend policy is irrelevant. Investors can generate self-made dividend from the 
change in firm share prices by selling shares. 
Since Miller and Modigliani’s theory, researchers have attempted to relax their 
assumptions by proving several market imperfections. In reality, a substantial market 
imperfection is that firms and investors are required to pay income tax and transaction 
cost. Thus, firm cost of equity is affected by their dividend policy due to taxation and 
transaction cost. Moreover, the perfect market condition requires symmetric 
information and aligned interest between investors and managers, which rarely exist 
in the capital market. Thus, Miller and Modigliani’s conclusion cannot hold in the real 
world (Lease et al. 1999). 
Interestingly, many theories followed Miller and Modigliani’s theory in 
attempt to explain the determinants of the firm dividend policy. More relevant to the 
study are the signalling theory and agency theory. The following section summarises 
these theories.  
2.7. Payout policy explanations 
The principal determination of firm payout policy has constituted a leading interest in 
corporate and finance literature. Studies were based on two primary theories: the 
signalling theory and the agency theory. The following sections overview these 
theories highlighted in prior literature.   
2.7.1.1. Payout policy and signalling theory 
Signalling theory considers issues related to information asymmetry between firm 
outsiders and insiders. Managers are considered to have more information about future 
perception. Thus, any dissension made by the firm managers is a sign to investors on 
private information. Accordingly, investors regard any change in the firm dividend 
policy as a sign on the firm’s financial wellbeing (Frankfurter and Wood Jr 2002). It 
is frequently debated that share price of a firm drops following the announcement of 
dividend payout cut. The announcement of dividend decrease causes negative security 
returns, where the announcement of dividend increase causes positive security returns.  
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 Meanwhile, researchers such as Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams 
(1985) and Miller and Rock (1985) developed the dividend signalling theory classic-
models. Bhattacharya (1979) conducted one of the first studies to introduce a dividend 
signalling model under the assumption that a firm’s managers hold more information 
about the firm’s profitability than outside investors and that managers’ can transfer 
private information to the capital market through abnormal cash dividend 
announcement. According to Bhattacharya (1979), in the case of firms making a profit 
on their projects, the dividend can be realised based on their realised earnings. 
However, when firms have a loss on their projects, a dividend can only be paid through 
external finance bearing the transaction costs. Thus, the only justification for firms to 
pay high dividend is when managers predict firms’ future high profitability. 
Following Bhattacharya (1979) study, John and Williams (1985) and Miller 
and Rock (1985) developed Bhattacharya signalling model and reached similar 
conclusions. They concluded that when managers believe that firm market value does 
not show genuine reflection on the firm intrinsic value, they have the incentive to 
signal private information to outside investors through the payments of dividend. 
Following these studies, many studies’ results have accorded with the dividend 
signalling theory, concluding dividend payments directly affect firm market value 
(Aharony and Swary 1980; Asquith and Mullins Jr 1986; Healy and Palepu 1988; 
Aharony and Dotan 1994; Bernheim and Wantz 1995; Michaely et al. 1995; Brook et 
al. 1998; Travlos et al. 2001; Bali 2003; Salih 2010; Dasilas and Leventis 2011). 
On the other hand, studying Japanese firms, Dewenter and Warther (1998) 
study shows that dividend signalling power has limited effect when compared to US 
firms. They argue that the Japanese firms are caused to experience less information 
asymmetry, considering their difference in corporate governance mechanism and 
ownership structure. Empirical evidence addressed the question of whether the change 
in dividend payment allows the market to predict future earnings show conflicting 
results. For example, studies undertaken by Watts (1973), Gonedes (1978), Penman 
(1983), DeAngelo et al. (1996) and Benartzi et al. (1997) show that dividend is not the 
best instruments to predict future earnings. Watts (1973) found that across firms, the 
average estimated coefficients of current dividends, when regressing with the 
following year earnings, to be positive. However, the average level of significance 
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was minimum. Gonedes (1978) and Penman (1983) reported similar results. However, 
when focussing on the relationship between dividend changes and firms future 
earnings, Benartzi et al. (1997) findings support those of Watts (1973), however, they 
did not find evidence that change in current dividend payment can predict the change 
in future earnings, similarly to the findings of DeAngelo et al. (1996).  
Challenging Watts’s earlier conclusions, Laub (1976) proposed that dividends 
transport information related to firm future earning beyond those predicted by 
historical earnings. Pettit (1972) study reported similar results. Moreover, according 
to Grullon et al. (2005), after controlling for the well-known nonlinear patterns in the 
performance of earnings, dividend changes did not convey information about future 
earnings changes. Although Nissim and Ziv (2001) documented a positive relationship 
between dividend changes and earning changes, the results were only for when 
dividend payments increase. After controlling for current and expected profitability, 
they concluded no relationship exists between dividend payment decreases and future 
profitability. They argue that accounting conservatism could be the result of these 
findings. 
Evidence on the signalling hypothesis also seems stronger when testing the 
reaction of firm market value to dividend announcement. However, the results are 
weak for studies testing the hypothesis that dividend payments are used to convey 
information regarding future earnings. Signalling theory is based on the idea that 
managers release dividend to transfer information regarding firm future performance; 
the agency theory concept of dividend contradicts this hypothesis, arguing that 
managers may have different incentives to hold dividend, rather than paying, and 
therefore, need to be governed to pay the appropriate amount of dividend.  
2.7.1.2. Dividend policy and agency theory 
One of the assumptions of Miller and Modigliani (1961) on the perfect capital-market 
is that managers and investors share the same objectives. However, this assumption 
does not hold in the real world, where ownership of the firm is separate from its 
management. Since the separation of ownership and control causes information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders, modern organisation managers are always 
considered to be inadequate agents of investors. Managers will conduct activities that 
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are not necessarily profitable to investors but are managerially rewarding. Thus, 
investors need to monitor managers’ activities and, hence, bear the agency cost.  
As a way to mitigate the shareholder managers’ conflict of interest, dividend 
payments are used as a tool to reduce the free cash flow available to managers, forcing 
them to seek external financing and thus making them liable to capital suppliers 
(Rozeff 1982; Easterbrook 1984; Lloyd et al. 1985; Jensen 1986; Crutchley and 
Hansen 1989; Dempsey and Laber 1992; Glen et al. 1995; Saxena 1999; Farinha 
2003). La Porta et al. (2000) documented that firms pay more dividend in countries 
where there is better protection against minority shareholders. Another source of 
agency cost that could be mitigated by the dividend policy is the conflict of interest 
between shareholders and debtholders. In this case, bondholders are considered the 
principals, where shareholders are the agents of bondholders’ funds. Thus, extra 
dividend payments to shareholders may be considered bondholders’ wealth transforms 
to shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Shareholders have access to the firm 
funds before bondholders; thus, for the bondholder, it is necessary to minimise 
dividend payments to shareholders (John and Kalay 1982; Ang 1987). 
Firm management has the task of making the daily decision that affects firm 
future earnings. Managers might not always pursue the shareholders’ interest when 
adopting a dividend policy (Pucheta-Martínez and Bel-Oms 2015). In a situation 
where the agency problem arises, owners would be sceptical about firm free cash flow 
abuses (Krafft et al. 2013). Jensen (1986) documented how the distribution of dividend 
reduces the amount of free cash flow in manager’s hand, preventing the misuse of 
cash. Hence, this prevents firms from taking unprofitable projects and eases their 
agency cost. Easterbrook (1984) theorised that dividend payments would force 
managers to raise funds through the capital market. Consequently, professional 
investors (e.g. banks and financial analysists) will act as monitors over managers’ 
activities. In this case, shareholders can monitor managers’ behaviour at low 
monitoring cost. It proposes that managers’ monitoring can be increased through 
dividend payments and, hence, reduces managers’ acting based on their interest. 
Conversely, Easterbrook (1984) argues that high dividend payments could provoke 
managers to increase firm leverage and, hence, raise the level of firm riskiness.  
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According to Jensen (1986) and Farinha (2003), dividend payout is affected 
by firm agency cost. They argue that to mitigate firm agency cost, firms offer to pay 
more dividend to shareholders. Following literature built on the agency theory, studies 
focused on the role corporate governance mechanism on firm payout policy and, more 
importantly. study the impact of the board of directors’ composition effectiveness 
(Belden et al. 2005; Sharma 2011; Wellalage et al. 2012).  
2.8. Board of directors and payout policy 
Board of directors play a pivotal role in firms’ corporate governance mechanisms and 
monitoring top-management decisions. After all, a firm’s payout policy is a major 
decision made by top-management. According to Bhattacharya (1979) signalling 
theory, managers hold more information about firm future earnings than shareholders 
and aim to signal information to shareholders through their dividend policy 
(Bhattacharya 1980; Healy and Palepu 1988; Gugler 2003). Sudden changes in firm 
payout policies are exercised to ease the information asymmetry problem between 
managers and shareholders (Frankfurter and Wood Jr 2002). However, under the 
agency theory perspective, firm dividend payments are used as an essential controlling 
mechanism to mitigate firm agency cost (Jensen 1986; Fenn and Liang 2001; Byoun 
et al. 2016). As a result of the separation of control, shareholders prefer dividend 
payments to retained earnings to avoid management misuse of excess cash (Rozeff 
1982).  
Baker (2009) argues that the variation in the agency problem setting affects 
shareholders’ expectations of dividend payments. There are two conflicting views, 
grounded on the agency theory, explaining the relationship between firm corporate 
governance and payout decisions: the outcome view and the substitute view. The 
outcome view highlights the managers’ incentives to retain more cash to serve their 
own interests and emphasises the role of strong governance to induce dividend 
payments (Jensen 1986; La Porta et al. 2000). Moreover, Adjaoud and Ben‐Amar 
(2010) studied the relationship between corporate governance quality and firm 
dividend payments and found that strongly governed firms have a high dividend 
payment. Other studies also support the outcome view (Mitton 2004; Kumar 2006; 
Adjaoud and Ben‐Amar 2010; Jiraporn et al. 2011).  
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Contradicting the outcome view, La Porta et al. (2000) report that there is an 
inverse association between shareholder protection and dividend payments (substitute 
view). This argument is based on firms establishing a reputation in the market of not 
exploiting shareholders. The need for firms to establish reputation is higher for firms 
with weak shareholder protection. A follow up study by Jiraporn and Ning (2006) 
investigating the relationship between shareholders’ right and dividend policy, found 
that firms with weak shareholders’ right pay more dividend. Based on the argument 
that dividends are used as a substitute for shareholder rights, several studies report 
results are consistent with this argument (Jiraporn and Ning 2006; Chae et al. 2009; 
Jo and Pan 2009; Setiawan and Kee Phua 2013).  
Both board composition and payout policy are mechanisms used to mitigate 
conflict of interest between managers and shareholders; therefore, extent literature 
argues on the relationship between the two mechanisms. Using board of directors as a 
monitoring mechanism, studies shows a strong relationship between the firm board of 
directors’ composition and firm payout policy (Schellenger et al. 1989; Abdelsalam et 
al. 2008; Adjaoud and Ben‐Amar 2010). Hu and Kumar (2004) found a positive 
association between firm board independence and dividend payout. Other studies have 
also confirmed board independence role in enhancing firm divided policy (Setia-
Atmaja 2010; Sharma 2011). Moreover recent studies have also examined the effect 
of board diversity on dividend payment and find that a diversified board improves 
board monitoring and increases firm dividend payment (Pucheta-Martínez and Bel-
Oms 2015; Byoun et al. 2016; Al-Rahahleh 2017; Chen et al. 2017).  
Previous studies on the role of board composition on payout policy mainly 
focus on board independence, board size, CEO duality and board diversity. Extant 
literature also argues that financial-experts on board serve by improving board 
monitoring and advisory role, giving their higher expertise in monitoring firm 
financial information and playing an important role in providing effective advice by 
giving their higher expertise in monitoring firm financial information and reporting 
quality. However, considering the conflicting views on how corporate governance 
affects payout policy (outcome vs substitute), the relationship between financial-
experts and firm payout policies still remains unclear. For this reason, the final theme 
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of this study explicitly focusses on the relationship between financial experience of 
directors on the board and firm payout policy. 
2.9. Conclusion 
This chapter focussed on describing the relevant literature relating to the role of board 
of directors, stock price synchronicity, cash holding and payout policy. In summary, 
board of directors has the highest authority in the firm governance system, thus they 
play a significant role in establishing the firm policies and in decision-making. Many 
theories attempt to explain the main role of board of directors on board including the 
agency theory, resource dependency theory and stewardship theory. From previous 
literature, the board of directors performs the two leading roles of monitoring and 
advising managers, emphasising board of directors’ composition role in board of 
directors’ effectiveness. Following a recent regulation demand for more financial 
experts on board and the increase in firm appointment of financial-expert directors, 
recent studies investigate the role of directors’ financial experience effectiveness. This 
study investigates how financial-experts on the board affects firm stock price 
synchronicity, measuring stock price informativeness, and top management main 
financial decisions regarding cash holding and payout policy.  
The level of firm-specific information embedded in the share price is affected 
by a wide range of variables. It can be argued that financially sophisticated boards 
could affect stock price synchronicity by increasing the monitoring effectiveness over 
managers, which makes them more transparent and/or by changing the nature and 
dynamics of the board, which makes board members pay more attention to the quality 
of information reported. Moreover, enhancing board monitoring and advisory role 
through the increase of board financial expertise would also affect firm key financial 
decisions. Firm decisions on the level of cash holding and payout policy are one of the 
major decisions taken by managers and supervised by board of directors. Previous 
literature proved the direct influence a board of director composition has, as a 
monitoring mechanism, on enhancing firm financial decision making. Thus, this study 
also examines the effect financial expiries have on managers’ behaviour towards firm 
cash holding and payout policy. The next chapter, however, provides a comprehensive 
examination and discussion of the financial expertise of directors and their effect on 
stock price synchronicity.  
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Chapter 3: Examining financial expertise on board of 
directors and stock price synchronicity  
3.1. Introduction  
Following the accounting scandals of Enron and WorldCom in the early 2000s, the 
role of information transparency in preventing financial manipulation and frauds was 
debated. Consequently, to restoring public confidence, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
was enacted in 2003, ensuring that corporate boards have a sufficient number of 
directors who understand “ … generally accepted accounting principles and financial 
statements … ” and thus have the competence in protecting shareholder interests.7 
Despite a plethora of studies examining the link between directors’ financial 
experience and accounting manipulation (see, e.g. Xie et al. (2003); Abbott et al. 
(2004); Agrawal and Chadha (2005); Güner et al. (2008)), the question of whether 
such financial directors are conducive to enhancing the firm’s information 
environment remains unclear. This chapter fills this gap by examining the information 
content of firm stock prices.  
Arguably, directors with financial expertise could enhance a firm’s 
information environment through better and efficient monitoring. As delegated 
monitors, it falls within the remit of directors to review the firm’s financial statements, 
audit process, and internal control mechanisms, and such tasks often require a certain 
degree of financial knowledge. Compared to non-experts, financial-expert directors 
are in a better position to monitor management because their prior experience allows 
them to acquire financial information at lower costs and to process such information 
with relative ease (Harris and Raviv 2008). Prior evidence also shows that directors 
who have had experience working in the financial industries are likely to be more 
competitive and have better skillsets, suggesting that financial experience is likely to 
 
7 For the definition of audit committee financial expertise, please refer to Section 407 of the Sarbanes-
Oxley (2002) Act. This stipulates that “each issuer (...) to disclose whether or not, and if not, the 
reason therefore, the audit committee of that issuer is comprised of at least 1 member who is financial 
expert”. Similarly, all major stock exchanges have introduced listing requirements on director 
financial literacy. Please also see the survey by Jensen et al. (2004), e.g. recommendation R-36. 
Moreover, in the UK, the Smith Committee report (2003) recommends financial expertise on 
corporate boards and proposes that “at least one member of the audit committee should have 
significant, recent and relevant financial experience”.  
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be indicative of their superior technical abilities (Klein 2002). As such, boards that 
have more financial-expert directors, and thus are better-informed, could possibly 
function more effectively than other boards in deterring managerial information 
hoarding and/or accounting manipulations, which in turn facilitates a better 
information environment. 
Financial-expert directors also enhance information environment through their 
advisory role. As pointed out by Adams and Ferreira (2007), directors tend to consume 
a greater portion of their time in serving the firm in their advisory capacity than their 
monitoring role, such as giving advice on the firm’s investment decisions. To facilitate 
an effective advisory function, the board must ensure that financial information is 
accurate and timely to ascertain that directors are well informed about the costs and 
benefits of existing and future projects. Because financial-expert directors process 
financial information with lower costs, rely more on such information to support their 
advisory function, and are shown to be better advisors,8 it can be argued that boards 
with more financial-expert directors sense a greater need to enhance information 
quality and, as a result, expend more resources and effort in fostering a better 
information environment. 
 To test the study hypotheses, this chapter measures the quality of the firm’s 
information environment by the amount of firm-specific information embedded in its 
stock prices. The rationale is that when the firm’s information environment improves, 
its stock prices will incorporate greater variation in firm-specific factors and thus 
synchronise less with market factors (Roll 1988). A growing body of empirical studies 
have confirmed that stock price informativeness improves with the quality of 
corporate disclosure (Shi and Kim 2007; Haggard et al. 2008; Kim and Shi 2010; Song 
2015) and informational transparency (Jin and Myers 2006). Following extant 
literature (Morck et al. 2000; Piotroski and Roulstone 2004; Gul et al. 2010; Gul et al. 
2011; Xu et al. 2013; Boubaker et al. 2014), this study estimates an expanded market 
model and employs the logistic-transformed R2 to capture stock price synchronicity. 
 
8 Prior studies show that financial-expert directors give better advice, such as in identifying Mergers 
and Acquisition (M&A) opportunities, balancing the cost and benefits of merger deals Huang, Q. et 
al. 2014. The role of investment banker directors in M&A. Journal of Financial Economics 112(2), 
pp. 269-286., and rendering better corporate risk hedging decisions Dionne, G. and Triki, T. 2005. 
Risk management and corporate governance: The importance of independence and financial 
knowledge for the board and the audit committee. Available at SSRN 686470. 
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A higher synchronicity reflects less firm-specific information in stock prices, or a 
lower information environment. 
Using a sample of 1,078 US publicly listed firms over the period from 1999 to 
2016, the study examines the relation between the fraction of financial-expert directors 
on corporate boards and their stock price synchronicity. Following prior studies (see, 
e.g., Güner et al. (2008); Minton et al. (2014); Fernandes and Fich (2016), financial-
expert directors are defined as those who (1) have prior experiences as executives in 
banking and financial institutions, finance-related positions in nonfinancial firms, or 
professional investors (henceforth, “accounting financial directors”) and (2) those 
who have non-accounting positions supervising the financial reporting functions, such 
as Presidents and CEOs (henceforth, “non-accounting financial directors”). The study 
tests reveal that the fraction of accounting financial directors is negatively and 
significantly associated with stock price synchronicity, suggestive of better 
information environment. However, the study finds little evidence of a significant 
association of the fraction non-accounting financial directors with stock price 
synchronicity. 
A potential concern arising from the overview discussed earlier in chapter two 
noted that the relation between board financial expertise and stock price synchronicity 
could be endogenous. For example, the study estimates could be biased if omitted 
variables that affect the fraction of financial-expert directors on board of directors and 
stock price informativeness are present. The study’s results would also be subject to 
the reverse causality concern if firms with superior information environment are more 
appealing and able to recruit directors with better qualifications and financial 
experience. To address these concerns, this chapter exploits the plausibly exogenous 
increase in the fraction of financial-expert directors on boards brought by the 2003 
NYSE and NASDAQ listing rules, mandating that boards without majority 
independence must appoint new independent directors. Since boards without 
financial-expert directors prior to the enactment are more likely to have new financial 
directors brought in as a result of the mandatory changes, the study finds that such 
boards experience a marginally significant reduction in price synchronicity in the one 
and two years after the new listing rules took place. This evidence suggests that 
endogeneity is unlikely to fully explain the study results. 
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To obtain further understanding of the role of financial-expert directors in 
shaping the firm’s information environment, this chapter test the effect financial-
experts have on firm crash risk and found that even though accounting financial-
experts reduce firm stock price synchronicity, they have no effect on CEOs’ ability to 
withhold bad news disclosure, resulting in crash risk. This chapter also explores the 
cross-sectional heterogeneity in the relation in question across firms with different 
governance characteristics. The results show that the negative relation between 
financial-expert directors and price synchronicity is more pronounced among firms 
with a chairman-CEO, low institutional ownership, and a low threat of takeover 
(measured by the antitakeover index), where governance and monitoring are most 
needed. This evidence is consistent with better monitoring by financial-expert 
directors improving firms’ information environment. Finally, this study examines the 
types of directors and shows that the significant relation stems from those financial-
expert directors who are independent and have many outside directorships. 
The study contributes to the finance literature on the effectiveness of financial-
expert directors serving on the board of directors in several ways. First, the new trend 
of increasing financial expertise on the board of directors provides an opportunity to 
investigate financial expertise effectiveness. It is the board of directors who have main 
responsibility of supervising the firm’s financial reporting process (Klein 2002). 
However, recent studies considered the financial expertise of corporate audit 
committees (McDaniel et al. 2002; Davidson et al. 2004; Mangena and Pike 2005; 
Carcello et al. 2006b) or on banks’ boards (Fernandes and Fich 2009; Minton et al. 
2014). In view of these responsibilities, this study contributes to corporate board 
composition effectiveness to enhance firm information environment through the 
appointment of directors with financial experience to serve on the board. Second, the 
study adds value to the limited literature on the effect of board composition on stock 
price informativeness. Previous literature primarily focuses on the role of board 
independence, board gender diversity, board size, and CEO duality (Ferreira et al. 
2011; Gul et al. 2011; Ntow-Gyamfi et al. 2015; Sila et al. 2017). To the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, this study is one of the few existing studies that attempts to 
link financial experience of directors to the firm’s information environment. Third, the 
study results challenge the SOX Act’s definition of financial experience which 
includes “supervising” employees with financial reporting responsibilities. In fact, 
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directors with CEO- and Chairman-experiences failed to have the same positive 
influence when compared to directors with prior financial reporting responsibilities 
(accounting financial experience). Finally, the study results offer empirical 
justification to the increasing calls by policymakers for more financial-expert directors 
on boards to prevent accounting manipulations and fraud. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 provides a 
brief review of the literature on the relationship between board of directors’ financial 
experience and stock piece synchronicity; Section 3.3 forms the hypothesis to be 
tested; Section 3.4 presents the study’s methodology adopted and describes the sample 
and dataset; Section 3.5 defines the study methodology; Section 3.6 outlines and 
discusses the study’s empirical results; Section 3.7 concludes the chapter. 
3.2. Hypothesis development  
Many of the recent corporate governance debates have developed around the 
composition of the corporate board, raising the question of which type of directors 
better serve the interest of shareholders. In modern-corporations, one of the major 
investors’ concerns lies in the excrescence of information asymmetry problem 
between shareholders and managers, causing accounting manipulation, fraud and 
misleading financial reporting. Following policymakers’ call for the importance of 
financial-experts on board under the assumption that financial-experts have better 
understanding of firm financial reporting and thus serve as better informed directors, 
recent studies on board of directors’ effectiveness show serious attention to the effect 
of directors financial experience (see, e.g., Xie et al. (2003); Abbott et al. (2004); 
Agrawal and Chadha (2005); Güner et al. (2008). However, examining the empirical 
effect of directors’ financial experience has on enhancing firm information 
environment still remains unclear and under-researched.   
In an efficient market, share prices incorporate and reflect all information 
related to a firm. It assumes that all market participants share the same information 
and the cost of production and gathering this information in the market is relatively 
low. However, firm-specific information is costly and investors will only expand 
resources spent on acquiring information if they believe that the benefit will offset the 
cost (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980). Roll (1988) argues that the level at which share 
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price moves together is related to the percentage of firm-specific information to market 
and industry-wide information embedded in the price. Increasing firm-specific 
information in the markets leads stock return to be less reliant on industry and market-
wide information and, thus, less synchronised. Thus, to study financial-expert 
directors’ effect on firm information environment, this study empirically investigates 
the link financial-experts on board have on firm stock price informativeness.   
A large body of research shows that the board of directors’ composition affects 
firms’ information environment and decision making. For example, Lim et al. (2007) 
document a positive association between board independence and firms’ voluntary 
disclosure. Vafeas (2000) indicates that the earnings of firms with small boards are 
more informative. Other studies also showed that board composition is related to 
voluntarily disclosure (Cheng and Courtenay 2006; Chau and Gray 2010), accounting 
conservatism, (Ahmed and Duellman 2007; García Lara et al. 2007), borrowing 
structure (Stearns and Mizruchi 1993), cost of corporate borrowing (Fields et al. 
2012), information asymmetry (Kanagaretnam et al. 2007; Rutherford and Buchholtz 
2007; Ferreira et al. 2011; Gul et al. 2011), financial statement fraud (Beasley 1996), 
earnings manipulations (Dechow et al. 1996), earning management (Klein 2002; Jaggi 
et al. 2009) and accounting report integrity (Anderson et al. 2004). However, most of 
the earlier studies focus on board independence, board size, CEO duality and board 
gender diversity. 
According to Klein (2002), directors’ experience is an indicator of directors’ 
ability and skills to identify firms’ issues. Board of directors has initial responsibility 
for supervising the firm’s financial reporting process. Board review firm financial 
statement, audit process and internal control mechanism through regularly meeting the 
firm external auditors and accounting executives. Debatably, Harris and Raviv (2008) 
argue that, among independent directors, financial-expert directors have lower cost in 
obtaining information relating to the complexity of the financial transactions and thus 
are more capable of effectively monitoring executive management. Moreover, Francis 
et al. (2012a) study the direct effect of outside directors’ financial experience on firm 
stock return in the U.S market during the financial crisis. The relationship was based 
on the idea that outside financial-experts deliver a more sophisticated understanding 
of financial information that is critical for effective board monitoring and mitigating 
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agency problem between firm managers and shareholders, which effect firm 
informational environment and stock retune. Also, Gray and Nowland (2015) link 
directors with accounting and consultant bankers’ experience to higher shareholders’ 
value, where DeFond et al. (2005) found a positive market reaction following 
appointing financial-experts on the audit committee. Thus, it could be argued that there 
is a direct negative relationship between appointing directors with financial experience 
and stock price synchronicity. 
Studying financial-experts’ monitoring role, Jeanjean and Stolowy (2009) 
show that financial expertise on board of directors is positively related to board 
independence, ownership concentration and institutional ownership. This is in line 
with firm better corporate governance. According to Sharma et al. (2009), the level of 
audit committee meeting frequency is positively related to financial experience when 
the risk of financial misreporting is high; that is, when the financial expertise is most 
needed. Xie et al. (2003) reported that the presence of financially sophisticated 
directors constrains the propensity of managers to engage in earning management. 
They argue that this could indicate that financially sophisticated directors act as better 
monitors. Some studies successfully showed that financial expertise is negatively 
linked to the firm engaging in earnings management (Xie et al. 2003), fraud (Agrawal 
and Chadha 2005) and restatements (Abbott et al. 2004). These factors are associated 
with better firm corporate governance. Increasing shareholder protection through 
monitoring will result in improving firm information environment and thus reducing 
stock price synchronicity (Morck et al. 2000). 
Prior literature shows that financial-experts affect firms’ outcome beyond 
better information disclosure and audit committee performance. Directors use most of 
their time in the firm on their advisory role rather than their monitoring role (Adams 
and Ferreira 2007). Several studies have, indeed, questioned the directors’ conflict of 
interest and found that not all financial-expert directors have the incentive to protect 
shareholders’ interest (Güner et al. 2008); in October 2008, a new directors’ duty (the 
Companies Act 2006 (the “Act”)) was placed on directors to avoid positions in which 
conflict of interest may arise (situational conflicts) and/or disclose any interest in a 
proposed or existing transaction or arrangement with the company (transactional 
conflict). Minton et al. (2014) also show that financial-experts on bank board of 
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directors were unable to alleviate the consequence from the 2007 financial crisis. 
When studying the board financial-experts’ advisory role free of potential conflict of 
interest, Huang et al. (2014) found that financial-experts are able to identify better 
Mergers and Acquisition (M&A) opportunities and reducing costs of the deals. Dionne 
and Triki (2005) also show that financial expertise on board encourages firm risk 
hedging. It could be argued that, in order for financial-experts to govern and advise 
effectively, directors must be better informed about firm activities. As a result, the 
quality of firm information environment improves over time. Consequently, 
increasing firm-specific information in the market results in decreasing firm stock 
price synchronicity.  
Moreover, viewing the board as a decision-making group allows to link 
psychological perspectives to financial expertise influence on board decisions. 
According to the influential theory of group performance, group decision making 
quality is influenced by the level to which group members cooperatively acquire 
relevant, useful resources (Hackman 1995). In groups, responsible for making 
complex decisions, knowledge resources are of importance (Littlepage et al. 1997; 
Faraj and Sproull 2000; Espinosa et al. 2007). Related studies show that group 
decision-making quality is determined by the collective relevant task knowledge and 
experience of the group individual members (Kerr and Tindale 2004; Woolley et al. 
2008). Previous research frequently conceptualises group experience and ability as the 
sum of their individuals’ experience (Faraj and Sproull 2000; Reagans et al. 2005; 
McDonald et al. 2008; Woolley et al. 2008). Thus, this study argues on the fraction of 
financial-expert board directors’ effect on firm stock price synchronicity. Following 
on the previous discussion, this study formulates the following hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 1: the fraction of accounting financial-expert directors on board 
are negatively related to firm stock price synchronicity  
As proposed in the SOX Act, addition to financial-expert definition, all 
directors with previous experience supervising financial-experts are labelled as 
financial-expert directors. This definition does not specify but includes all directors 
with previous experience as firms’ CEOs or presidents. Although there are no studies 
assessing directors’ non-accounting financial experience effect on firm financial 
information, the effect of CEOs’ accounting financial experience on the firm 
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information environment is widely studied. According to Matsunaga and Yeung 
(2008), CEOs with previous CFO experience improve the quality of firm financial 
disclosure. Similarly, Jiang et al. (2013) found a positive relationship between CEOs’ 
financial experience and the precision of earning information and quality of financial 
statement. If previous financial-experts’ supervision gives the directors financial 
experience, CEOs with previous accounting financial experience should not have any 
different effect from CEOs without accounting financial experience. Yet, literature 
distinguishes between the two types of CEOs’ effect on firm informational 
environment. Moreover, DeFond et al. (2005) examined the market reaction to the 
announcement of financial expertise appointed onto the board of directors’ audit 
committee. They find a positive reaction around the appointment of accounting 
financial expertise but not around that appointment of non-accounting financial 
expertise or directors with no financial expertise. Their findings are in line with the 
idea that only accounting financial expertise is seen to improve firm governance. 
Thus, this study argues that directors with non-accounting financial experience would 
not influence firm informational environment, resulting in no improvement in 
reducing a firm stock price synchronicity. Following the previous discussion, the 
study hypothesises the following:   
 Hypothesis 2: the fraction of non-accounting financial-expert directors on 
board are unrelated to firm stock price synchronicity.  
3.3. Data and variables construction 
3.3.1. Sample and Scope 
The study’s sample selection includes all publicly listed non-financial Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P) 1500 companies over the period from 1999 to 2016. The period begins 
in 1999 because it was when BoardEx commenced having relatively stable data 
coverage. Directors’ characteristics, such as their work experience, and other attributes 
of the boards are collected from BoardEx. To estimate stock price informativeness, 
stock information was collected from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) database and the asset pricing factors from Fama-French Data Library. 
Accounting information is downloaded from Compustat. Industry classification 
follows the Fama-French 48-industry classification. The study excludes financial 
 53 
firms from the sample, reducing the numbers of firms to 1,292 firms. After further 
discarding missing observations, the final sample consists of 1,078 firms and 13,936 
firm-year observations (see Table 3.1 for more details). To reduce the effect of 
outliers, all continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 
Table 3. 1 Selection criteria for the sample  
 
Analysis of sample attrition at different stages of sample. 
 
  
 
 construction. 
 
Criterion # of firms 
All firms in the S&P 1500 1,500 
Financial firms  208 
Missing data firms  214 
Sample (excluding finance firms and missing data firms) 1,078 
 
3.3.2. Variable definitions  
This section presents the dependent and control variable definitions for the issue under 
investigation. The independent variable (directors’ financial experience) was 
described previously in Section 2.3.3. The discussion focuses first on the stock price 
synchronicity measures, explaining the definition of stock price synchronicity by Roll 
(1988) and developed by Morck et al. (2000). In addition, the control variable 
measures provide information about all of the variables employed in this part of the 
study.  
3.3.2.1. Measuring stock price synchronicity  
Following Piotroski and Roulstone (2004), Gul et al. (2010), Xu et al. (2013), An and 
Zhang (2013), Boubaker et al. (2014) and as proposed by Roll (1988) and further 
developed by Morck et al. (2000), the stock price synchronicity is measured by each 
individual firm’s market model regression. The model allows us to decompose the 
variation of firm total return into returns tied to market- and industry-wide information 
and return tied to firm-specific information. For each stock in a given year, the study 
estimates the following model:  
!!,# = # + %$&!%,& + %$&!%,&'$ + %('(!%,& + %('(!%,&'$ +	*!.&	                               (1) 
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where , for firm i and week w, ! signifies the firms’ weekly return. "!!,# denote the 
value-weighted A-share market return based on the S&P 1500 index on day t and #$!!,# denote the value-weighted industry return. Following Boubaker et al. (2014) 
and Gul et al. (2010), for a firm to be included in the sample, it must have at least 30 
weeks of observations. The individual firm’s return index data, the value weighted 
market return and the value weighted industry return were retrieved from CRSP 
database. The value weighted market return &!% is calculated, using the following 
equation: 
&!% =	∑,-./	.012.3	-3405 ∗ 	( *!+,	,.+/0&	1.2!&.3!4.&!565&.3	,.+/0&	1.2!&.3!4.&!57)                                             (2) 
as the total return index of all firms in the market index multiplied by the fraction of 
the firm’s market capitalisation to the total market capitalisation. On the other hand, 
the '(!% is calculated as the total of all firms’ return indices in the firm i industry 
multiplied by the fraction of the firm’s market capitalisation to the total industry 
capitalisation as follows: 
'(!% =	∑,-./	.012.3	-3405 ∗ 	( *!+,	,.+/0&	1.2!&.3!4.&!565&.3	!7894&+:	1.2!&.3!4.&!57)                                          (3) 
the !$ statistic is calculated individually for each firm using (Eq. 1). The regressed !$ 
explains the level of variation in the firm’s return tides to the market and industry 
return. Nevertheless, the !$ attained from the regression bounded within the unit 
interval and cannot be used as an independent variable. Following Morck et al. (2000) 
and Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) and Xu et al. (2013), this study apply a log-
transformation of !$ to allow the variable to vary from negative infinity to positive 
infinity, giving a dependent variable with a better normal distribution. Thus 
synchronicity measures as follows: 
9:(; = log ? ;!$';!@                                                                                                               (4) 
where the %&$'	is the study empirical measure of firm annual synchronicity. A lower 
value in %&$'	indicates that a firm’s stock price incorporates more firm-specific 
information and thus a better information environment.  
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3.3.2.2. Control variables 
The study includes a list of firm- and industry-related control variables that were 
identified as influential on stock price synchronicity in the relevant literature. These 
variables include: leverage, volume, firm size, stock return volatility, market-to-book 
ratio board structure and directors’ characteristics.  
Firm Size: according to Skaife et al. (2006), large firms are usually associated 
with better and larger information environment. However, compared to small firms, 
large firms have better opportunities to diversify their risk across the market, resulting 
in their trades being more synchronised with the market. According to Roll (1988) 
study, large firms incorporate more market-wide information than small firms. His 
study establishes a positive relationship between firm size and stock price 
synchronicity. Moreover, Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) argue that small firms rely 
on large firms’ actions as indications of macroeconomic events; this results in large 
firms’ stock price synchronicity to rise. Firm size is calculated as the logarithm of the 
firm market capitalisation at the end of the fiscal year. 
Leverage: previous studies have shown the important role of financial leverage 
in determining the stock price volatility and cross-sectional variation. According to 
Hutton et al. (2009), levered forms shift their risk from shareholders to debtholders 
bearing them higher idiosyncratic volatility, which reduces the firm stock price 
synchronicity. Inversely, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2011) argue that higher 
leverage increases firms’ exposure to financial distress and thus increases their return 
volatility. The study measures leverage as the firm total book liability divided by the 
firm total assets at the end of the fiscal year. 
Market-to-book ratio (M/B) of equity: the firm M/B ratio is a measure of firm 
growth opportunity. Firms with high growth opportunities are more difficult to 
evaluate and hence suffer from high information asymmetry (Francis et al. 2012b) and 
are likely to experience higher stock return volatility (Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 
2011). In contrast, Hasan et al. (2014) argue that firms with high growth opportunities 
incorporate more firm-specific information, resulting in low stock price synchronicity. 
The M/B ratio is calculated as the market value of equity (market capitalisation) 
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divided by the book value of equity (total assets minus total liability) at the end of the 
fiscal year.  
Volume: according to Easley et al. (1996), firms with a high trading volume, 
(high shares traded in the fiscal year) have a higher probability of information events 
than those of low volume trading. This indicated that trading volume is negatively 
related to stock price synchronicity. Moreover, Alford and Berger (1999) state that, 
since trading volume plays as a proxy of the brokerage commissions, higher trading 
volume will result in security analysis being more incentive to supply more 
information. Firm trading volume is calculated as the sum of shares traded in a year, 
divided by the sum of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. 
Stock return volatility: for firms with high return volatility, the probability of 
the expected return provisional on private and public information highly deviates from 
the expected return provisional solely on public information, and, thus, requires 
generating more firm-specific information (Bhushan 1989). Chan and Hameed (2006) 
point out that firms with high volatility return have a more prosperous information 
environment. Therefore, their share price will be more independent from market and 
industry effect. The volatility of firm earnings is calculated as the standard deviation 
of their daily return over the fiscal year.  
Other control variables: the study also includes the number of firms in the 
industry to which the firm belongs (NINA) to control the difference in sample size 
effect that might be reflected on the stock price synchronicity (Durnev et al. 2003; 
Boubaker et al. 2014). The industry number of firms is calculated as the natural 
logarithm of the total number of firms in the industry to which a firm belongs. 
Moreover, to control the industry and year fixed effects, industry and year dummies 
are added to the regression. 
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3.4. Methodology 
3.4.1. Empirical model 
To examine the impact of board financial experience on stock price synchronicity, the 
study estimates the following model: 9 
9:(;!,& = %< +	%$	,.AB1-C3	CD	D-3A3B-AE	05F0.1	4-.0B1C.G!,& 	+ 	H	;C31.CEG!,& +:0A.,I + ,-./,I + *!,&                                                                                                      (5) 
where %&$'%,# is the stock price synchronicity measured by each firm !$ logistic 
which explains the level of variation in the firm’s return tides to the market and 
industry return. Similar stock price synchronicity measure is found in previous studies 
on stock price synchronicity (i.e. Morck et al. (2000) Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) 
and Xu et al. (2013). )*+,-./0	/1	1.0+0,.+2	3453*-	6.*3,-/*7%,#	is the study main 
variables of interest and is either the fraction of accounting financial-expert directors 
or the fraction of non-accounting financial-expert directors. '/0-*/27%,# is a vector of 
firm controls as defined in Section 3.4.1.2. To reduce the effects of outliers, all 
continuous variables are winsorised at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
The study also follows previous stock price synchronicity studies and other 
financial studies and includes year and firm fix effect Firm and year fixed effects are 
included (see, e.g., Gul et al. (2010); Boubaker et al. (2014). Considering that the study 
variables may change over the study period, the year fixed effect controls for the trends 
of financial expertise on board and firm stock price synchronicity, where the firm fixed 
effect to reflect factors related to specific firm that could influence the determinants 
of stock price synchronicity.  
3.5. Descriptive Analysis 
This section provides the descriptive analysis through a summary of the sample 
characteristics and variables summary statistics and correlation. 
 
9 A similar approach is used by previous studies relating corporate governance to stock price 
synchronicity (e.g. Gul et al., 2010; Boubaker et al., 2014) 
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3.5.1. Sample Characteristics 
This section provides sample characteristics through descriptive analysis of the 
number of observations spread through the sample years, yearly summary (mean) of 
the percentage of financial-experts on board and sample firm industries’ distribution.  
Table 3.2 panel A shows the number of observations spread through the sample 
period. The number of firm observations start at only 35 firms in 1999 and increase 
yearly to reach 1022 firms in 2016 with a total of 13,936 firm-year observation10. 
 
Table 3. 2 Descriptive statistic 
 
The study sample contain 1,078 firms from S&P 1500 non-financial firms and 13,936 firm-year 
observation over the period from 1999 to 2016.  
Panel A: number of observation spread through the years 
Year Number of firm obs. % of firm obs. from the total sample. 
1999 35 0.3% 
2000 467 3.4% 
2001 549 3.9% 
2002 570 4.1% 
2003 685 4.9% 
2004 745 5.3% 
2005 783 5.6% 
2006 810 5.8% 
2007 850 6.1% 
2008 854 6.1% 
2009 868 6.2% 
2010 900 6.5% 
2011 919 6.6% 
2012 947 6.8% 
2013 969 7% 
2014 970 7% 
2015 993 7.1% 
2016 1,022 7.3% 
Total 13,936 100% 
 
 
 
 
 
10 The sample start in 1999 based on BoardEx data availability. Even though year 1999 have 
a substantial lower firm observations excluding this year have no effect on the study main 
results or robust checks. However, these results are not reported in this study.  
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Table 3. 3 Descriptive statistic (continue) 
 
Panel B: yearly sample mean and change of mean of the fraction of financial-experts on board  
Year 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. 
Exp. Dir. 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. 
Exp. Dir. Change 
Frac. of Non-
Acc. Fin. Exp. 
Dir. 
Frac. of Non-
Acc. Fin. Exp. 
Dir. Change 
1999 10.7% - 5.0% - 
2000 10.7% 0.0% 6.2% 1.3% 
2001 12.1% 1.4% 7.0% 0.8% 
2002 13.7% 1.6% 7.6% 0.6% 
2003 16.5% 2.8% 8.9% 1.3% 
2004 18.8% 2.3% 8.8% -0.1% 
2005 20.9% 2.1% 9.5% 0.7% 
2006 22.7% 1.7% 10.1% 0.5% 
2007 24.5% 1.8% 10.5% 0.5% 
2008 26.6% 2.1% 10.9% 0.4% 
2009 28.9% 2.3% 11.4% 0.5% 
2010 30.7% 1.8% 12.0% 0.6% 
2011 33.0% 2.4% 12.9% 0.9% 
2012 35.3% 2.2% 14.0% 1.0% 
2013 37.7% 2.4% 15.4% 1.4% 
2014 40.3% 2.6% 17.4% 2.0% 
2015 43.1% 2.9% 19.5% 2.1% 
2016 46.0% 2.8% 21.4% 1.9% 
Avg. 26.2% 2.1% 11.6% 1.0% 
Panel C: Sample industry firm distribution based on  Fama-French 10 industry classification. 
Industry 
No. of 
firms obs. %of firms 
No. of firm 
year obs. % of firms 
Average 
Frac. of 
Acc. Fin. 
Exp. Dir. 
on board 
Average 
Frac. of 
Non-Acc. 
Fin. Exp. 
Dir. on 
board 
Durables 28 3% 349 3% 27% 11% 
Energy 51 5% 696 5% 27% 14% 
High Tech 203 19% 2,712 19% 28% 12% 
Healthcare 112 10% 1,406 10% 25% 13% 
Manufacturing 201 19% 2,676 19% 28% 12% 
Non-Durables 76 7% 937 7% 26% 14% 
Other 165 15% 2,083 15% 29% 13% 
Shops 160 15% 1,963 14% 27% 12% 
Telecom 23 2% 212 2% 27% 15% 
Utilities 59 5% 902 6% 32% 14% 
Total 1078 100% 13,936 100%   
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Panel B on Table 3.3 reports the average values in the board fraction of 
financial-experts by year. The statistics show that the fraction of accounting financial-
expert directors increases steadily over the sample period. With an average annual 
percentage change of 2.1%, its mean value is 10.7% in 1999 and 2000 and increases 
to 26% in 2016. In respect of non-accounting financial-expert directors, an increasing 
trend is similarly observed; its average value is 5% in 1999 and reaches 21.4% in 2016, 
implying an average annual percentage growth of 1%. Note also that the fraction of 
accounting financial-expert directors is always higher (in both levels and percentage 
changes) than that of non-accounting financial-expert directors. 
Panel C presents a sample breakdown by Fama-French 10-industries 
(financials excluded). The statistics show that technology and manufacturing firms 
have the highest coverage (19% of the observations), followed by firms in the Others 
and Shop industries. The average Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. is the highest for Utilities 
firms (an average fraction of 32%), followed by Others industry (an average fraction 
of 29%). Non-Durables industry firms have the lowest Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. 
with an average fraction of 26%. As for Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir., the highest 
average is found in Telecom firms, with an average of 15%, followed by Utilities, 
Non-Durables, and Energy firms, and the lowest is observed for Durables-goods 
industry firms. 
3.5.2. Summary Statistics and Correlation 
This section provides the variables used (in this part of study) summary statistic, 
univariant analysis and correlation coefficient. Table 3.4 provides the descriptive 
statistic of the study main variables. The mean (median) value of !$ is 0.351 (0.340) 
higher than 0.193 (0.148) in Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) sample of US firms. The 
mean (median) of the dependent variable SYNCH has the value of -0.726 (-0.665) 
which is higher than reported in Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) study, which 
documented a mean (median) of -1.742 (-1.754). This suggests that stock prices of US 
share prices in this study sample integrate more firm-specific information when 
compared to Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) US sample shares. This could be because 
of the different time scale between the two samples’ studies. As Piotroski and 
Roulstone (2004) study estimate US firms stock price synchronicity between 1984 and 
2000, this study uses the time scale between 1999 and 2017. Furthermore, !$ and 
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SYNCH have a standard deviation of 0.168 and 0.878, respectively. This implies that 
the stock price synchronicity displays considerable cross-sectional variation in this 
sample. 
Table 3.4 Panel B shows the summary statistic of different financial experience 
measures. Among directors, the mean of the Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. is higher than 
the mean on Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. 0.2970 (with a standard deviation of 
0.179) compared to 0.127 (with a standard deviation of 0.120) respectively. This 
suggests that on board of directors the Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. are higher than the 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. and both the Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. and the 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. display considerable cross-sectional variation in this 
sample.  
Panel C on Table 3.4 summarises the study control variables related to firms’ 
financial information (control variables). The study sample size includes both high 
and low LEV firms (mean and standard deviation of 0. 214 and 0.168 respectively) 
with a 5th percentile of 0.000 and 95th percentile of 0.508. The sample also includes 
high and low M/B ratio firms (mean of 3.481 and standard deviation of 3.579) with a 
5th percentile of 0.929 and 95th percentile of 9.278. The sample also includes small 
and large firms. The firm SIZE (with mean of 7.845 and a standard deviation of 1.582) 
holds 5th percentile of 5.529 and 95th percentile of 10.733. The sample includes firms 
with high share trading VOLUME (with a mean and standard deviation of 0.201 and 
0.139 respectively) but relatively low SDRET (with a mean and standard deviation of 
0.024 and 0.011 respectively). Sample firms derive from industries constructed from 
a large and small number of firms with Log(NIND) mean of 4.676 and standard 
deviation of 0.913.  
Table 3.5 presents the univariate comparison (mean and median breakpoint) 
based on the Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. Results show that firms with high Frac. of 
Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. tend to have higher SYNCH then those with low Frac. of Acc. Fin. 
Exp. Dir. Moreover, firms with high Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. tend to have higher 
market capitalisation, market-to-book ratio, trading volume, and financial leverage. 
However, firms with low Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. tend to have high stock return 
volatility and a high number of firms in the industry to which they belong. 
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Meanwhile, Table 3.6 reports the correlation coefficient between the main 
variables used in the study. The correlation matrix provides an insight into the 
relationship between the study dependent and independent variables. It also specifies 
a potential multicollinearity problem that might lead to false estimate. Spearman 
(Pearson) correlation coefficients are shown below (above) the diagonal. Several 
features of the data are worth highlighting. The relationship between the Frac. of Acc. 
Fin. Exp. Dir. shows a positive magnitude to SYNCH and significant at 1% level, 
inconsistent with the research hypothesis but in line with the study univariate analysis. 
Moreover, the correlation between Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. and SYNCH is 
positive and statistically significant at 1% level. The correlation matrix also shows that 
all control variables are significantly correlated to SYNCH at the 1% level. Other than 
VOLUME, all control variables significant relationship to SYNCH is in the expected 
direction provided by previous literature. Spearman (Pearson) correlation coefficients 
provide similar results for almost all variables with similar degrees and significance 
levels11.  
 
11 Another way to assess the multicollinearity problem is through calculating the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) for all independent variables. The VIF results show that the maximum VIF takes the 
value of 1.63 where the lowest VIF is 1.05. These values are below the 10 rule of thumb threshold 
provided by Chatterjee, S. and Hadi, A. S. 2015. Regression analysis by example. John Wiley & Sons. 
This indicated that the multicollinearity issue is unlikely to be presented in this study. 
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Table 3.4 Summary statistic 
 
This table presents the study’s variables summary statistic. SYNCH: is the stock price synchronicity, measuring the logistic transformation of the reformed 
market model regression. Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.: the fraction of accounting financial-experts on board. Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.: the fraction of 
non-accounting financial-experts on board. Control variables include SIZE, LEV, M/B, VOLUME, SDRET and Log(NIND). SIZE: is the firm size calculated as 
the logarithm of the firm market capitalisation at the end of the year. LEV: is the firm leverage calculated as the firm total book liability divided by the firm 
total assets, all at the beginning of the year. M/B: is the firm market-to book ratio calculated as the market value of equity (market capitalization) divided by the 
book value of equity (total assets minus total liability) at the end of the fiscal year. VOLUME: is the firm trading volume calculated as the sum of shares traded 
in a year divided by the sum of shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. SDRET: is the firm daily standard deviation in year. Log(NIND): logistic 
transformation of the number of firms in the industry in which the company belong. All continua’s variables are winsorised at the bottom and top 1 % levels.  
Variables Obs. Mean Std. dev 5
th Pctl 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 95th Pctl 
Panel A: Stock price synchronicity (dependent variables)  !! 13,936 0.351 0.169 0.089 0.222 0.340 0.474 0.651 
SYNCH 13,936 -0.726 0.878 -2.331 -1.255 -0.665 -0.104 0.625 
Panel B: Financial Experience measures (independent variables) 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. 13,936 0.290 0.179 0.000 0.143 0.273 0.400 0.625 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.  13,936 0.127 0.120 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.200 0.364 
Panel C: firm financial information (control variables) 
SIZE 13,936 7.845 1.582 5.529 6.684 7.657 8.915 10.733 
LEV 13,936 0.214 0.168 0.000 0.058 0.209 0.328 0.508 
M/B 13,936 3.481 3.579 0.929 1.597 2.436 3.904 9.279 
VOLUME 13,936 0.201 0.139 0.057 0.107 0.162 0.251 0.488 
SDRET 13,936 0.024 0.011 0.011 0.016 0.022 0.029 0.047 
Log(NIND) 13,936 4.676 0.913 2.918 4.094 4.660 5.252 6.058 
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Table 3. 5 Univariate analysis 
 
This table presents the study univariate analysis. Firm-year observation are divided into two groups based on the sample median Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. 
T-test (Wilcoxon signed-rank test) were used to determine whether the difference in means (medians) is statistically significant. *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
High Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.=1 Low Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.=0 Difference(1-0)  
(6,686 obs.) (7,250 obs.) 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
SYNCH -0.628 -0.577 -0.816 -0.755 0.188*** 0.178*** !! 0.370 0.360 0.334 0.320 0.036*** 0.040*** 
SIZE 8.049 7.844 7.658 7.475 0.391*** 0.370*** 
M/B 3.710 2.523 3.270 2.360 0.440*** 0.163*** 
VOLUME 0.209 0.170 0.195 0.154 0.014*** 0.015*** 
SDRET 0.023 0.020 0.026 0.023 -0.003*** -0.003*** 
Log(NIND) 4.591 4.599 4.755 4.739 -0.164*** -0.140*** 
LEV 0.232 0.229 0.196 0.188 0.036*** 0.042*** 
 65 
 
 
 
Table 3. 6 Correlation matrix 
 
This table presents the study variables correlation matrix. Spearman (Pearson) correlation coefficients are shown on below (above) the diagonal. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.    
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
R2 1.000 0.9796*** 0.1160*** 0.0201** 0.2277*** -0.0612*** -0.0476*** -0.0980*** 0.0277*** 0.0862*** 
SYNCH 1.000*** 1.0000 0.1181*** 0.0267*** 0.2280*** -0.0592*** -0.0632*** -0.0969*** 0.0330*** 0.0826*** 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. 0.124*** 0.1242*** 1.0000 0.1917*** 0.1595*** 0.0603*** -0.1819*** -0.1169*** 0.0457*** 0.1384*** 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. 0.028*** 0.0282*** 0.2223*** 1.0000 0.0148* 0.0235*** -0.0814*** -0.0594*** 0.0254*** 0.0293*** 
SIZE 0.235*** 0.2354*** 0.1552*** 0.0205* 1.0000 0.2468*** -0.4301*** -0.0169** 0.0006 0.1736*** 
M/B -0.073*** -0.0734*** 0.0376*** 0.0234*** 0.3406*** 1.0000 -0.0658*** 0.0596*** 0.0398*** 0.1091*** 
SDRET -0.0834*** -0.0834*** -0.1925*** -0.0956*** -0.4816*** -0.1773* 1.0000 0.1438*** 0.4107*** -0.1027*** 
Log(NIND) -0.1014*** -0.1014*** -0.1171*** -0.0754*** -0.012 0.1076*** 0.1526*** 1.0000 0.0441*** -0.2233*** 
VOLUME 0.0566*** 0.0566*** 0.1028*** 0.0376*** 0.0847*** 0.0209 0.3777*** 0.0448*** 1.0000 -0.0173** 
LEV 0.1003*** 0.1003*** 0.1283*** 0.0383*** 0.2215*** -0.0779*** -0.1714*** -0.2486*** -0.0297*** 1.0000 
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3.6. Regression results 
To test the study’s main hypothesis, the study estimates Eq. (5) using pooled ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression with firm and year fixed effect. All continued variables 
were winsorised by 1%. Table 3.7 presents the study main results on the relationship 
between financial-experts on board and firm stock price synchronicity. The table first 
column presents the results for the baseline model, where stock price synchronicity is 
regressed against the fraction of accounting financial experience and firm size. The 
results show a negative coefficient of the Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. and statistically 
significant at less than 5% threshold, which implies a negative relationship between 
the fraction of accounting financial-expert directors and firm stock price 
synchronicity. This indicates that results are inconsistent with the correlation evidence 
where the Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. shows a positive effect on firm SYNCH. 
However, the results are consistent with the study main hypothesis estimating that the 
fraction of accounting financial-experts is negatively related to firm stock price 
synchronicity. This result implies that directors with previous accounting financial-
experience encourage the flow of firm-specific information into the share price. Thus, 
share price would reflect on more firm-specific information and less industry- and 
market- information which reflects on low stock price synchronicity.  
Table 3.7 (second column) shows the study expands on the baseline model 
with firm’s and industry’s control variables verified by literature to affect stock price 
synchronicity (e.g. Piotroski and Roulstone (2004); Hutton et al. (2009); Boubaker et 
al. (2014)). Compared to the baseline model, after adding all control variables, the 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. remains negatively and significantly (at less than 5% 
threshold) to stock price synchronicity. The model R-squares slightly improved after 
adding control variables (from 0.439 to 0.442) which suggests a slightly better fit 
model. As stated in previous literature, SIZE shows a positive and significant (at less 
than 1% threshold relationship) to stock price synchronicity. This is in line with Roll 
(1988) conclusion that large firms incorporate more industry- and market- information 
than firm-specific information, when compared to small firms. The second column 
also shows that the coefficient of LEV to be positive and significant at less than 5% 
level. This suggests that levered firms incorporate more industry- and market-wide 
information than firm-specific information, similar to Rajgopal and Venkatachalam 
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(2011) findings. In the model, firms’ SDRET ration appears to be positively related to 
stock price synchronicity at 1% significance level. This came in line with Bhushan 
(1989) argument that firms with high return volatility, the probability of the expected 
return provisional on private and public information highly deviates from the expected 
return provisional solely on public information, and is thus required to generate more 
firm-specific information. Moreover, as Chan and Hameed (2006) point out, a firm 
with high volatility return has a richer information environment. Therefore, their share 
price will be more independent from market and industry effect. The firms’ VOLUME 
in the sample is found to be negatively and strongly related to stock price synchronicity 
(at 1% significance level). This result is similar to Easley et al. (1996) argument that 
firms with a high trading volume have a higher probability of information events than 
those of low volume trading. Additionally, Alford and Berger (1999) state that higher 
trading volume results in security analysis being more incentive to supply more 
information. Therefore, higher trading volume firms incorporate more firm-specific 
information and less industry- and market-wide information reducing firm stock price 
synchronicity. The M/B and Log(NIND) are found to be insignificant to stock price 
synchronicity at all conversational level in all models. For all models, all control 
variables remain with the same magnetite and significance level.  
Table 3.7 column 3 and 4, the study replicates regressions in columns 1 and 2, 
respectively, but uses different financial experience measures. Column 3 employs 
directors’ financial experience using directors’ non-accounting financial-experts 
(directors with previous firm CEO or Present experience). The Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. 
Exp. Dir. appears to have an insignificant relationship to stock price synchronicity. 
After controlling for firm and industry control variables, column 4 shows the Frac. of 
Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. remains insignificant to SYNCH. This is in line with the study 
main hypothesis, suggesting that, unlike directors with accounting financial-
experience, directors with non-accounting financial-experience do not affect the 
amount of information imbedded into the share price.  
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Table 3. 7 Financial experience and stock price synchronicity 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of the relation between financial-experts and stock 
price informativeness. The dependent variable is the stock price synchronicity (SYNCH). The main 
independent variables are the percentage of accounting financial-experts on board ( Frac. of Acc. Fin. 
Exp. Dir.) and the percentage of non-accounting financial-experts on board ( Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. 
Exp. Dir.). Other firm-level independent variables include: The logarithm of the market capitalisation 
at the end of the year (SIZE), market-to-book ratio (M/B), standard deviation of their daily return over 
the fiscal year (SDRET), the logarithm of the number of firms in the industry to which the firm belongs 
(Log(NIND)), share traded volume (VOLUME) and firm leverage (LEV). The study control for firm 
and year fix effect. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
  Expected 
signs 
SYNCH  
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Frac. Of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. 
 
-0.185** -0.196** 
  
  
(0.0848) (0.0852) 
  
Frac. Of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. 
   
0.116 0.127     
(0.110) (0.111) 
SIZE (+) 0.119*** 0.151*** 0.122*** 0.155***   
(0.0173) (0.0192) (0.0173) (0.0191) 
M/B (-) 
 
0.000204 
 
-0.000252    
(0.00297) 
 
(0.00298) 
SDRET (-) 
 
8.002*** 
 
8.012***    
(1.414) 
 
(1.414) 
Log(NIND) (?) 
 
0.0407 
 
0.0346    
(0.0699) 
 
(0.0697) 
VOLUME (-) 
 
-0.234** 
 
-0.238**    
(0.0931) 
 
(0.0931) 
LEV (+/-) 
 
0.169** 
 
0.170**    
(0.0859) 
 
(0.0857) 
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 
 
13,936 13,936 13,936 13,936 
R-squared   0.439 0.442 0.439 0.442 
All in all, the results appear to be qualitatively different for director accounting 
financial experience compared to directors’ non-accounting financial experience. 
Unlike the fraction of directors with non-accounting financial experience, the 
regression results show that the fraction of directors with accounting financial 
experience improves firm-specific information in the market, which results in more 
firm-specific information embedded in share price, reducing firm stock price 
synchronicity. These results compose new evidence in the literature.  
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3.7. Robustness checks 
In order to assess the reliability of the results, multiple sensitivity tests performed. 
First, this part of the study controls for board attributes that might affect firm 
information environment — board independence and board size. Board independence 
was reported in the literature to have a positive effect on firm information environment 
(Beny 2005; Huafang and Jianguo 2007; Chau and Gray 2010; Sun et al. 2012). 
Moreover, large boards were also found in the literature to improve firm information 
environment (Arcay and Vazquez 2005; Chahine and Filatotchev 2008; Akhtaruddin 
et al. 2009; Abeysekera 2010). After controlling for board independence and size, all 
regression results remain the same (see Table 3.8 columns 1 and 2). 
Second, a replication of the study’s primary regressions also undertaken use 
more stringent sample. For firms to be included in the second robustness regression, 
firms must have a minimum of 50 weeks of observations per year instead of 30 weeks 
of observations; the results remain qualitatively the same (see Table 3.8 columns 3 
and 4). Third, the largest 40 firms from the sample are excluded since market index 
was calculated based on firm market capitalisation, the relationship between a firms’ 
return and market return could be driven by the existence of large firms in the market. 
although the fraction of large firms’ present effect was mitigated by the large sample 
size, repeating the regression after excluding the top 40 firms, the results remain the 
same. Fourth, to avoid any bias result driven from the unusual stock price behaviour 
of this year financial depression, the study excludes the year 2007 from the sample. 
The conclusion of all variables remains the same (see Table 3.8 columns 5 and 6). 
In conclusion, the findings presented in this chapter are robust to alternative 
regression specification. The relationship between the fraction of directors with 
financial experience on board and firm stock price synchronicity is also robust to other 
board attributes, more stringent sample (minimum of 50 weeks of observations per 
year instead of 30), the presence of top firms in the sample and the present unusual 
stock price behaviour due to the financial crisis
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Table 3. 8 Financial experience and stock price synchronicity (Robustness checks) 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of the relation between financial-experts and stock price synchronicity robustness checks. The 
dependent variable is the stock price synchronicity (SYNCH). The main independent variables are the percentage of accounting financial-experts 
on board (Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.) and the percentage of non-accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. ). Other 
firm-level independent variables include: The logarithm of the market capitalisation at the end of the year (FirmSize), market-to-book ratio (MB), 
standard deviation of their daily return over the fiscal year (SDRET), the logarithm of the number of firms in the industry to which the firm belongs 
(Log(NINA)), share traded volume (VOLUME) and firm leverage (LEV). the first two columns the board independence (Indep) and the total number 
of directors on board (BoardSize) are added. the third and fourth columns restrict the sample to minimum of 50 weeks of stock price observation 
to calculate stock price synchronicity. the fifth and sixth columns, the top 40 firms based on their market capitalisation were removed from the 
sample. The seventh and eighth columns the year 2007 the study removed from the sample. The study control for firm and year fix effect. Standard 
errors (in brackets) are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
  
Adding board attributes Min 50 weeks obs. Removing the top 40 
firms 
Removing year 2007 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. -0.206**  -0.247***  -0.205**  -0.193**  
 (0.0863)  (0.0937)  (0.0877)  (0.0868)  
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.   0.126  0.262**  0.114  0.121 
  (0.111)  (0.119)  (0.115)  (0.113) 
SIZE 0.152*** 0.155*** 0.166*** 0.171*** 0.152*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.160*** 
 (0.0192) (0.0192) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0195) (0.0195) (0.0197) (0.0196) 
M/B 9.06e-07 -0.000380 -0.00117 -0.00163 -0.000312 -0.000703 -0.000482 -0.000967 
 (0.00300) (0.00301) (0.00305) (0.00307) (0.00313) (0.00314) (0.00309) (0.00309) 
SDRET 8.124*** 8.130*** 6.920*** 6.930*** 7.525*** 7.541*** 7.808*** 7.818*** 
 (1.413) (1.414) (1.510) (1.515) (1.435) (1.435) (1.436) (1.436) 
Log(NIND) 0.0451 0.0388 -0.00115 -0.00945 -0.0139 -0.0192 0.0388 0.0328 
 (0.0698) (0.0696) (0.0731) (0.0728) (0.0728) (0.0726) (0.0711) (0.0710) 
VOLUME -0.245*** -0.248*** -0.252** -0.257** -0.216** -0.223** -0.171* -0.176* 
 (0.0938) (0.0938) (0.103) (0.103) (0.0942) (0.0943) (0.0950) (0.0950) 
LEV 0.172** 0.170** 0.229** 0.229** 0.180** 0.181** 0.192** 0.192** 
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 (0.0861) (0.0860) (0.0931) (0.0927) (0.0875) (0.0874) (0.0868) (0.0866) 
Indep 0.169* 0.152       
 (0.0992) (0.0989)       
BoardSize -0.000288 0.00166       
 (0.00647) (0.00646)       
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,908 13,908 11,683 11,683 13,320 13,320 13,058 13,058 
R-squared 0.442 0.442 0.468 0.467 0.441 0.441 0.451 0.450 
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3.8. Addressing endogeneity issues. 
A potential concern is that board composition is endogenous with respect to stock 
price informativeness. For example, results may be driven by omitted variables, a 
variable that affects both, stock price synchronicity and the fraction of financial-expert 
directors on board. Moreover, the study results might be subject to reverse causality. 
That is, firms with superior information environment may be regarded more appealing 
and able to recruit more qualified directors with financial experience.  
To address these concerns, the study adopts an alternative research design,  a 
quasi-natural experiment, which offers a research design that is less susceptible to 
endogeneity and is thus more likely to show a causal effect. The difference-in-
difference (DID) approach was chosen to eliminate the observed or unobserved 
difference in the stock price synchronicity and the fraction of financial-experts on 
board relationship over time. The study exploits the reasonably exogenous increase in 
the fraction of financial-expert directors on boards brought by the 2003 NYSE and 
NASDAQ listing rules, instructing boards without majority independence to hire new 
independent directors. Since boards without financial-expert directors prior to the Act 
are more likely to appoint new financial directors as a result of the new appointment 
of new independent directors. 
Since the validity of the approach depends on the parallel trend assumption: in 
the absence of the SOX Act, treated firms’ financial-experts would have evolved in 
the same way as the control firms. Specifically, the parallel trends assumption does 
not require the level of stock price synchronicity variables to be identical across the 
treatment and control groups in the pre-treatment period, yet it requires a similar 
movement in financial-experts’ variables (Gao and Zhang). Following Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2010) and Dasgupta et al. (2010) the study estimates the following 
regression:  
D!"#$!,# = &$ +	&%	)*+,-! ∗ "+,*&$$%,! + &&	)*+,-! ∗ "+,*$&$',! 	+ 	&(	)*+,-! ∗"+,*$)$*,! 	 + &*	)*+,-! + /	#01-*023 + 45*678 + "+,*78 + 9!,#                                   (6) 
 Where D!"#$!,# = !"#$!,# − !"#$!,#$% for firm i and year t; '()*+	is a 
dummy variable that equals one for firms without any financial-expert directors on the 
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board, and zero otherwise. Year2000 is the baseline year. -	#./+(.01 are the firms 
control variables. The study also adds the firm and year fix effect to the model 
(23(456	*/7	")*(56	respectively). The study uses sample size between 2000 and 
2006. For firms to be included in the sample, they need to appear at least in year 2000 
as it was the baseline year.  
Table 3. 9 Pre-treatment trend 
 
This table shows the pre-treatment trend between the treated group and the control group. 
The dependent variable is the change in firm stock price synchronicity (∆SYNCH). The 
indicator variable Treat is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has zero 
financial-experts on the baseline year 2000 and 0 otherwise. The dummy variables Year2001, 
Year0204, and Year0506 equal one for the years 2001, 2002-2004, and 2005-2006, respectively, 
and zero otherwise. Other firm-level control variables include: The logarithm of the market 
capitalisation at the end of the year (SIZE), market-to-book ratio (M/B) , standard deviation 
of their daily return over the fiscal year (SDRET), the logarithm of the number of firms in 
the industry to which the firm belongs (Log(NIND)), share traded volume (VOLUME) and 
firm leverage (LEV). The study control for firm and year fix effect. Standard errors (in 
brackets) are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 ∆SYNCH 
 (1)   
Treat × Year 2001 -0.514 
 (0.360) 
Treat × Year 0204 -0.580* 
 (0.349) 
Treat × Year 0506 -0.548 
 (0.350) 
SIZE 0.382*** 
 (0.0637) 
M/B 0.00806 
 (0.0133) 
SDRET 6.688 
 (4.373) 
Log(NIND) 0.199 
 (0.211) 
VOLUME -0.528 
 (0.367) 
LEV 0.198 
 (0.296) 
Year FE Yes 
Industry FE Yes 
Observations 2,691 
R-squared 0.214 
As Table 3.9 shows, the coefficient estimate for '()*+! ∗ ")*(&''%is 
statistically insignificant, suggesting that the pretrend in the change in stock price 
synchronicity is not significantly different between firms with and without financial-
expert directors prior to the SOX Act. The impact of SOX Act starts to show after its 
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enactment in the period between 2002 and 2004 ('()*+! ∗ ")*('&'() showing 
significantly negative magnitude at 10% level. However, the effect disappears at the 
period following to the implementation of SOX Act Treat	×	Year	0506. This could be 
due to the period prior and beginning to the 2006 financial crisis resulting in the 
unusual stock price behavior of these years’ financial distress. 
Table 3.9 shows that prior to the implementation of the SOX Act, financial-
experts of treatment and controlled groups trend were similar. This is associated with 
the DID parallel trends assumption. Additionally, results denote that the effect of SOX 
Act starts after its enactment in 2002-2004 period and dissolves after that, implying a 
causal effect. 
3.9. Additional analysis 
This study also takes the opportunity to undertake further analysis to allow a better 
understanding of the effect of directors’ financial experience on the stock price 
synchronicity dynamic by analysing the impact of financial experts on crash risk, the 
effect of directors characteristics on the relationship between the fraction of financial-
experts on board and stock price informativeness and the cross sectional variation on 
the study main results.  
3.9.1. Crash risk 
As documented in prior literature, directors’ financial experience affects the directors’ 
ability to monitor CEOs (Harris and Raviv 2008) and thus improve the board monitor 
(Xie et al. 2003; Abbott et al. 2004; Agrawal and Chadha 2005). According to Kothari 
et al. (2009), managers tend to delay the disclosure of bad news to investors in the 
presence of a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders. Nevertheless, 
Jin and Myers (2006) establish that no bad news can be withheld forever. Instead, it 
can only be held to a certain point where all bad news is suddenly released. This 
sudden shock in the market results in a dramatic decrease in share prices, defined as 
the firm crash risk. At the country level, Jin and Myers (2006) demonstrate that, in 
more transparent countries, firms experience less stock crash risk compared to low, 
transparent countries. 
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 To measure crash risk, the study used two different measures that are in line 
with previous literature studying crash risk. As the study focuses on firm-specific 
factors that donate firm specific-crash risk, the study first measures the firm-specific 
weekly retune signified by H. H is measured by the natural logarithm of one plus the 
residual return for the following equation. That is H!,# = I/(1 + 9.,/)	: :!,0 = 	; + &%<:1,#2& + &%<:1,#2%+&%<:1,# + &%<:1,#3% + &%<:1,#3& 	+ 9!,#        (7) 
 Following Chen et al. (2001) and Kim et al. (2011b), the first measure of crash 
risk is by identifying the negative conditional return skewness (NCSKEW). That is, for 
a giving firm-year, the NCSKEW is obtained by taking the negative of the third 
moment of firm-specific weekly returns for each sample year and dividing it by the 
standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns raised to the third power. Precisely, 
for each firm 3 in year + the NCSKEW is calculated as:  
=#!>8?!,# =	−[/(/ − 1)32	ΣH),*3 ]/[(/ − 1)(/ − 2)(ΣH),*2 )32]                                     (8) 
The second crash risk measures the study using the down-to-up volatility 
(DUVOL) drone from Chen et al. (2001). For each firm-year, DUVOL is measured by 
separating all “down” weeks (weeks with firm-specific weekly returns lower the 
annual mean) from “up” weeks (weeks with firm-specific weekly returns higher the 
annual mean) and separately computes the standard deviation of the “up” and “down” 
weeks and the DUVOL is the natural logarithm of the standard deviation of the “down” 
weeks divided by the standard deviation of the “up” weeks.  
The following model is used to estimate the relationship between directors’ 
financial experience and stock price crash risk: 
#*,3ℎ:53C!.# = &$ +	&%	751,1D5,2	+EF+*5,1D+!,# 	+ 	/	#01-*023!,# +("+,*	GH665+3) +	(I1JH3-*KGH665+3) + 9!,#                                                            (9) 
Where #(*1ℎS31T represents variables used to measure stock price crash risk, more 
specifically NCSKEW and DUVOL. #./+(.01 is the regression control variables. The 
study control for firm size, leverage, market-to-book ratio, standard deviation of their 
return and the number of industry firms in which the firm belongs. Furthermore, the 
regression controls for the industry and year fixed effects.  
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Table 3. 10 Financial experience and crash risk 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of the relation between financial-
experts and Crash risk. The dependent variables are the negative conditional return 
skewness (NCSKEW) and the don-to-up volatility (DUVOL). The main independent 
variables are the percentage of accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Acc. Fin. 
Exp. Dir.) and the percentage of non-accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of 
Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. ). Other firm-level independent variables include: The 
logarithm of the market capitalisation at the end of the year (SIZE), market-to-book ratio 
(M/B), standard deviation of their daily return over the fiscal year (SDRET), the 
logarithm of the number of firms in the industry to which the firm belongs (Log(NIND)), 
share traded volume (VOLUM) and firm leverage (Lev). The study controls for firm and 
year fix effect. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
  NCSKEW DUVOL 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. 
Dir. -0.106  -0.0318  
 (0.0814)  (0.0267)  
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. 
Exp. Dir.   -0.0816  -0.000951 
  (0.112)  (0.0361) 
SIZE -0.0690*** -0.0676*** -0.0179*** -0.0174*** 
 (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.00548) (0.00549) 
M/B -0.0226*** -0.0230*** -0.00767*** -0.00775*** 
 (0.00298) (0.00299) (0.00104) (0.00104) 
SDRET -0.469 -0.493 0.102 0.0986 
 (1.279) (1.280) (0.417) (0.417) 
Log(NIND) 0.0824 0.0806 0.0127 0.0119 
 (0.0637) (0.0636) (0.0212) (0.0212) 
VOLUM 0.832*** 0.828*** 0.289*** 0.288*** 
 (0.0911) (0.0912) (0.0313) (0.0313) 
LEV 0.166* 0.167* 0.0517* 0.0518* 
 (0.0884) (0.0883) (0.0283) (0.0283) 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,785 13,785 13,785 13,785 
R-squared 0.104 0.104 0.107 0.106 
Table 3.10 reports the regression results of Eq. 9. It shows the relationship 
between directors’ financial expertise and firm crash risk. Columns 1 and 2 test the 
relationship between the fraction of financial-expert directors and firm crash risk 
measured by NCSKEW. Column 1 shows that when measuring directors’ financial 
experience by directory accounting financial experience, the coefficient shows a 
negative magnitude to firm NCSKEW. That is the fraction of financial-experts on 
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board reduces firm crash risk. However, the relationship appears to be insignificant at 
any level. Column 2 replicates column 1 regression using the fraction of non-
accounting financial-experts and shows similar results, a negative but insignificant 
relationship between Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. and NCSKEW.  
Table 3.10 Columns 3 and 4 imitate the table first two columns regression 
using the DUVOL crash risk measure. When changing crash risk measure, the first two 
columns’ result remains the same, the Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. and the Frac. of 
Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. have a negative but insignificant relationship to firm crash 
risk measured by DUVOL. These results indicate that the fraction of accounting 
financial-experts and the fraction of non-accounting financial-experts have no 
significant effect on firm crash risk. 
All in all, the results show that although the Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. reduce 
firm stock price synchronicity, increasing the firm-specific information embedded in 
the share price; it failed to have an effect on CEOs’ ability to withhold bad news 
disclosure resulting in crash risk. A similar result is also found when directors’ 
financial experience is measured by the Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.  
3.9.2. Effect of directors’ characteristics. 
In this section, to understand the dynamics of the effect of accounting financial-expert 
directors’ effect on firm stock price synchronicity by empirically testing whether the 
relationship between the fraction of directors’ financial experience and stock price 
synchronicity is diverse across different types of directors’ characteristics12. Through 
the literature, directors’ characteristics effect on directors’ monitoring drew many 
scholars’ attention. This study split the fraction of accounting financial-experts based 
on directors’ business (Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.(Busy) and Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. 
Dir. (Non-Busy)), independence (Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (Independent)) and Frac. 
of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (Executive)) and gender (Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (Female) 
 
12 The study draws its further analysis based on directors’ accounting financial experience 
only giving their significant relationship to firm stock price synchronicity. The study 
investigated a similar analysis on non-accounting financial-experts and found the non-
significant relationship does not change with different directors’ characteristics. However, 
these results are not documented in this study. 
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and Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (Male)) and tests their effect on firm stock price 
synchronicity. 
Table 3.11 presents the results of the regressions of stock price synchronicity 
for different groups of the Frac. Of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. Column 1 presents the results 
for busy and non-busy Frac. Of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. A business of director is identified 
if the director serves on three or more current boards. The split was based on the 
sample median on the number of seats a director holds on other current boards. 
Column 1 documents a negative relationship between both Frac. Of Acc. Fin. Exp. 
Dir. (Busy) and Frac. Of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (Non-Busy) with SYNCH. However, the 
relationship is only significant with Frac. Of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (Busy). This 
concludes that the relationship between accounting financial-expert directors on board 
and the amount of information embedded into the share price is driven from busy 
accounting financial-experts. This is in line with the literature findings that busy 
directors are better source of knowledge (Harris and Shimizu, 2004) and that director 
busyness is a proxy for director quality (Ghosh, 2007) as they may provide better 
expertise by gaining experience with other board responsibilities and be better 
monitors (Ferris et al., 2003). 
Column 2 in Table 3.11 test the relationship between the Frac. Of Acc. Fin. 
Exp. Dir. independence on firm stock price synchronicity. The results show a negative 
and significant coefficient only for the Frac. Of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (Independent) and 
not for Frac. Of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (Executive). This result indicates that the fraction 
of accounting-financial-experts are more effective in reducing firm stock price 
synchronicity if they are independent. This finding is consistent with the literature that 
independent directors improve the firm monitoring and informational environment 
(Chen and Jaggi 2000; Lim et al. 2007; Donnelly and Mulcahy 2008; Garcia-Meca 
and Sanchez-Ballesta 2010). 
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Table 3. 11 Board of directors’ characteristics and stock price synchronicity 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of the relation between different directors’ 
characteristics financial experience and stock price synchronicity. The dependent variable is the stock 
price synchronicity (SYNCH). The main independent variables are the percentage of busy accounting 
financial-experts on board (Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.(Busy)), the percentage of non-busy 
accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (Non-Busy)) the percentage of 
independent accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (Independent)), the 
percentage of executive accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. 
(Executive)), the percentage of female accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. 
Dir. (Female)) and the percentage of male accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Acc. Fin. 
Exp. Dir. (Male)). Other firm-level independent variables include: The logarithm of the market 
capitalisation at the end of the year (SIZE), market-to-book ratio (M/B), standard deviation of their 
daily return over the fiscal year (SDRET), the logarithm of the number of firms in the industry to 
which the firm belongs (Log(NINA)), share traded volume (VOLUME) and firm leverage (LEV). The 
study control for firm and year fix effect. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the firm level. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
   
SYNCH 
(1) (2) (3) 
        
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.(Busy) -0.0982**   
 -0.0398   
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (Non-Busy) -0.0447   
 -0.0517   
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (Independent)  -0.178**  
  -0.0701  
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (Executive)  0.0354  
  -0.0372  
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (Female)   -0.0166 
   -0.0345 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (Male)   -0.136* 
   -0.0776 
SIZE 0.152*** 0.151*** 0.152*** 
 -0.0191 -0.0191 -0.0192 
M/B 0.00016 0.0000554 0.0000486 
 -0.00297 -0.00296 -0.00297 
SDRET 7.997*** 8.000*** 8.023*** 
 -1.408 -1.41 -1.41 
Log(NIND) 0.0387 0.04 0.0391 
 -0.0697 -0.0698 -0.0698 
VOLUME -0.239** -0.236** -0.235** 
 -0.0928 -0.0929 -0.0931 
LEV 0.171** 0.168* 0.170** 
 -0.0857 -0.0857 -0.0859 
    
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13,908 13,908 13,908 
R-squared 0.442 0.442 0.442 
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Column 3 in Table 3.11 presents the regression result for the relationship 
between firm stock price synchronicity and the Frac. Of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. split based 
on accounting financial-experts’ gender. It concludes that despite Frac. Of Acc. Fin. 
Exp. Dir.(Female) and Frac. Of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (Male) both have a negative 
coefficient, only Frac. Of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (Male) is significant. This indicates that 
the fraction of male accounting financial-experts to males on board have a positive 
effect on the amount of information imbedded in the share price where the fraction of 
female accounting financial-experts to females on board has no significant effect. 
Although Gul et al. (2011) found that female directors improve stock price 
informativeness, when looking at the fraction of accounting financial experience, the 
study found that the fraction of male accounting financial-experts to male directors 
improves stock price informativeness rather than the fraction of female accounting 
financial-experts to female directors. 
All in all, for different directors’ characteristics, the percentage of accounting 
financial-experts’ effect on stock price synchronicity differs. According to the study 
findings, increasing the percentage of accounting-financial-experts with busy, 
independent and male directors can improve the amount of information embedded in 
the share price.  
3.9.3. Cross-sectional variation in financial-experts’ synchronicity. 
In this section, the study turns attention to whether a relationship between the 
financial-experts on board and stock price informativeness is heterogeneous across 
different types of firms. The study examines how firm size, the quality of a firm’s 
corporate governance and market competition affects the financial-experts stock price 
informativeness relation. Firms are grouped according to the median of the 
distribution of corporate governance variables. However, for CEO duality variable, 
the sample is grouped according to the CEO duality condition.  
Table 3.12 presents regressions of firm SYNCH for groups of firms based on 
their size, internal and external corporate governance quality and market competition. 
In the literature, firm size has indicated to be a key determinant of stock price 
synchronicity (Roll 1988; Skaife et al. 2006). Columns 1 and 2 present the regressions 
results of the effect of accounting financial-experts on firm stock price synchronicity 
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based on the sample split of small and large firms (measured as the logarithm of the 
firm market capitalisation at the end of the year). Columns 1 and 2 found a negative 
relationship between SYNCH and Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.. However, the negative 
coefficient for Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. was only found in large firms. This suggest 
that the study’s prime findings are exclusively driven by large firms.  
According to previous studies, board independence is linked to better corporate 
governance and board monitoring (Weisbach 1988). Columns 3 and 4 present the 
regression results between SYNCH and Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. for the sample 
splits of high and low dependent boards’ firms. For high board independence firms, 
column 3 shows that the Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. coefficient is negative and 
significant at 10% level. However, for low board independence firms, column 4 shows 
that the Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. to be insignificant at any level. These results 
conclude that the negative relationship between SYNCH and Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. 
Dir. only exists in high dependent board firms. This indicates that the study prime 
findings are exclusively driven by high dependent boards’ firms. 
Focusing on extant literature on corporate governance quality, CEO duality is 
a widely studied topic and the results on CEO duality on firms’ reveal mixed results. 
From stewardship theory point of view, CEO duality is a necessary contributor to the 
harmony of the firm (Donaldson and Davis 1991) where agency theory proponents 
perspective argues that firms with a management structure based on non-CEO duality 
delivers better governance through more CEO monitoring effectiveness (Peng et al. 
2007). Columns 5 and 6 present the results for the relationship between SYNCH and 
Frac. Of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. for the sample split based on CEO duality. A negative 
relationship is found between SYNCH and Frac. Of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. only in firms 
where supervision structure is based on CEO duality. This concludes that the fraction 
of accounting financial-experts on board is effective on increasing the amount of 
information embedded in the share price if CEO duality exists.  
The empirical findings on the institutional ownership effectiveness over top 
management monitoring are also mixed. whilst some studies provide empirical 
evidence suggesting that institutional investors serve a monitoring role (Chung et al. 
2002; Hartzell and Starks 2003), other studies contradict this finding (Brickley et al. 
1988; Van Nuys 1993). Columns 7 and 8 show the regression results between SYNCH 
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and Frac. Of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. for the sample split based on the firm institutional 
ownership. Results show that the negative relationship between Frac. Of Acc. Fin. 
Exp. Dir. and SYNCH are significant only in low institutional ownership sample. The 
study concludes that main findings are fully driven by low institutional ownership 
firms. 
The study also used the E-Index of Bebchuk et al. (2009) as a measure of 
corporate governance strength13. High E-Index indicates low corporate governance 
strength where low E-Index indicates high corporate governance strength. Columns 9 
and 10 illustrate the main study regression on the sample split based on the E-Index 
score. The study concludes that after splitting the sample, results show that the primary 
study results hold only on firms with weak corporate governance. 
Lastly, the study considers firm market competition. Each firm’s HHI 
(Herndahl-Hirschman Index) was measured based on the "Textual Network Industry 
Classification" (TNIC) industries formed using firm-by-firm similarity measures 
following Hoberg et al. (2014). Testing the firm market competition effect on the 
relationship between SYNCH and Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir., according to Hoberg et 
al. (2014) in a less stable market, firms hold more security to allow them to react at 
times when competitive threats arise. Better firm corporate governance will allow 
firms to better react at market competitive threats (Kurzeja and Novak 2017). Column 
11 and 12 shows that the negative association between directors accounting financial 
experience and firm stock price synchronicity is pronounced in firms with low market 
competition rather than high market competition.  
 
 
13 E-Index is constructed based on the six provisions (staggered boards, limits to shareholder byelaw 
amendments, supermajority requirements for mergers, supermajority requirements for charter 
amendments, poison pills, and golden parachute). The study give the value of 1 for the presence of 
each provision or 0 otherwise. The E-Index is the sum of the values of all the 6 provision. Thus E-
Index will take the value from 0 to 6 Bebchuk, L. et al. 2009. What Matters in Corporate 
Governance? The Review of Financial Studies 22(2), pp. 783-827.  
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Table 3. 12 The effect of firm size and corporate governance 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of the relation between financial-experts and stock 
price synchronicity. The first columns the sample was divided into high and low firm size. Columns 3 
and 4, the sample was divided based on the firm board independence. Columns 5 and 6, the sample 
was divided based on the firm CEO duality. Columns 7 and 8, the sample was divided based on the 
firm institutional ownership. Column 9 and 10, the sample was divided based on the firm E-Index. 
Columns 11 and 12, the sample was divided based on the firm market competition. The study control 
for firm and year fix effect. Standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
  High Firm Size Low Firm Size High indep Low indep 
 SYNCH SYNCH SYNCH SYNCH 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Frac. of Acc. Fin. 
Exp. Dir. -0.200* -0.163 -0.215* -0.134 
 (0.120) (0.128) (0.114) (0.143) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,909 6,897 7,506 6,295 
R-squared 0.472 0.435 0.475 0.478 
     
  
CEO is the 
Chairman 
CEO is not the 
Chairman High instown Low instown 
 SYNCH SYNCH SYNCH SYNCH 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
Frac. of Acc. Fin. 
Exp. Dir. -0.207* -0.195 -0.125 -0.259** 
 (0.108) (0.165) (0.117) (0.122) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,064 4,722 6,539 7,268 
R-squared 0.472 0.465 0.480 0.431 
     
  Low E-Index   High E-Index   High HHI Low HHI 
 SYNCH SYNCH SYNCH SYNCH 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) 
          
Frac. of Acc. Fin. 
Exp. Dir. -0.0386 -0.273** -0.135 -0.262** 
 (0.147) (0.123) (0.122) (0.122) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,188 5,689 6,872 6,706 
R-squared 0.509 0.507 0.510 0.439 
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In summary, the main results of the study appear to vary based on firm size, 
corporate governance and market competition. For firm size, results hold only in large 
firms, rather than small firms. However, for firm corporate governance, results mainly 
hold for firms where CEOs also held the role of chairman, low institutional ownership 
and low E-Index. This finding shows that directors’ financial experience effect appears 
when firm corporate governance is weak. This is an interesting finding and is in line 
with the argument that directors with financial experience act as better monitors as 
their monitoring effect appears where most needed. Conversely, when measuring firm 
corporate governance by their board independence, directors’ financial experience 
effect appears when firm board of directors is highly independent (strong governance). 
Moreover, the negative association between directors’ accounting financial experience 
and firm stock price synchronicity is pronounced in firms with low market 
competition, rather than high market competition. This result is inconsistent with the 
argument that better corporate governance enhances firm activities during market 
competitive threats.    
3.10. Conclusion 
This study investigates the extent to which financial-experts serving on board of 
directors’ affect firm informational environment and can improve the amount of 
information embedded in the firm share price reducing firm stock price 
informativeness. The study argues that better financial experience on board can 
improve the board’s understanding of financial information, reduce the cost in 
obtaining information relating to complexity of financial transactions and risk taking, 
demand better corporate and financial information environment and improve board 
monitoring. This, in turn, increases and improves the firm specific information on the 
market, allowing greater independence to the firm share price.  
Based on a sample of 1,078 non-financial firms from the S&P 1500 database 
for the period 1999–2016, this part of the study presents several important findings 
and implications. First, the study provides new evidence that firms with a higher 
fraction of accounting financial-experts on board have lower firm stock price 
informativeness. However, results show that financial-experts failed to have an effect 
on CEOs’ ability to withhold bad news disclosure resulting in crash risk.  Second, the 
study finds that the negative association between financial-experts on board and firm 
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stock price informativeness is stronger with busy and independent directors. This 
finding is in line with prior literature, arguing that different directors’ attributes affect 
firm informational environment. Third, the study highlights that the relationship 
between accounting financial-experts and stock price informativeness is non-
heterogeneous across different types of firms. The relationship is mainly found in 
firms with large market capitalisation, CEO duality, low institutional ownership and 
high E-Index. The results show that prior to the implementation of the SOX Act, 
financial-experts on board of treatment and controlled groups trend were similar. This 
is in line with the difference-in-difference parallel trends assumption. Moreover, 
results denote that the effect of the SOX Act began after its enactment in the 2002-
2004 period and dissolved after that implying a causal effect.  
Overall, the findings presented in this chapter advance the growing literature 
on the effectiveness of board composition and the role of financial-experts on board 
monitoring. The study’s main results are robust because the study utilises a greater 
number of board attributes, a stricter sample selection method, removing the effect of 
large firms and removing the effect of unusual stock price behaviour during financial 
crises. In particular, the study findings provide some useful guidance to regulators and 
board of directors on directors’ allocation. The next chapter focusses on the 
investigation relating to financial-experts and firms cash holding. 
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Chapter 4: Financial experience and firm cash holding  
4.1. Introduction  
During economic growth, firm cash holding increases and it is the managers’ duty to 
make strategic decisions about the appropriate way to manage the firm cash reserve, 
whether to distribute it to shareholders, use it internally, use it for external acquisition 
or continue holding the extra cash Harford et al. (2008). Over recent years, firms 
worldwide have shown an extraordinary increase in their cash holding. According to 
Bates et al. (2009), in the US, the cash to assets ratio for industry firms more than 
doubled during the period between 1980 and 2006. The concept of building up an 
enormous cash reserve is also seen in the UK market. Florackis and Sainani (2018) 
note an increase in the average cash holdings of UK firms from the period between 
1999 and 2011. Moreover, Iskandar-Datta and Jia (2012) cross-country analysis shows 
an increase of cash holding in France, Australia, Canada and Germany for the period 
between 1991and 2007. Consequently, the topic of the main determinants of firm cash 
holding became increasingly attractive in literature. The aim of this chapter is to 
investigate the effect that financial expert directors have on firm cash holding.    
From an economic logical-perspective, excess cash holdings benefit firms by 
limiting their transaction cost and funding their capital investment. This results in 
reducing firm loss from underinvesting due to shortage in free cash flow (Kim et al. 
1998; Opler et al. 1999; Mikkelson and Partch 2003; Ozkan and Ozkan 2004). 
Moreover, cash holding provides firm access with liquidity (Almeida et al. 2014), 
mainly during a financial crisis or shortage of access to credit (Campello et al. 2011). 
However, under the agency theory point of view, where ownership and control are 
separated, firm corporate governance plays a vital role in the firm’s level of excess 
cash held. The theory suggests that better-governed firms are more keen to distribute 
free cash to shareholders to limit the appearance of agency problem due to managers’ 
misuse of free cash flow (Jensen 1986; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2003). According to 
Jensen (1986), firms that tend to hold high free cash flow encounter managers who 
overinvest in unprofitable investments or engage in activities seeking their benefits at 
the expense of shareholders. Following Jensen (1986) study, literature shows that 
cash-rich firms engage in more value distortion activities (Lang et al. 1991; Blanchard 
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et al. 1994; Harford 1999; Harford et al. 2008). Managers have a strong incentive to 
hold more free cash flow. Thus corporate governance strength was found to have a 
direct effect on the amount of excess cash holdings in a firm (Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith 2003). 
Extended studies provide sufficient evidence on the relationship between 
shareholders’ right and corporate cash holding (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2003; Lee 
et al. 2003; Kalcheva and Lins 2007; Al-Najjar 2013) and show that countries with 
low shareholder protection retain more cash. However, when studying the US market, 
a country with high shareholder protection, Harford et al. (2008) shows that weak 
corporate governed structured firms have lower cash reserves. Nevertheless, firms 
with excess cash and weak shareholder rights were found to increase their capital 
expenditures and acquisitions and reduce their profitability and valuation. Other 
studies investigate the effect of firm monitory policy on firm cash holding. Jigao and 
Zhengfei (2009) study investigate the effect of monitory policy and cash holding in 
China and found that firm cash holding vary according to the monitory policy 
tightness. They argue that tighter monitory policy, the firm face higher external 
financial constraints and thus firms hold on more cash.  
Board of directors play a pivotal role in firm monitory policy and board of 
directors’ demography reveals a direct effect on firm cash holding. For example, 
literature shows that firm cash holding can be determined by directors’ independence 
(Ozkan and Ozkan 2004; Chen 2008; Chen and Chuang 2009) board size (Harford et 
al. 2008; Al-Najjar and Clark 2017), board leadership structure (Kusnadi 2011) and 
CEO duality (Boubaker et al. 2015). Previous literature also shows the effect of 
financial expertise on board has on firm financial decisions (Güner et al. 2008; Minton 
et al. 2011; Minton et al. 2014). This study investigates, for the first time, how 
financial-experts on board affect the propensity to stockpile cash. In doing so, the 
study raises the following questions:  
(1) Do financial-expert directors lead managers to reduce their stockpile cash 
reserves?  
(2) How does the presence of financial-experts on board affect the managers’ 
deployment of free cash? 
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(3) Are the differences in deployment of cash reflected in differences in firm 
profitability and ultimate valuation? 
A primary attribute of the study is attempting to capture the different financial-
expert director’s (accounting financial-experience and non-accounting financial 
experience) ability to influence critical financial policies in light of two contradicting 
hypotheses: the flexibility hypothesis and the spending hypothesis. The flexibility 
hypothesis argues that the less effective control is over managers, the more managers 
stack cash reserves for future financial flexibility, whereas the spending hypothesis 
suggests that managers prefer excess cash spending rather than holding, thus the more 
effective monitoring is over managers. Consequently, better effective control over 
managers positively affects firm cash holding.  
Using a sample of 965 non-finance and non-utility listed firms on the S&P 
1500 from 2000 to 2017, this study examines the effect of the fraction of financial-
experts on board on firm cash holding and investigates whether these effects are 
related to firm investment decision and profitability. Using ordinary least squares 
regression with industry and year fixed effect, this study found that the fraction of 
accounting financial-experts has an inverse relationship to firm level of cash holding. 
The relationship was found to be driven by the high fraction of accounting financial-
experts decreasing the firm level of cash holding but not by the low fraction of 
accounting financial-experts on board increasing firm cash holding. The study’s main 
findings are robust to controlling for additional board characteristics and different cash 
holding measures. To gain a better insight into the dynamics of the relationship 
between financial-experts on board and firm cash holding, the study investigates the 
influence of firm financial constraint and corporate governance. Additional tests show 
that when firm financial constraints are measured by firm size and payout ratio, 
directors with accounting financial-experience limit firm cash holding in financial 
constraint firms; however, using KZ Index, the effect of financial-experts on firm cash 
holding appears only in financially unconstrained firms. Moreover, the fraction of 
accounting financial-experts is more effective in reducing the firm cash holding when 
boards are highly independent and small and the firm CEO also holds the role of 
chairman and the firm E-Index measure is high. This shows that the effect from the 
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fraction of accounting financial-experts on board on firm cash holding is not consistent 
across different firms’ financial constraint and corporate governance measures.  
The study also examines how the relationship between board financial 
experience and firm excess cash holding affects firm financial decisions and payout 
policies. Results show that accounting financial-experts’ distribution of excess cash 
usually functions in the form of dividend payments. However, they do not influence 
how the firm excess cash is used in firm financial decisions. Moreover, results also 
show accounting financial-experts’ ability to enhance firm profitability and market-
to-book ratio from the firm changes in excess cash holding. Following Faulkender and 
Wang (2006) model on the value of cash holding, results suggest that shareholders 
would not value cash holding any differently in the presence of financial-experts on 
board. Also, applying Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) model on the value of excess 
cash holding, there is no evidence to support the argument that investors would value 
excess cash holding any differently in the presence of accounting financial-experts on 
board and very weak evidence on investors valuing excess cash more in the presence 
of non-accounting financial-experts on board.  
The study contributes to the finance literature on the effectiveness of financial-
expert directors on board in several ways. First, the results indicate that financial-
expert directors play a significant role in firm cash holding and in support of the 
flexibility hypothesis. This study adds to the literature on the effect of board 
composition on firm cash holding. Previous literature primarily focuses on the role of 
board independence, board gender diversity, board size, and CEO duality (Gill and 
Shah 2012; Boubaker et al. 2015; Atif et al. 2019). To the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, this study is the first to link financial experience of directors to the firm’s 
cash holding.  Second, the results challenge the SOX Act definition of financial 
experience14, which includes “supervising” employees with financial reporting 
responsibilities. Directors with CEO- and Chairman-experiences failed to have the 
same positive influence to those with prior accounting financial experience. Finally, 
the results offer empirical justification to increasing calls by policymakers and 
 
14 This study financial experience measured were taken according to the SOX Act 
definitions of financial experience (see section 2.2.3.) 
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academics for more financial-expert directors on boards to prevent managers pursuing 
self-interest activities. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 provides a 
literature review on the firm cash holding; Section 4.3 develops the study hypothesis; 
Section 4.4 outlines the study sample and the scope; Section 4.5 provides the study 
methodology; Section 4.6 describes the sample descriptive analysis; Section 4.7 
provides and discusses the study main results; Section 4.8 shows additional analysis; 
Section 4.9 concludes the chapter. 
4.2. Hypothesis development  
As a corporate governance mechanism, the board of directors is responsible for 
evaluating and monitoring top management decisions. Fundamental to board 
effectiveness is the question of directors’ characteristics. The literature on the impact 
of directors’ knowledge and experience shows that directors with financial-experts can 
improve board monitoring and advisory role (Güner et al. 2008; Minton et al. 2011; 
Minton et al. 2014). Lack of efficient monitoring by the board of director provides 
managers with more freedom to pursue more self-interested activities, including cash 
holding (Ozkan and Ozkan 2004; Lee and Lee 2009; Boubaker et al. 2015; Atif et al. 
2019). 
Previous studies on corporate governance effect on firm cash holding 
investigate the role of different board characteristics’ effect. According to Boubaker 
et al. (2015) study of French listed firms, firms with more board independence and 
split CEO and chairman role retain less cash reserve than those of less effective board 
composition. Gill and Shah (2012) studied the main determinant of firm cash holding 
in Canada and report, among other firm financial position variables, board size and 
CEO duality to have a significant effect on firm cash holding. A recent study by Atif 
et al. (2019), on the effect of gender presence on board on firm cash holding in the 
US, documents that the more diversified board shows a significant negative 
relationship to firm level of cash holding. Moreover, Lee and Lee (2009) found that 
when managerial entrenchment is high, firms’ fraction of outside director on the board 
and smaller board size have a negative effect on firm cash holdings, emphasising that 
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the positive association between entrenched managers and firm cash holding is 
mitigated by strong board structure. 
Literature on the best board structure to serve shareholder interest recently 
shed light on the effect of directors’ financial experience on firm activities., For 
example, according to Güner et al. (2008), financial-experts on board play a vital role 
in firm financial decisions. Other studies show that financial-experts on board are 
associated with a firm level of risk-taking (Minton et al. 2014). According to Huang 
et al. (2014), investment bankers on board attempt to increase firm acquisitions. 
Moreover, they show investment banker directors’ ability to identify suitable target 
acquirers and reduce the cost of acquirers’ deals. Harris and Raviv (2008) argue that 
financial-experts are better able to acquire information about a specific financial 
transaction complexity and associated risk at a lower cost and are, thus, more effective 
monitors at top management. Based on financial-experts’ ability to make better-
informed investment decisions, it can be argued that improving board monitoring 
through directors’ financial experience would affect firm-level and distribution of cash 
holding. This effect has not been covered in the literature and, therefore, this study 
investigates the nature and dynamic of the effect of directors with financial experience 
on board on firm cash holding. 
Previous studies discuss financial-expert directors’ ability to improve board 
monitoring role (Xie et al. 2003; Abbott et al. 2004; Agrawal and Chadha 2005). On 
the one hand, improving monitoring reduces information asymmetry problem between 
shareholders and managers. Arguably, this would ease borrowing constraints, 
increasing the firm ability to raise money externally (Ozkan and Ozkan 2004), which 
suggests a negative relationship between board financial experience and firm cash 
holding. In contrast, improving board efficiency can provide shareholders with better 
protection. According to Opler et al. (1999), consistent with the financial hierarchy 
hypothesis, shareholders would be more willing to ease restrictions on managers, 
allowing them to hold more cash. This suggests that as financial-expert directors 
improve board efficiency, financial-expert directors have a positive effect on firm cash 
holding.  
To the extent that financial-expert directors perform a better monitoring and 
disciplining function, it would be expected that board of directors’ financial 
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experience exercises their influence on the firm cash holding. To test the relationship 
between directors’ financial experience and firm cash holding, the study follows 
previous studies focused on two primary contradicting hypotheses in relation to 
mitigating agency conflict of interest and firm management of cash holding: 
The Flexibility Hypothesis: the traditional financial theory refers to the long-
run value of a firm reliance mainly on firm investments. Finance flexibility allows 
managers to have substantial financial reserves to quickly finance suitable investments 
(Jensen 1986). According to Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986), managers prefer 
financial flexibility and independence from capital market control. However, self-
interested managers withhold excess cash from investment to help them survive 
unexpected adversity. According to the flexibility hypothesis, the less effective control 
is over managers, the more managers stack cash reserves. From previous arguments, 
financial-expert directors improve directors’ monitoring and advisor role; thus, the 
study hypothesises the following: 
The spending Hypothesis: according to the agency theory, self-interested 
managers prefer spending firm excess cash flow rather than holding it (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). Spending hypothesis, in contradiction with flexibility hypothesis, 
suggests that the more effective monitoring is over managers, the more firm will retain 
cash. In light of the spending hypothesis and the positive effect of financial-experts on 
firm advisory and monitoring role, the study hypothesises the following: 
Hypothesis 1: the fraction of accounting financial-expert directors have an 
effect on cash holding.  
Hypothesis 2: the fraction of non-accounting financial-expert directors have 
an effect on cash holding.  
4.3. Data and variables construction 
4.3.1. Sample and scope 
The study sample comprises publicly traded companies of Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 
500 (LargeCap), S&P 400 (MidCaps), S&P 600 (SmallCap). The sample period 
begins in 2000 and ends in 2017. The study excludes all financial firms SIC code 
 93 
between 6000 and 6999 due to their involvement in inventory marketable securities 
which are included in cash and their need to meet legal capital requirements. 
Moreover, it excludes firms where their cash holding might be conditional on the 
regulatory requirement (Utilities). Firms in the sample are required to have positive 
cash holding and sale. To mitigate the outlier effects, all continuous variables 
winsorise at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution. 
 
Table 4. 1 Selection criteria for the sample 
 
Analysis of sample attrition at different stages of sample. 
 
Criterion # of firms 
All firms in the S&P 1500 1500 
Financial and Utilities firms 370 
Missing data firms  165 
Sample (excluding finance and Utilities firms and missing data firms) 965 
All of this study’s financial firm-specific information is collected using the 
COMPUSTAT North America database. The study uses BoardEx database to measure 
directors’ previous financial experience and collect board characteristic variables. 
Industry classification is formed based on the Fama-French 48 industry classification. 
After excluding financial and utility firms and firms with missing data, the sample size 
includes 965 firms and 11,530 firm-year observations (see Table 4.1). 
4.3.2. Variable definitions 
This section presents the dependent and control variable definitions used in this part 
of the study. The study independent variable (the fraction of accounting financial 
experts and the fraction of non-accounting financial experts) definition and measure 
remains as described in Section 2.3.3.  
4.3.2.1. Cash policy  
To measure firm cash holding, the study uses three cash holding measures used in the 
literature: First, for the main analysis, following Harford et al. (2008), cash holding is 
measured as the ratio of cash to sale computed as the logarithm of cash and cash 
equivalent divided by total sale (CH); Second, as a robust check, it follows Opler et 
al. (1999) and Harford et al. (2008) and cash holding is measured as the ratio of cash 
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and marketable securities to net assets computed as the logarithm of assets minus cash 
and marketable securities. (CH2). Moreover, following Bates et al. (2009) and Nguyen 
et al. (2018), cash holding was also measured as the ratio of cash and marketable 
securities to total assets computed as the cash plus marketable securities divided by 
total assets (CH3). 
4.3.2.2. Control variables 
For the main model, a list of control variables was included that were identified in the 
literature to influence the corporate cash holding. These variables were motivated by 
Opler et al. (1999) and the study main objectives include: firm size, growth 
opportunities, cash flow, net working capital, financial leverage, cash flow volatility, 
research and development expense, capital expenditure and dividend policy.  
Firm size (SIZE): prior literature shows mixed results when it comes to the 
relationship between firm size and a firm cash holding. Among many scholars, Miller 
and Orr (1966) argue that cash holding must be lower in larger firms due to economies 
of scales. Previous studies documented a positive relationship between firm size and 
the amount of cash holding (Ozkan and Ozkan 2004; Kalcheva and Lins 2007). When 
comparing large firms to small firms, to meet quality of investment and firm activities, 
large firms need to retain a larger amount of capital reserves (Opler et al. 1999; Chen 
and Chuang 2009). SIZE is computed as the logarithm of firm total assets at the end 
of the year. 
Growth opportunities (GROWTH): The firm level of growth opportunities 
determines their amount of financial needs. Thus, as Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2003) 
propose, firms with greater growth opportunity prefer to hold more cash. As growth 
opportunities increase, the firms increase their cash reserves to avoid the additional 
cost of raising external financial funds (Myers and Majluf 1984). Boyle and Guthrie 
(2003) demonstrate that holding substantial cash reserves can help to maintain their 
potential growth opportunity alive. Previous literature shows a positive relationship 
between the strength of growth opportunity and firm cash holding (Opler et al. 1999; 
Ozkan and Ozkan 2004). The study measures the firm growth opportunity as the firm 
market-to-book ratio. 
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Cash flows (CF): firm cash flow symbolises the firm source of cash (Chen and 
Chuang 2009). Literature anticipated mixed results when it comes to the relationship 
between cash flow and cash holding. The pecking order theory assumes that increasing 
the firm cash flow should boost the firm cash holding where the trade-off theory 
predicts an inverse relationship (Boubaker et al. 2015). The study measures cash flow 
as the ratio of earnings before interests, taxes, depreciation and amortisation less 
interests, taxes, and dividends, to assets net of cash and marketable securities. 
Net working capital (NWC): the firm net working capital is used as a proxy for 
liquidity (Harford et al. 2008). It shows the firm ability to self-finance, discounting for 
cash. According to Kim et al. (1998), a firm NWC is expected to have a negative effect 
on the level of cash holding. NWC is computed as working capital minus cash and 
marketable securities, divided by the total assets net of cash and marketable securities. 
Financial leverage (LEV): firm financial leverage is an indicator of firm ability 
to issue debt. Firms may use debt as a financial alternative to holding great amounts 
of cash and marketable securities (Ozkan and Ozkan 2004). Literature shows that 
highly levered firms have lower cash holding (Opler et al. 1999; Ozkan and Ozkan 
2004; Harford et al. 2008; Florackis and Sainani 2018). LEV is calculated as total debt, 
defined as long term debt, divided by assets net of cash and marketable securities. 
Cash flow volatility (CFVOL): Minton and Schrand (1999) argue that in the 
existence of capital market imperfection, high rate of cash flow shortfalls raises the 
firm’s cost of external capital. Therefore, firms with high cash flow volatility are 
anticipated to hold more cash to mitigate the predicted costs of financial constraints. 
Literature shows a significantly positive relationship between CFVOL and cash 
reserves (Opler et al. 1999; Harford et al. 2008; Florackis and Sainani 2018). The 
measure used in the study for CFVOL is the standard deviation of cash flow from the 
past four years. 
Research and development (R&D) expense: According to Opler et al. (1999), 
research and development expense can be used as an indicator to measure the cost of 
financial distress. Studies show that research and development have a positive and 
significant relationship with cash holding (Florackis and Sainani 2018). R&D 
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calculated as firm research and development expenditure to total sales. Firms that do 
not report R&D expenses are categorised as firms with no R&D expenses. 
Capital expenditures (CAPEXP): Capital expenditure reflects on the firm 
investment activities; it is an indicator of managers incentive to increase the size of 
their firm (Harford et al. 2008), since cash would be a good resource to finance capital 
expenditure (Boubaker et al. 2015). CAPEXP is computed as the ratio of capital 
expenditure to total assets. 
Dividend policy (DIV): Following Opler et al. (1999) and Chen and Chuang 
(2009), the study control for the firm dividend policy. DIV is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the firm paid dividend and 0 otherwise. 
The model also controls for board of directors’ demography that was argued 
to affect firm level of cash holding; the study control for the board of directors’ size 
(BoardSize) measured as the logarithm of the sum of board members and board 
independence (Indep) measured as the fraction of independent directors to board size.  
Moreover, given that the main variables may change over time, the study also 
adds control for year and industry to control for the unobserved heterogeneity effect 
of time and firm. Year fixed effect controls for the time trends of financial expertise 
on board and firm cash holding, where the industry fixed effect reflects factors related 
to a specific industry that could influence the determinants of both; appointing 
directors with financial experience and firm cash holding. Industry fixed effect was 
added based on Fama-French 48 industry classification.  
4.4. Methodology  
4.4.1. Empirical model  
To empirically test the  relationship between the fraction of financial-experts on board 
and firm cash holding, motivated by Harford et al. (2008) study, this research develops 
the following model: 
log O 5!,#6789!,#P = &$ +	&%	4*,D-501	04	451,1D5,2	+EF+*-3	J5*+D-0*3!,(#2%) 	+	/	#01-*023!,(#2%) + "+,*	78 + I1JH3-*K	78 + 9!,#                                                        (10) 
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Where i represent the firm and t represent the year, cash holding is the dependent 
variable measured as the natural logarithm of #!,# (the firm cash and cash equivalents) 
divided by the firm !*0)!,# as total sale (CH). 4*,D-501	04	451,1D5,2	+EF+*-3	J5*+D-0*3!,(#2%) represent the study independent 
variables which are the fraction of firm different financial-experts (accounting and 
non-accounting financial experience) on board. The model #./+(.01!,#$%represent all 
study controls that were proven in the literature to influence the corporate cash 
holding. The model adds ")*(	56 and I/7U1+(V	56. This study control for industry 
effect follows Fama and French 48 industry classification. Following Harford et al. 
(2008) and Petersen (2009) and reports out t-statistics using standard errors corrected 
for clustering at firm level.  
4.5. Descriptive analysis 
This section provides the sample descriptive analysis through a summary of the sample 
characteristics and variable summary statistics and correlation. 
4.5.1. Sample characteristics  
This section provides sample characteristics through descriptive analysis of the 
number of observations spread through the sample years, and sample firm industries 
distribution. 
Table 4.2 panel A shows the number of observations spread through the sample 
period. The number of firm observations start at only 56 firms in 2000 and increases 
yearly to reach 886 firms in 2016. The total firm-year observation comes to 11,530.  
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Table 4. 2 Descriptive statistic 
 
The study sample contain 965 firms from S&P 1500 non-financial and non-utilities firms 
and 11,530 firm-year observation over the period from 2000 to 2017. The Fama-French 
10-industry classification is used for Panel B. 
 
Panel A: observation yearly distribution 
Year Number of firm obs. % of firm obs. from the total sample. 
2000 56 0.5% 
2001 415 3.6% 
2002 468 4.1% 
2003 497 4.3% 
2004 631 5.5% 
2005 664 5.8% 
2006 697 6.0% 
2007 723 6.3% 
2008 740 6.4% 
2009 754 6.5% 
2010 772 6.7% 
2011 793 6.9% 
2012 825 7.2% 
2013 839 7.3% 
2014 853 7.4% 
2015 883 7.7% 
2016 886 7.7% 
2017 34 0.3% 
Total 11530 100% 
Panel B on Table 4.3 provides the sample firm distribution among Fama-French 10 
industry classifications. It shows that tech and manufacturing industry has the highest 
number of firms in the sample with 193 and 189 firms respectively, each representing 
approximately 20% of the sample firms. Following tech and manufacturing industry, 
shop and other industries represent 16% (156 firms) and 14% (138 firms) of the sample 
firms correspondingly. Consumer durables and telecommunication industries came 
last with the number of firms’ observations, with only 3% (32 firms) and 2% (23 firms) 
of the firms’ study sample. Table 4.3 also shows that the distribution of firm-year 
observation through industries has a very similar percentage to the firms’ observations 
distribution. 
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4.5.2. Summary statistics and correlation. 
This section provides the study main variables summary statistic and correlation. 
Table 4.4 presents the sample descriptive statistic for the main variables including the 
mean, median, standard deviation, 5th, 25th, 75th and 95th percentiles. The main variable 
in panel A, CH, has a mean (median) variable of -2.678 (-2.529)15 and a standard 
deviation of 1.439, higher than those reported in Harford et al. (2008) of US market. 
Panel B shows the sample descriptive static of independent variables Frac. of Acc. 
Fin. Exp. Dir. and Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.. The sample shows higher Frac. 
of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. with a mean of 28.3% and a median of 25% when compared to 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. with a mean of 13.6% and a median of 11.1%. Frac. 
of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. has a standard deviation of 0.283 where Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. 
Exp. Dir. has a slandered deviation of 0.136.  
 
15 Due to the skewness in the ratio of cash to sale with a mean of 0.194 , a median of 0.080 
and a standard deviation of 1.453, the study log cash holding. 
Table 4. 3 Descriptive statistic (continue) 
 
Panel B:  Sample industry firm distribution based on  Fama-French 10 industry 
classification. 
Industry No. of firms obs. %of firms No of firm year obs. % of firms 
Durables 32 3% 351 3% 
Energy 53 5% 624 5% 
High Tech 193 20% 2430 21% 
Healthcare 107 11% 1,178 10% 
Manufacturing 189 20% 2361 20% 
Non-Durables 74 8% 910 8% 
Other 138 14% 1,656 14% 
Shops 156 16% 1,813 16% 
Telecom 23 2% 207 2% 
Utilities 0 0% 0 0% 
Total 965 100% 11530 100% 
 100 
Table 4. 4 Summary statistics 
 
This table presents the study variables summary statistic. CH: is the firm level of cash holding, measured as the log of the firm ratio of cash to sale Frac. of Acc. 
Fin. Exp. Dir.: the percentage of accounting financial-experts on board. Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. : the percentage of non-accounting financial-experts 
on board. SIZE: firm size measured as the log of the firm total assets. NWC: is the firm net working capital measured as firm working capital minus cash divided 
by firm assets net of cash. LEV: is the firm leverage: measured as firm long term debt divided by assets net of cash. R&D: is the firm research and development 
expenses divided by sale. M/B: is the firm market-to-book ratio, measured as the firm market value divided by firm assets net of cash. CAPEXP: is the firm 
capital expenditure measured divided by total assets. CF: is the firm cash flow divided by assets net of cash. AQC: is the firm acquisitions divided by firm assets 
net of cash. CFVOL: is the firm cash flow volatility measured as is measured as the standard deviation of cash flow-to-assets net of cash for the past four years. 
DIV: is dividends. It is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm paid dividend and 0 otherwise. All continues variables are winsorised at the bottom and top 1 % 
levels.  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev 5th Pctl 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl 95th Pctl 
Panel A: Cash holding (dependent variable) 
CH 11,530 -2.678 1.439 -5.173 -3.520 -2.529 -1.691 -0.634 
Panel B: Financial Experience measures (independent variables) 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. 11,530 0.283 0.172 0.000 0.143 0.250 0.400 0.600 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.  11,530 0.136 0.128 0.000 0.000 0.111 0.200 0.375 
Panel C: Firm financial information (control variables) 
SIZE 11,530 7.587 1.590 5.216 6.418 7.460 8.624 10.421 
NWC 11,530 0.134 0.180 -0.127 0.010 0.113 0.239 0.472 
LEV 11,530 0.199 0.183 0.000 0.018 0.178 0.303 0.540 
R&D 11,530 0.043 0.086 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.044 0.204 
M/B 11,530 1.915 1.714 0.378 0.835 1.398 2.348 5.398 
CAPEXP 11,530 0.050 0.047 0.008 0.020 0.035 0.062 0.149 
CF 11,530 0.113 0.103 -0.026 0.071 0.111 0.160 0.269 
AQC 11,530 0.034 0.069 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.031 0.186 
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CFVOL 11,530 0.047 0.071 0.005 0.013 0.024 0.049 0.166 
DIV 11,530 0.586 0.493 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
 
 102 
Table 4.4 panel C shows the study sample control variables descriptive static. In terms 
of firm financial information, firms in the sample has an average firm size of 7.587 
with high and low firm SIZE (5.216 and 10.421, 5th and 95th percentile respectively), 
higher than reported in Harford et al. (2008)16. The mean of the sample net working 
capital to net assets of 13.4%, the sample firms have low and high NWC (-0.127 and 
0.472, 5th and 95th percentile correspondingly). The sample mean of firm leverage ratio 
is 19.9% slightly lower than Harford et al. (2008) study sample. There are unlevered 
firms in the sample with 0 LEV as the 5th percentile and increases only to 0.540 as the 
95th percentile. Firm in the sample mean of research and development to sale ratio of 
4.3%. More than 25% of sample firms pay no research and development expenses. 
However, R&D reached 0.204 in 95th percentile. As for M/B ratio, the sample mean is 
1.915. The sample is constructed from high and low growth opportunity firms with 
M/B of 0.375 in the 5th percentile and 5.398 in the 95th percentile. Sample firms mean 
of capital expenditure to total assets of 0.050 vary similarly to those reported in 
Harford et al. (2008). The average firms of the sample have cash flow to net assets of 
11.3%, acquisition to net assets ratio of 3.4%, cash flow volatility of 0.047 and about 
0.586 of firms’ payout dividends.  
Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 reports the correlation coefficient between the main 
variables used in the study. The correlation matrix provides an insight into the 
relationship between the study dependent and independent variables. It also specifies 
a potential multicollinearity problem that might lead to false estimate. Spearman 
(Pearson) correlation coefficients are shown on below (above) the diagonal. Several 
features of the data are worth highlighting. The relationship between the Frac. of Acc. 
Fin. Exp. Dir. shows a positive magnitude to CH and significance at 10% level in 
Spearman correlation and insignificance at Pearson correlation., inconsistent with the 
research hypothesis. Moreover, the correlation between Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. 
Dir. and CH is positive and statistically insignificant at any level for Spearman and 
significant at 10% level in Pearson correlations. These changes in significance indicate 
inconsistent significance level for financial-experts’ variables. The correlation matrix 
also shows that all control variables are significantly correlated to CH at the 1% level. 
 
16 The sample firms average assets is 7.8$ billion and their mean is 1.7$ billion. Due to the 
data skewness, the firm size is calculated using the log of firm assets.  
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Spearman (Pearson) correlation coefficients provide similar results for almost all 
variables with similar degrees and significance levels. The correlation matrix shows 
no potential multicollinearity between the study variables17
 
17 Another way to assess multicollinearity problem is through calculating the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) for all independent variables. The VIF results show that the maximum VIF takes 
the value of 1.91 where the lowest VIF is 1.05. These values are below the 10 rule of thumb 
threshold provided by Chatterjee, S. and Hadi, A. S. 2015. Regression analysis by example. 
John Wiley & Sons.. This indicated that the multicollinearity issue is unlikely to be presented 
in this study. 
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Table 4. 5 Correlation matrix 
 
This table presents the study variables correlation matrix. Spearman (Pearson) correlation coefficients are shown on below (above) the diagonal. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
CH 1 0.0115 0.0149* -0.1176*** 0.098*** -0.0991*** 0.4501*** 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. 0.0158* 1 0.1929*** 0.1613*** -0.1012*** 0.1409*** -0.0437*** 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.  0.0022 0.2082*** 1 0.006 -0.0462*** 0.0695*** -0.0536*** 
SIZE -0.1559*** 0.1435*** 0.0012 1 -0.3889*** 0.3153*** -0.1885*** 
NWC 0.1083*** -0.0845*** -0.0687*** -0.4355*** 1 -0.2917*** 0.2406*** 
LEV -0.2085*** 0.15*** 0.0431*** 0.4426*** -0.3474*** 1 -0.1559*** 
R&D 0.4879*** -0.006 -0.0423*** -0.1587*** 0.2405*** -0.199*** 1 
M/B 0.422*** -0.0196** 0.0251*** -0.3475*** 0.2327*** -0.4417*** 0.387*** 
CAPEXP -0.2617*** -0.05*** 0.0626*** 0.1151*** -0.2139*** 0.0682*** -0.3362*** 
CF 0.1349*** -0.0142 0.0258*** -0.1269*** 0.09*** -0.2976*** 0.0483*** 
AQC -0.03*** 0.0438*** -0.0285*** 0.0752*** -0.0345*** 0.0913*** 0.1066*** 
CFVOL 0.3996*** -0.0591*** -0.0155* -0.3159*** 0.1904*** -0.197*** 0.3177*** 
DIV -0.2561*** 0.0473*** 0.021** 0.3461*** -0.1617*** 0.1566*** -0.2101*** 
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Table 4. 6 Correlation matrix (continue) 
 
This table presents the study variables correlation matrix. Spearman (Pearson) correlation coefficients are shown on below (above) the diagonal. *, **, and 
*** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
  8 9 10 11 12 13 
CH 0.3605*** -0.1969*** 0.0058 0.0003 0.2979*** -0.2085*** 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. -0.0319*** -0.0597*** -0.0048 0.0254*** -0.0497*** 0.0561*** 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.  0.0173** 0.0204** 0.0436*** -0.0071 -0.0228*** 0.0298*** 
SIZE -0.3199*** 0.0183** -0.0544*** -0.0347*** -0.2721*** 0.3619*** 
NWC 0.1666*** -0.2025*** 0.0061 -0.0677*** 0.1009*** -0.1668*** 
LEV -0.3299*** -0.0335*** -0.2334*** 0.0665*** -0.0883*** 0.1432*** 
R&D 0.3625*** -0.1738*** -0.2456*** 0.047*** 0.4099*** -0.308*** 
M/B 1 0.0174** 0.4029*** -0.0239*** 0.2814*** -0.2272*** 
CAPEXP -0.058*** 1 0.1691*** -0.1388*** -0.065*** -0.0071 
CF 0.6259*** 0.245*** 1 -0.0393*** -0.1088*** 0.0616*** 
AQC 0.0034 -0.2201*** -0.0444*** 1 -0.0014 -0.0781*** 
CFVOL 0.2669*** -0.1139*** 0.0935*** -0.0877*** 1 -0.2788*** 
DIV -0.1746*** 0.1119*** 0.0378*** -0.0191** -0.3153*** 1 
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4.6. Regression Results 
4.6.1. Cash holding and financial experience on board 
To test the relationship between the fraction of financial experts on board their effect 
on firm cash holding, the study estimates Eq. (10) using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression with industry and year fixed effect. All continuous variables were 
winsorised by 1%. Models 1 and 3 in Table 4.7 present the study main regression 
result testing the effect the fraction of accounting financial-experts and non-
accounting financial-experts on board, correspondingly. The result in Model 1 tests 
the relationship between the Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. and firm CH and shows that 
after controlling for firm financial variables, Model 1 proposes that CH is negatively 
related to the Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.. The relationship is shown to be significant 
at 5% level. On the other hand, Model 3 duplicates the first model regression using 
firm Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. as financial experience measure and shows a 
positive non-significant relationship between the Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. and firm 
CH. Moving to firm-related control variables, the table shows that all control variables 
have their expected sign. As discussed previously, firms with high cash holding tend 
to be significant in size, high growth opportunity, substantial cash flow and high cash 
flow volatility, whereas, firms with low cash holding have high net working capital, 
leverage, high capital expenditure, high acquisition and pay more dividend.  
4.6.2. Changes in cash holding and financial experience on board 
Even though the relationship between the board of directors’ financial experience and 
firm cash holding is negatively significant, OLS regression does not account for 
sample endogeneity. The main concern related to sample endogeneity is that the 
relationship may be subject to reverse casualty; that is, the relationship may be a result 
of firms with low cash holding possibly hiring more financial-experts rather than a 
higher fraction of financial-experts holding lower cash of firm; alternatively, that 
fraction of board financial-experts and cash holding are jointly determined. To test 
whether the directors’ financial experience variables are related to the change in a 
firm’s cash holdings, the study follows Harford et al. (2008) research and control for 
the endogeneity concern by adding the lagged variable of firm cash holding on the 
study model. This model offers evidence on the fraction of financial experience on 
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board ability to predict firm future cash holding. Moreover, as an additional control 
for endogenous choice, the lagged fraction of financial-expert variable was added 
representing the historical values.  
Models 2 and 4 to 6 in Table 4.7 represent the results of the analysis after 
accounting for the endogenous concerns. Models 2 and 4 duplicate Models 1 and 3, 
respectively, using an additional variable of lagged cash holding. Models 2 and 4 show 
similar results to previous regressions (Models 1 and 3 correspondingly). The 
significance level of Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. remains significant at 5% level in 
Model 2 when comparing the results to Model 1, where the Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. 
Dir. coefficients rise from -0.385 to -0.125. The Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. 
Dir. remain insignificant in Model 4 when comparing the results in Model 2. As 
should be expected, the firm lagged cash holding explains a significant amount of the 
current cash holding with coefficients of 0.732 and significance at 1% level. This is 
also shown in the jump of the model R-square from 0.41 in Models 1 and 3 to 0.74 in 
Models 2 and 4. Model 5 tests the relationship between board financial-experts 
different measured combined (accounting and non-accounting financial-experts) to 
firm cash holding and found similar results with the same level of significance and 
magnitude.  
 In previous models, it assumes a linear relationship between cash holding and 
board financial experience. In Model 6, the study examines the effect of the fraction 
of financial experts on board in a non-linear relationship. The fraction of accounting 
financial-experts is split into quartiles and two new variables are added representing 
the first and fourth quartiles. The results found that only the coefficient of the 4th 
quartile to be significant at 1% level. This suggests that the real relationship is 
asymmetric and the coefficient presence with the linear model to be inaccurate18.  
 
18 A similar type of cut was applied on the non-accounting financial-experts (although the 
results are not reported in the thesis), both variables were shown to be insignificant. 
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Table 4. 7 Financial experience and firm cash holding 
 
This table reports the results of the relation between financial-experts and firm cash holding. The dependent variable is the firm cash holding (CH), measured as the 
logarithm of cash and cash equivalent divided by total sale. The main independent variables are the percentage of accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of 
Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.) and the percentage of non-accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. ). SIZE: firm size measured as the log of the 
firm total assets. NWC: is the firm net working capital measured as firm working capital minus cash divided by firm assets net of cash. LEV: is the firm leverage: 
measured as firm long term debt divided by assets net of cash. R&D: is the firm research and development expenses divided by sale. M/B: is the firm market-to-
book ratio, measured as the firm market value divided by firm assets net of cash. CAPEXP: is the firm capital expenditure measured divided by total assets. CF: is 
the firm cash flow divided by assets net of cash. AQC: is the firm acquisitions divided by firm assets net of cash. CFVOL: is the firm cash flow volatility measured 
as is measured as the standard deviation of cash flow-to-assets net of cash for the past four years. DIV: is dividends. It is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm paid 
dividend and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
 CH 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
             
CH(t-1)  0.732***  0.733*** 0.732*** 0.732*** 
  (0.0115)  (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0115) 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.(t-1) -0.385** -0.125**   -0.128**  
 (0.171) (0.0573)   (0.0571)  
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (t-1)   0.0463 0.0640 0.0701  
   (0.213) (0.0677) (0.0678)  
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.(t-1)(1Q)      0.0170 
      (0.0177) 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.(t-1)(4Q)      -0.0513*** 
      (0.0184) 
SIZE 0.0377* -0.00301 0.0359* -0.00337 -0.00261 -0.00320 
 (0.0195) (0.00634) (0.0195) (0.00629) (0.00631) (0.00632) 
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NWC -0.329** -0.406*** -0.315* -0.402*** -0.406*** -0.402*** 
 (0.162) (0.0563) (0.162) (0.0562) (0.0564) (0.0564) 
LEV -0.0597 0.113** -0.0977 0.102* 0.114** 0.113** 
 (0.162) (0.0562) (0.162) (0.0556) (0.0562) (0.0560) 
R&D 3.985*** 1.040*** 3.987*** 1.039*** 1.042*** 1.037*** 
 (0.387) (0.136) (0.388) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) 
M/B 0.173*** 0.0568*** 0.172*** 0.0561*** 0.0567*** 0.0568*** 
 (0.0149) (0.00640) (0.0149) (0.00638) (0.00640) (0.00640) 
CAPEXP -4.825*** -3.319*** -4.790*** -3.310*** -3.325*** -3.325*** 
 (0.728) (0.257) (0.734) (0.259) (0.258) (0.257) 
CF 0.674*** 0.400*** 0.666*** 0.395*** 0.398*** 0.400*** 
 (0.221) (0.111) (0.221) (0.111) (0.111) (0.111) 
AQC -1.123*** -1.858*** -1.116*** -1.857*** -1.859*** -1.862*** 
 (0.218) (0.123) (0.218) (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) 
CFVOL 1.057*** -0.0922 1.047*** -0.0966 -0.0921 -0.0940 
 (0.293) (0.114) (0.294) (0.115) (0.114) (0.115) 
DIV -0.199*** -0.0864*** -0.202*** -0.0871*** -0.0865*** -0.0865*** 
 (0.0601) (0.0196) (0.0604) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0196) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,530 11,498 11,530 11,498 11,498 11,498 
R-squared 0.408 0.739 0.407 0.739 0.739 0.739 
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Overall results suggest that financial-experts on board can influence firm cash 
position as accounting financial-experts were found to be negatively related to firm 
cash holding. However, the fraction of non-accounting financial-experts on board was 
not related in all cross-sectional analysis. Firms with a higher fraction of accounting 
financial-experts on board retain less cash. However, results were driven by a high 
fraction of financial-experts on board reducing firm cash holding and not by a lower 
fraction of financial-experts on board holding more cash. In relation to cash holding, 
the regression results suggest that accounting financial-experts appear to influence 
board monitoring role, where non-accounting financial-experts do not have any 
significant influence. Increasing board financial-experts through the increase of the 
fraction of non-accounting financial-expert directors would not have the same 
influence on cash holding monitoring as when increased through the fraction of 
accounting financial-expert directors. This result is consistent with the traditional 
financial theory argument on the flexibility hypothesis where managers prefer 
financial flexibility and independence from capital market control. However, 
enchanted managers reserve on excess cash form investment to help them survive 
unexpected adversity. According to the hypothesis, as control over managers 
decreases, managers stack more cash reserves (Fama and Jensen 1983; Easterbrook 
1984). This study shows that enhancing board control over managers through more 
accounting financial-expert directors reduces managers’ ability to retain more cash on 
the firm. 
4.6.3. Financial experience, investment decisions and valuation 
According to Harford et al. (2008), a firm’s cash position is affected by the level of 
shareholders’ protection. Referring to the shareholders' right hypothesis; as 
shareholders’ rights increase, shareholders would allow managers to hold more higher 
cash reserves, giving their ability to control the way in which cash is spent. To better 
understand the optimal outcome of increasing shareholder protection through 
financial-expert directors, the study tests the relationship between excess cash holding, 
financial experience and firm investment. Moreover, the study tests the relationship 
between financial-expert directors and excess cash holding on firm value. 
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4.6.3.1. Financial experience and investment decisions  
In addition to the study main regression, it further investigates the relationship 
between firm investment decisions and directors’ financial experience. Precisely, it 
investigates how excess cash, directors financial experience and the interaction 
between these two variables are related to firm investment decisions. The study 
follows Harford et al. (2008) and uses two internal investment measurement of (i) 
capital expenditure and (ii) R&D expenditure and one external investment decisions 
(iii) acquisition. 
 Following Harford et al. (2008), firm cash position is defined as the 
unexplained amount of cash holding and the variations in the unexplained amount. 
The unexplained amount of cash holding is measured as residual from a regression of 
cash holdings on firm size, leverage, growth options, profitability, the ratio of working 
capital to assets, cash flow volatility, R&D to sales, capital expenditures to assets and 
acquisition to sales controlling for industry and year fixed effects.  
When examining how the interaction between the fraction on financial experts 
on board and firm cash holding relates to firm investment decisions, this part of the 
study creates a set of interaction variables between firm different financial-expert 
directors (accounting and non-accounting financial-experts) and cash holding 
residuals (measuring the excess cash) using the following model: 
!"#$#%!"&'()*'")!,# = ,$ +	,%	/01(ℎ!,#&% + ,'	D	/01(ℎ!,#&% +,(	3415)67"	73	36"1"5618	'9:'4)(	#64'5)74(!,#&% +,)		34415)67"	73	36"1"5618	'9:'4)(	#64'()74(!,#&% ×	 	/01(ℎ!,#&% ++	<	07")478(!,# +='14	#>**? + !"#>()4?	#>**? + @!,#	                                                                         (11) 
Where D	#$%&%'#$()*+,)$+!,# for firm i for year t represent the firm change 
in industry adjusted investment. These are: industry adjusted capital expenditure, 
industry adjusted research and development and industry adjusted acquisition. All 
industry adjusted variables are calculated as firm variable minus the mean of the 
industry variable. All industry figures are calculated using all firms in COMPUSTAT 
following Fama-French 48 industry classification. -./*ℎ!,#$% is measured by the 
lagged year cash holding regression residual. Cash holding regression control values 
include firm size measured by firm total assets), leverage, growth opportunity, 
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profitability, working capital to total assets, cash flow volatility, R&D to sale, capital 
expenditure to assets and acquisition to sale, the regression also account for year and 
industry fixed effect. D	/01(ℎ!,#&% is the change in the lagged excess cash holding from 
the previous year.	1415)67"	73	36"1"5618	'9:'4)(	#64'5)74(!,#$% is the lagged value of 
the fraction of financial expert directors on board (measured by the fraction of 
accounting financial-experts on board or by the fraction of non-accounting financial-
experts on board). Additional control variables (.2$+324*!,#) are added following 
Harford et al. (2008), which studied the effect of corporate governance and firm 
investment decisions and profitability, and Comment and Schwert (1995) who 
investigated the effect on firm corporate governance to the profitability of acquisition 
activities. Control variables include the market model residual over the estimation 
period, average prior four years sales growth, average prior four years net working 
capital (less cash), average prior four years leverage (the ratio of long-term debt to 
market value), average prior four years price-earnings ratio and the lagged firm size. 
The model also accounts for the year and industry dummy variables. 
Table 4.8 Models 1, 2, and 3 shows the result of the effect of financial experts 
on board on firm investment decisions. All models show low R-square. The analysis 
is directed on the change in the firm industry investment decisions, which, according 
to Harford et al. (2008) are expected to have a considerable idiosyncratic component. 
When it comes to firm industry adjusted investment decision, results suggest that the 
fraction of accounting and non-accounting financial-experts has no effect on the firm 
industry adjusted capital expenditure, firm industry adjusted R&D or a firm industry 
adjusted acquisition (see Models 1, 2, and 3 correspondingly). Although the firm 
lagged excess cash holding positively influences the firm industry adjusted acquisition 
and the change in the firm lagged excess cash holding increases the firm industry 
adjusted acquisition and capital expenditure, results suggest that the interaction 
between different financial experiences and excess cash holding have no effect on firm 
industry-adjusted investment decisions.  
4.6.3.2. Financial experience and payout policy 
A different explanation for the reason why firms have low cash holding is making the 
decision for distributing cash to shareholders. Mirroring the analysis of investment 
decision, this study investigates how financial-experts on board are related to firm 
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payout policy; precisely, the firm dividend distribution and repurchases. Following 
Harford et al. (2008), the study measures the yearly industry-adjustment of dividend 
and repurchase. To capture the gradual changes in industry adjusted-dividend due to 
conservative dividend policy, the study measures the changes in firm industry-
adjusted payout ratios of dividend and repurchases (see Brav et al. (2005) and Harford 
et al. (2008)).  
When testing the effect financial experts and firm excess cash have on firm 
payout policy, results reported in Table 4.8 (Model 4) shows that change in firm excess 
cash positively influences the firm industry adjusted repurchase decision where Model 
5 shows that firm lagged excess cash holding to be negatively related to the firm 
change in dividend payout. For financial-expert variables, the study found that the 
fraction of accounting and non-accounting financial-experts on board not to affect firm 
change in repurchases or dividend payments (see Models 4 and 5). However, the 
interaction variables between accounting financial-experience and excess cash have a 
significant effect on firm dividend payment. This suggests that, even though account 
financial-experts do not affect the change of firm industry-payout policy, they do 
affect the distribution of excess cash holdings to shareholders in the form of dividend 
only.  
Payout policy results suggest that firms do not differ in the change of their 
payout policies based on the fraction of financial-expert directors on board. However, 
the fraction of accounting financial-experts explains a great deal of the firm increase 
in industry adjusted-dividend payments from firm excess cash holding.
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Table 4. 8 Financial experience and cash holding as they relate to firm' investment and payout decisions 
  
This table depicts the relationship between investment decisions and payout policy and financial-experts on board. In relation to investment 
decisions, the dependent variables are the change in industry-adjusted acquisition, R&D expenditure and capital expenditure. In relation to 
payout decisions the dependent variables are industry-adjusted dividend and repurchase. All dependent variables are yearly industry-
adjusted using Fama-French 48 industry classification system. To avoid selection bias, industry median is calculated using all 
COMPUSTAT data. Firm cash position is the unexplained cash holding and the change in their cash position. That is, the residual from 
regressing cash holding on firm specific characteristics representing the firm excess cash holding. The cash holding regression control for 
firm size, leverage, growth option, profitability, ratio of working capital to assets, four years cash flow volatility, R&D to sale, capital 
expenditure to assets, and acquisition to sale. The cash holding regression also control for industry and year effects. The board financial 
experience variables are the percentage of accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.) and the percentage of non-
accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.). Board financial experience variables are lagged one year. The 
interaction between board financial experience and cash holding residuals examine how the use of the firm excess cash and financial 
experience related to investment decisions and payput policy. More control variables including the firm average sale growth (SaleGrowth), 
average leverage (LEV), average net working capital net of cash (NWC), average Price/Earnings ratio (PE), market model residual calculated 
over the estimated period (MarketResidual), and lagged firm size (SIZE) (averages are calculated over the prior four years). Standard error 
is estimated with clustered error at firm level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 Investment Decisions Payout Policy 
 
∆Ind 
Adjusted 
Acquisitions 
∆Ind 
Adjusted 
R&D 
∆Ind 
Adjusted 
Capital Exp. 
∆Ind 
Adjusted 
Repurchase 
∆Ind 
Adjusted 
Dividend 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
CH-residual(t-1) 0.00628*** 0.000554 0.000810 0.0502 -0.106* 
 (0.00233) (0.00231) (0.00109) (0.0499) (0.0640) 
∆CH-residual(t-1) 0.0131*** -0.00101 0.00162** 0.217*** -0.0156 
 (0.00209) (0.000840) (0.000645) (0.0350) (0.0385) 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.(t-1) 0.000184 -0.00261 0.00115 0.0877 -0.156 
 (0.00317) (0.00180) (0.00154) (0.0908) (0.142) 
 115 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.(t-1)*CH-residual(t-1) -0.00234 0.0140 7.52e-05 0.217 0.507** 
 (0.00747) (0.0130) (0.00274) (0.173) (0.244) 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.( (t-1) -0.000962 -0.00194 -0.000937 0.0695 0.197 
 (0.00414) (0.00272) (0.00189) (0.103) (0.186) 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.( (t-1)*CH-residual(t-1) 0.000950 3.83e-05 0.00370 -0.183 0.445 
 (0.0104) (0.00868) (0.00371) (0.188) (0.685) 
SaleGrowth -0.0273*** -0.0179 -0.00262 0.568*** 0.526** 
 (0.00514) (0.0109) (0.00265) (0.0936) (0.233) 
LEV -0.00516* 0.00488** 0.00715*** -0.307*** -0.317** 
 (0.00295) (0.00225) (0.00198) (0.104) (0.158) 
NWC -0.0141*** 0.00888* 0.00327 -0.126 -0.276 
 (0.00398) (0.00514) (0.00254) (0.103) (0.206) 
PE -1.52e-05 1.11e-06 -6.27e-06 0.000245 -0.0179*** 
 (1.64e-05) (1.04e-05) (6.02e-06) (0.000188) (0.00578) 
MarketResidual 0.0495 0.242* 0.268*** 8.614** 15.59 
 (0.219) (0.128) (0.0926) (4.110) (12.33) 
SIZE(t-1) -0.00423*** 0.00104*** -0.000123 0.0520*** -0.00830 
 (0.000399) (0.000264) (0.000168) (0.00740) (0.0149) 
Industry FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Observations 9,637 9,770 9,768 9,204 9,787 
R-squared 0.026 0.017 0.011 0.043 0.015 
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4.6.4. Financial experience and profitability.  
Although investment decision and payout policy relations to directors’ financial 
experience are informative, they show nothing about the effect on shareholders’ 
wealth. In this section, the investigation focuses on firm performance. It answers the 
question of whether different investment and payout decisions matter to firm future 
profitability. To empirically measure the effect of financial experts on board on firm 
profitability, motivated by Harford et al. (2008), the study develops the following 
model:  
!"#$#%&'()!,# = +$ +	+%!"#$#%&'()!,#&% +	+'./01ℎ!,#&% + +(	D	./01ℎ!,#&% ++)	)'0345("	()	)5"0"3506	7897'41	("	:(0'#!,#&% ++*		)'0345("	()	)5"0"3506	7897'41	("	:(0'#!,#&% ∗ 	./01ℎ!,#&% + 	<	/("4'(61!,# +=70'	#>??@ + !"#>14'@	#>??@ + A!,#                                                                          (12) 
Where !"#$#%&'()!,# is the firm industry adjusted profitability, firm 
profitability was calculated as firm profitability adjusted by the firm industry mean 
profitability. Industry mean profitability was calculated using all COMPUSTAT firm 
based in Fama-French 48 industry classifications that also capture the industry and 
yearly fixed effect. 	./01ℎ!,#&% is the lagged excess cash holdings measured by the 
cash holding regression residual. Cash holding regression control values include firm 
size (measured by firm total assets), leverage, growth opportunity, profitability, 
working capital to total assets, cash flow volatility, R&D to sale, capital expenditure 
to assets and acquisition to sale; the regression also accounts for year and industry 
fixed effect. D	./01ℎ!,#&% is the change in the lagged excess cash holding from the 
previous year. 	)'0345("	()	)5"0"3506	7897'41	#5'734('1!,#$% is the lagged value of the 
fraction of financial expert directors on board (measured by the fraction of accounting 
financial-experts on board or by the fraction of non-accounting financial-experts on 
board). To control for the fact that firm characteristics can be jointly determinant, the 
model adds the lagged industry adjusted profitability. The model also controls for firm 
size, average prior four years sales growth, average prior four years net working 
capital (less cash), average prior four years leverage (the ratio of long-term debt to 
market value).  
 117 
Table 4. 9 Financial experience and cash holding in relation to firm profitability and market-to-book ratio.  
This table examines the effect of financial-experts on board on firm profitability and market-to-book ratio in relation to their 
industry peers. Due to endogeneity concerns, the regression includes firm lagged industry adjusted profitability or industry 
adjusted market-to-book ratio and lag board financial experience measures. All dependent variables are yearly industry-adjusted 
using Fama-French 48 industry classification system. To avoid selection bias, industry median is calculated using all 
COMPUSTAT data. Firm cash position is the unexplained cash holding and the change in their cash position; that is, the residual 
from regressing cash holding on firm specific characteristics representing the firm excess cash holding. The cash holding 
regression control for firm size, leverage, growth option, profitability, ratio of working capital to assets, four years cash flow 
volatility, R&D to sale, capital expenditure to assets, and acquisition to sale. The cash holding regression also controls for 
industry and year effects. The board financial experience variables are the percentage of accounting financial-experts on board 
(Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.) and the percentage of non-accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. 
Dir.). Board financial experience variables are lagged one year. The interaction between board financial experience and cash 
holding residuals is to examine how the use of the firm excess cash and financial experience related to investment decisions and 
payput policy. More control variables, including the firm average sale growth (SaleGrowth), average leverage (LEV), average 
net working capital net of cash (NWC), and firm size (averages are calculated over the prior four years). Standard error is 
estimated with clustered error at firm level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.  
 IndAProf IndAMB 
 (1) (2) 
      
IndAMB(t-1)  0.609*** 
  (0.0365) 
IndAProf(t-1) 0.572***  
 (0.0167)  
CH-residual(t-1) -0.00749*** -0.136* 
 (0.00226) (0.0783) 
∆CH-residual(t-1) 0.00351*** -0.0354 
 (0.00127) (0.0420) 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.(t-1) 0.00464 0.374 
 (0.00487) (0.237) 
 118 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.(t-1)*CH-residual(t-1) 0.00983* 0.470* 
 (0.00580) (0.270) 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.(t-1) 0.0115* -0.0649 
 (0.00593) (0.240) 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.(t-1)*CH-residual(t-1) -0.000624 -0.468 
 (0.00768) (0.334) 
SaleGrowth -0.0208** -0.133 
 (0.00987) (0.218) 
LEV -0.0276*** -0.302 
 (0.00575) (0.320) 
NWC 0.000621 -2.050*** 
 (0.00815) (0.416) 
SIZE 0.000847 -0.0215 
 (0.000633) (0.0235) 
Industry FE Yes  Yes  
Year FE Yes  Yes  
Observations 10,040 10,020 
R-squared 0.701 0.368 
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When testing the relationship between board financial experience and 
profitability, Table 4.9 first column shows that a firm lagged industry adjusted 
profitability explains a significant amount of firm industry adjusted profitability with 
0.572 coefficient and significance at 1% level. Looking at the firm cash holding 
position, it appears that the firm lagged excess cash has a negative effect on the firm 
profitability, consistent with Harford et al. (2008) finding, where the change in lagged 
excess cash holding has a positive and significant effect to firm profitability. This 
could be a result of holding firm cash hindering firm growth opportunities and 
investments and thus reducing profitability. The results on the fraction of financial-
experts on board show that, even though the lagged of Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir does 
not affect IndAProf, the interaction between the lagged Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir and 
lagged CH-residual have a positive and significant at 10% level effect on IndAProf. 
Moreover, the Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir on board shows a positive and 
significant effect on IndAProf. However, their effect does not come from firm excess 
cash holding. 
Firm profitability results, shown above, suggest that the firm excess cash 
holding, together with the fraction of financial experts’ onboard matter in firm industry 
adjusted profitability. Where the excess cash holding hinders firm profitability, the 
fraction of non-accounting financial-experts on board enhances it. When measuring 
financial experience by the fraction of accounting financial-experts on board, the 
results suggest that accounting financial-experts on board enhance firm profitability 
through the use of firm excess cash holding.   
4.6.5. Financial experience and market-to-book value 
Cash holding can distort the value of firm through value-distorting activities or the 
reduction in future profitability. This study extends its analysis to cover firm overall 
value. Following previous approach in the previous section, the study tests how the 
market distinguishes between different spending choices (investment decisions and 
payout policies). Namely, it tests whether directors’ financial experiences are related 
to future firm market-to-book ratio. mirroring the previous section equation; this 
section uses the firm industry adjusted market-to-book ratio as the dependent variable.  
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Model 2 in Table 4.9 shows that lagged market-to-book ratio explains a 
significant amount of the current market-to-book ratio with a coefficient of 0.609 and 
significance at 1%. Results also show that firm lagged excess cash holding decreases 
firm market-to-book ratio with confession of -0.136 at 10% significance level, where 
the change in excess cash holding has an insignificant negative relationship. 
Regarding board financial experience effect on firm industry adjusted market-to-book 
ratio, results show lagged Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir and Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. 
Dir to be positive and negative insignificance, correspondingly, to the effect on 
firm IndAMB. However, the interaction between the lagged Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. 
Dir and firm lagged CH-residual have a positively significant relationship to 
firm IndAMB at 10% level. 
The firm market-to-book ratio results suggest that the firm valuation of 
investors does not change in the presence of financial-experts on board (accounting 
and non-accounting). However, investors’ value excess cash, holding more in the 
presence of accounting financial-experts on board.  
4.7. Robustness checks  
In order to test the verification of the study’s main results, two different robustness 
checks were used — first, the study control for the board of directors’ composition. 
Two main board characteristics are widely tested in the literature to affect firm cash 
holding (i.e. board size and independence) (Chen and Chuang 2009; Isshaq et al. 2009; 
Kuan et al. 2011; Gill and Shah 2012). Table 4.10 shows that, after controlling for 
board size and independence, the study’s main regression results hold showing a 
negative and significant relationship between the fraction of accounting financial-
experts and firm cash holding (Model 1) and no significant relationship between the 
fraction of non-accounting financial-experts and firm cash holding (Model 2). Testing 
the linearity of the relationship between the fraction of accounting financial-experts to 
firm cash holding also hold (Model 3) showing non-linear relationship after breaking 
the fraction of accounting financial-experts into quartiles. The table shows only the 
coefficient of the 4th quartile to be significant at 1% level. This suggests that the real 
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relationship is asymmetric and the coefficient presence with the linear model is 
inaccurate19.  
As a second robustness check, the study used two alternative cash holding 
measures used in the literature. The study also tests the relationship between the 
fraction of financial-experts on board and the log of the ratio of cash divided by firm 
total assets net of cash (CH2) and the ratio of cash and marketable securities divided 
by total assets (CH3). Model 4 and Model 5 in Table 4.10 show that CH2 has similar 
results to the study primary cash holding measure CH. However, the level of 
significance for the accounting financial-experts in Model 4 rises from 5% level to 
10% level. Moreover, the model R-square slightly drops to 0.72. Using CH3 cash 
holding measure, Model 6 and Model 7 also shows similar coefficient direction and 
significance level to the study’s main models’ regression. However, the R-square rises 
from 0.74 to 0.86, which suggests that when testing the relationship between firm cash 
holding and accounting financial-experience, measuring cash holding as the ratio of 
cash mad marketable securities divided by total assets gives a better fit model.  
 
19 A similar type of cut was applied on the non-accounting financial-experts (although the 
results are not reported in the thesis), both variables were shown to be insignificant. 
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Table 4. 10 Financial experience and firm cash holding (Robustness checks) 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of the relation between financial-experts and firm cash holding robustness checks. The dependent variable is the 
firm cash holding (CH), measured as the logarithm of cash and cash equivalent divided by total sale. The main independent variables are the percentage of 
accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.) and the percentage of non-accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. 
Exp. Dir.). SIZE: firm size measured as the log of the firm total assets. NWC: is the firm net working capital measured as firm working capital minus cash divided 
by firm assets net of cash. LEV: is the firm leverage: measured as firm long term debt divided by assets net of cash. R&D: is the firm research and development 
expenses divided by sale. M/B: is the firm market-to-book ratio, measured as the firm market value divided by firm assets net of cash. CAPEXP: is the firm capital 
expenditure measure divided by total assets. CF: is the firm cash flow divided by assets net of cash. AQC: is the firm acquisitions divided by firm assets net of 
cash. CFVOL: is the firm cash flow volatility measured as is measured as the standard deviation of cash flow-to-assets net of cash for the past four years. DIV: is 
dividends. It is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm paid dividend and 0 otherwise. Indep: is the percentage of board independent directors. BoardSize: is the 
board size calculated as the sum of directors on board. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively.   
 CH CH2 CH3 CH2 CH3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                
CH(t-1) 0.731*** 0.732*** 0.731***     
 (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0119)     
CH2(t-1)    0.714***  0.715***  
    (0.0118)  (0.0119)  
CH3(t-1)     0.767***  0.767*** 
     (0.0104)  (0.0104) 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.(t-1) -0.114*   -0.105* -0.00887**   
 (0.0600)   (0.0577) (0.00444)   
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (t-1)  0.0583    0.0644 0.00887 
  (0.0702)    (0.0686) (0.00591) 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.(t-1)(1Q)   0.0181     
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   (0.0178)     
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.(t-1)(4Q)   -0.0489**     
   (0.0195)     
SIZE -0.00135 -0.00133 -0.00145 -0.0332*** -0.00158*** -0.0334*** -0.00157*** 
 (0.00672) (0.00667) (0.00671) (0.00680) (0.000585) (0.00675) (0.000584) 
NWC -0.423*** -0.418*** -0.419*** -0.565*** 0.0448*** -0.562*** 0.0451*** 
 (0.0580) (0.0579) (0.0582) (0.0607) (0.00752) (0.0606) (0.00751) 
LEV 0.115** 0.105* 0.116** 0.0240 0.0303*** 0.0144 0.0295*** 
 (0.0584) (0.0578) (0.0582) (0.0582) (0.00569) (0.0577) (0.00565) 
R&D 1.060*** 1.060*** 1.055*** 0.438*** 0.0952*** 0.439*** 0.0953*** 
 (0.135) (0.136) (0.136) (0.132) (0.0201) (0.132) (0.0201) 
M/B 0.0584*** 0.0577*** 0.0585*** 0.0817*** 0.00867*** 0.0811*** 0.00861*** 
 (0.00654) (0.00652) (0.00654) (0.00688) (0.000880) (0.00687) (0.000876) 
CAPEXP -3.371*** -3.364*** -3.379*** -3.947*** -0.326*** -3.941*** -0.326*** 
 (0.266) (0.269) (0.267) (0.253) (0.0215) (0.254) (0.0217) 
CF 0.379*** 0.375*** 0.379*** 0.601*** 0.0480*** 0.597*** 0.0476*** 
 (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.112) (0.0126) (0.112) (0.0126) 
AQC -1.853*** -1.852*** -1.857*** -2.924*** -0.380*** -2.923*** -0.380*** 
 (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.124) (0.0146) (0.124) (0.0146) 
CFVOL -0.0703 -0.0744 -0.0711 -0.0503 0.0379*** -0.0539 0.0376*** 
 (0.119) (0.120) (0.120) (0.116) (0.0140) (0.117) (0.0140) 
DIV -0.0872*** -0.0881*** -0.0872*** -0.0896*** -0.00810*** -0.0902*** -0.00817*** 
 (0.0204) (0.0205) (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.00171) (0.0204) (0.00171) 
Indep(t-1) -0.0300 -0.0360 -0.0293     
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 (0.0587) (0.0585) (0.0586)     
BoardSize(t-1) 0.0142 0.0192 0.0148     
 (0.0341) (0.0340) (0.0342)     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,734 10,734 10,734 11,498 11,548 11,498 11,548 
R-squared 0.740 0.740 0.740 0.715 0.863 0.715 0.863 
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4.8. Additional analysis 
4.8.1. Cross-sectional variation in financial-experts cash holding 
To obtain an insight into the dynamic of the relationship between financial experts on 
board and firm cash holding, this section proceeds to investigate two cross-sectional 
variations in the relationship. The study introduces the effect of firm financial 
constraints level and corporate governance strength on the relationship and tests 
whether the relationship between financial experts on board and the firm cash holding 
heterogeneous across different financial constraints and corporate governance firms. 
4.8.1.1. Financial constraint 
Previous literature has, indeed, examined the effect of firm financial constraint 
measures on firm cash holdings. According to Han and Qiu (2007), due to 
precautionary reasons, financially constraint firms tend to retain more cash due to 
inadequate access to external capital. Moreover, Chan et al. (2013a) found that 
financially constraint firms have a higher marginal value of cash holding. Thus, a 
financial constraint makes enchanted managers retain more cash buffer compared to 
unconstraint firms. If financial-expert director’s effect on reducing firm cash holding 
due to board monitoring enhancement, financial-experts on board should have more 
effect on reducing cash holding in financially constraint firms, in which managers 
have incentive to retain cash in high. Based on previous literature, the study constructs 
firm financial constraint measures based on three firm characteristics. First, the study 
used firm payout ratio. According to Fazzari et al. (1988), financially constrained 
firms have lower payout ratio. Following Tong (2011), the study measures the 
dividend payout ratio for financial constraints measure based on the ratio of total 
dividend and repurchase divided by total assets. The sample separation is based on the 
sample yearly median payout ratio. To account for endogeneity concern, a firm is 
assigned as constrained (unconstrained) financially if the firm lagged payout ratio is 
below (above) the previous year sample payout ratio median. Second, the study uses 
firm size (firm total assets). According to Faulkender and Wang (2006), when 
compared to small firms, large firms are more recognised in the market and thus it is 
far easier to raise money through the market to fund their investments. Third, the study 
applies KZ index for financial constraint level (Kaplan and Zingales 1997). Based on 
 126 
five factors that arguably correlate with financially constrained firms (cash flow to 
total capital (negative effect), market-to-book ratio (positive effect), debt to total 
capital (positive effect), dividends to total capital (negative effect) and cash holdings 
to capital (negative effect)). Moreover, to deal with models’ endogeneity concern, the 
study categorised firms as financially constrained (unconstrained) if the lagged firm 
size under (above) the t-1 sample yearly firm size median. For payout and KZ index 
variables, the study categorised firms as financial constrained (unconstrained) if the 
lagged financial constraint variable above (under) the t-1 sample yearly financial 
constraint variable median. 
According to Table 4.11, splitting the sample into financial constraints and 
unconstraint firms using firm payout shows that the relationship between the fraction 
of accounting financial-experts on board and firm cash holding appears in financially 
constrained firms with 10% significance level. This implies that when firms are 
financial constraints, the fraction of accounting financial-experts of board have 
significant effect on decreasing the firm cash holding. Similar results were found using 
firm size as a financial constraint measure. The results indicate that the effect on 
accounting financial-experts show only on small firms when compared to large firms’ 
sample. However, when measuring firm financial constraint using the firm KZ Index, 
the results contradict the first two measures. The results show that the effect of 
accounting financial-experts on the reduction of cash holding appears only on low KZ 
Index (unconstraint firms). 
All in all, the results on the financial constraint effect of firms on the 
relationship between the fraction of financial-experts on board on firm cash holding is 
inconsistent and varies based on financial constraint measure. When measuring 
financial constraint based on firm size and payout ratio, the result shows that the effect 
of director financial-experts on limiting firm cash holding appears only in financially 
constraint sample firms (small firm size and low payout ratio). However, when 
measuring firm financial constraint level using KZ Index, the effect of financial-
experts on firm cash holding appears in unconstraint firm sample (low KZ Index).
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Table 4. 11 Sub-sample based on firm financial constrains 
 
This table reports the results the relation between financial-experts and firm cash holding after splitting the sample based on the firm financial constraint level. 
Sample is split based on the sample median of each financial constraint measure. First and second columns, the sample split based on the firm KZ index. Third 
and fourth columns, the sample split based on the firm size. Fifth and sixth columns, the sample split based on the firm payout. The dependent variable is the 
firm cash holding (CH), measures as the logarithm of cash and cash equivalent divided by total sale. The main independent variables are the percentage of 
accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.) and the percentage of non-accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. 
Exp. Dir. ). SIZE: firm size measured as the log of the firm total assets. NWC: is the firm net working capital measured as firm working capital minus cash 
divided by firm assets net of cash. LEV: is the firm leverage: measured as firm long term debt divided by assets net of cash. R&D: is the firm research and 
development expenses divided by sale. M/B: is the firm market-to-book ratio, measured as the firm market value divided by firm assets net of cash. CAPEXP: 
is the firm capital expenditure measure divided by total assets. CF: is the firm cash flow divided by assets net of cash. AQC: is the firm acquisitions divided by 
firm assets net of cash. CFVOL: is the firm cash flow volatility measure as is measured as the standard deviation of cash flow-to-assets net of cash for the past 
four years. DIV: is dividends. It is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm paid dividend and 0 otherwise. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
 Low Payout High Payout 
Small Firm 
Size 
Large Firm 
Size 
High KZ 
Index Low KZ Index 
 CH CH CH CH CH CH 
  (5) (6) (3) (4) (1) (2) 
              
CH(t-1) 0.709*** 0.753*** 0.723*** 0.726*** 0.727*** 0.727*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0131) (0.0135) (0.0204) (0.0163) (0.0145) 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.(t-1) -0.148* -0.0819 -0.130* -0.122 -0.0727 -0.182*** 
 (0.0853) (0.0654) (0.0757) (0.0881) (0.0827) (0.0692) 
SIZE 0.00710 -0.00615 0.0347* 0.00781 0.0111 -0.0168** 
 (0.0109) (0.00732) (0.0186) (0.0125) (0.00966) (0.00785) 
NWC -0.515*** -0.307*** -0.470*** -0.350*** -0.276*** -0.489*** 
 (0.0869) (0.0667) (0.0732) (0.0858) (0.0956) (0.0696) 
LEV 0.0391 0.192*** -0.00917 0.252*** 0.0380 0.202** 
 (0.0837) (0.0725) (0.0805) (0.0828) (0.0793) (0.0808) 
R&D 1.227*** 0.888*** 1.168*** 0.877*** 0.722*** 1.275*** 
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 (0.202) (0.190) (0.184) (0.205) (0.206) (0.188) 
M/B 0.0757*** 0.0322*** 0.0569*** 0.0671*** 0.0942*** 0.0407*** 
 (0.00974) (0.00818) (0.00760) (0.0118) (0.0128) (0.00663) 
CAPEXP -3.559*** -3.153*** -3.480*** -3.161*** -3.205*** -4.228*** 
 (0.347) (0.414) (0.341) (0.388) (0.304) (0.507) 
CF 0.446*** 0.518*** 0.522*** 0.174 0.204 0.605*** 
 (0.164) (0.154) (0.151) (0.171) (0.156) (0.134) 
AQC -1.935*** -1.772*** -1.939*** -1.744*** -1.946*** -1.811*** 
 (0.185) (0.154) (0.172) (0.172) (0.202) (0.150) 
CFVOL -0.353** 0.394 -0.197 0.169 0.131 -0.263* 
 (0.176) (0.253) (0.136) (0.228) (0.219) (0.146) 
DIV -0.0918*** -0.0624** -0.129*** -0.0243 -0.0798*** -0.0870*** 
 (0.0289) (0.0250) (0.0267) (0.0290) (0.0276) (0.0279) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,736 5,751 5,750 5,738 6,205 5,282 
R-squared 0.721 0.773 0.755 0.721 0.687 0.771 
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4.8.1.2. Corporate governance 
According to Jensen (1986), the amount of cash held by firms can lead firms into 
engaging in unprofitable investments. The extensive cash buffer gives management 
financial flexibility and liberates them from capital market disciplinary constraints. 
Followed up studies showed the strength of firm corporate governance has a direct 
effect on the firm level of cash holding (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2003; Kalcheva and 
Lins 2007; Harford et al. 2008). Boubaker et al. (2015) found that when governance 
is weak, board characteristics of strong corporate governance have a stronger influence 
on reducing agency conflict between enchanted managers and investors on the firm 
cash policy. Precisely, they found that board characteristics, such as board 
independence and the worth of their structure and business, help reduce firm excess 
cash holding. Thus, this section examines the impact of financial experts on board on 
firm cash holding in the present agency problem. If firms with a high fraction of 
accounting financial-experts reduce the firm cash holdings to mitigate agency 
problem, it should be expected that the effect of the fraction of financial-experts on 
board on firm cash holding to be more pronounced in firms with weak corporate 
governance. 
To measure board governance strength, the sample is separated, based on 
board characteristics that are well established in the literature to effect board 
effectiveness (i.e. board independence, board size and CEO duality). For board 
independence and size, the study split the sample based on the variable lagged yearly 
median. For CEO duality, the sample was split based on the lagged CEO duality 
condition. Moreover, the study also measures firm corporate governance strength 
based on the firm entrenchment index (E-Index ) proposed by Bebchuk et al. (2009). 
All data related to calculated E-Index were taken from Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) database. However, since data on ISS start only from 2007, for previous 
years, E-Index data were taken from Harvard Lucian Bebchuk webpage20 which 
covers the remainder of the sample E-Index. E-Index is constructed based on six 
governance provisions (staggered boards, limits to shareholder byelaw amendments, 
supermajority requirements for mergers, supermajority requirements for charter 
 
20 See http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml 
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amendments, poison pills and golden parachutes). A firm can have E-Index anywhere 
between or equal to 0 and 6. A firm is categorised as firms with strong corporate 
governance if the firm E-Index is 3 or below, where weak governance are marked on 
firms with E-Index 4 and above. 
Table 4.12 shows the main regression results after taking into consideration 
the firm corporate governance strength. Columns 1 and 2 show the main regression 
results after splitting the sample based on the fraction of independent directors on 
board. The regression between the fraction of accounting financial-experts and cash 
holding has a significant and negative coefficient for the fraction of accounting 
financial-experts for firms with high board independence only. This indicates that 
when the board is highly independent, the accounting financial-experts’ influence on 
firm cash holding is more prominent when compared to firms with low board 
independence. This result is inconsistent with the study’s expectation as strong board 
independence is considered to be a strong corporate governance mechanism; however, 
this result could be driven by the independence of financial-experts on board as the 
regression does not account for financial-experts’ independence. 
Moving to board size, columns 3 and 4 present the results for firms with large 
board size and firms with small board size. The results show that t the coefficients of 
the fraction of accounting financial-experts on the board are statistically significant 
for firms with a small board. Previous literature argues that board size is positively 
significant with firm cash holding (Kusnadi 2003; Lee and Lee 2009). Other studies 
found a negative relationship between board size and firm cash holding (Kusnadi 
2011; Al-Najjar and Clark 2017). Whereas previous studies argue that small boards 
are found to be more effective due to the fast decision-making process involving fewer 
people (Jensen 1993), Harris and Raviv (2008) found that a larger board are better 
monitors when managers are highly enchanted. This study shows that the fraction of 
accounting financial-experts on board is more effective on reducing the level of firm 
cash holding in firms with a small board. 
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Table 4. 12 Sub-sample based on firm corporate governance 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of the relation between financial-experts and firm cash holding after splitting the sample based on the firm corporate 
governance level. Sample is split based on the sample median of each financial constraint measure. First and second columns, the sample split based on the board 
independence. Third and fourth columns, the sample split based on the board size. Fifth and sixth columns, the sample split based on CEO duality. The dependent 
variable is the firm cash holding (CH), measured as the logarithm of cash and cash equivalent divided by total sale. The main independent variables are the percentage 
of accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.) and the percentage of non-accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. 
Dir.). SIZE: firm size measured as the log of the firm total assets. NWC: is the firm net working capital measured as firm working capital minus cash divided by firm 
assets net of cash. LEV: is the firm leverage: measured as firm long term debt divided by assets net of cash. R&D: is the firm research and development expenses 
divided by sale. M/B: is the firm market-to-book ratio, measured as the firm market value divided by firm assets net of cash. CAPEXP: is the firm capital expenditure 
measure divided by total assets. CF: is the firm cash flow divided by assets net of cash. AQC: is the firm acquisitions divided by firm assets net of cash. CFVOL: is 
the firm cash flow volatility measured as is measured as the standard deviation of cash flow-to-assets net of cash for the past four years. DIV: is dividends. It is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm paid dividend and 0 otherwise. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
High 
Independence 
Low 
Independence 
Large 
Board Size 
Small Board 
Size Duality 
Non- 
Duality High E-Index Low E-Index 
 CH CH CH CH CH CH CH CH 
  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (11) (12) 
                  
CH(t-1) 0.707*** 0.752*** 0.730*** 0.709*** 0.719*** 0.747*** 0.739*** 0.711*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0174) (0.0173) (0.0159) (0.0150) (0.0161) (0.0141) (0.0184) 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.(t-1) -0.165** -0.111 -0.0923 -0.220** -0.179** -0.00913 -0.190*** 0.00215 
 (0.0741) (0.0857) (0.0853) (0.0894) (0.0738) (0.0914) (0.0716) (0.0850) 
SIZE -0.00239 -0.00342 -0.00923 0.00792 -0.00472 0.00400 -0.000845 -0.00388 
 (0.00850) (0.00918) (0.00955) (0.0136) (0.00769) (0.0113) (0.00795) (0.00948) 
NWC -0.286*** -0.524*** -0.382*** -0.456*** -0.373*** -0.490*** -0.395*** -0.403*** 
 (0.0735) (0.0798) (0.0901) (0.0816) (0.0770) (0.0929) (0.0714) (0.0856) 
LEV 0.102 0.113 0.207*** 0.0393 0.181** -0.00765 0.136* 0.0756 
 (0.0698) (0.0813) (0.0765) (0.0907) (0.0724) (0.0871) (0.0708) (0.0878) 
R&D 0.825*** 1.240*** 1.092*** 1.229*** 1.096*** 0.916*** 1.003*** 1.162*** 
 (0.190) (0.191) (0.264) (0.223) (0.194) (0.207) (0.177) (0.216) 
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M/B 0.0624*** 0.0454*** 0.0699*** 0.0564*** 0.0594*** 0.0516*** 0.0583*** 0.0588*** 
 (0.00924) (0.00859) (0.0109) (0.00801) (0.00824) (0.0101) (0.00805) (0.00960) 
CAPEXP -3.084*** -3.539*** -2.896*** -3.564*** -3.330*** -3.419*** -3.093*** -3.638*** 
 (0.362) (0.358) (0.403) (0.390) (0.299) (0.504) (0.335) (0.409) 
CF 0.296** 0.620*** 0.262 0.651*** 0.544*** 0.273 0.349** 0.498*** 
 (0.150) (0.172) (0.185) (0.150) (0.137) (0.191) (0.142) (0.162) 
AQC -1.639*** -2.077*** -1.959*** -1.831*** -2.130*** -1.474*** -1.685*** -2.210*** 
 (0.143) (0.213) (0.209) (0.183) (0.166) (0.182) (0.153) (0.205) 
CFVOL -0.0753 -0.0860 0.169 -0.310* -0.196 -0.0101 -0.0217 -0.224 
 (0.153) (0.176) (0.208) (0.166) (0.150) (0.162) (0.128) (0.228) 
DIV -0.125*** -0.0473* -0.0499* -0.125*** -0.0911*** -0.0877*** -0.0605** -0.128*** 
 (0.0252) (0.0278) (0.0295) (0.0304) (0.0238) (0.0306) (0.0238) (0.0312) 
Year FE 
Firm FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,764 5,094 4,836 4,514 7,500 3,998 6,982 4,516 
R-squared 0.728 0.753 0.726 0.743 0.723 0.765 0.737 0.744 
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For CEO duality, columns 5 and 6 show the main regression results for the 
sample of firms with CEO also held the role chairman on the board and firms that split 
the CEO and chairman roles. The results show that the fraction of accounting 
financial-experts are found to be negatively significant to firm cash holding when 
firms have CEO duality. This is consistent with the argument that distributing cash is 
more important as a monitoring mechanism when CEOs are more dominant. 
Moreover, columns 7 and 8 show the sample split based on firm E-Index measure. 
The negative relationship between the fraction of accounting financial-experts and 
cash holding is statistically significant only for the above-median E-Index firms where 
managers’ opportunities to expropriate private benefits are high.  
To summarise, the results for the board of directors’ characteristics 
(independence and size), the results show that the fraction of accounting financial-
experts are more effective in reducing firm cash holding when the board characteristics 
are in line with string governance. However, for CEO duality and E-Index measure, 
the result of the fraction of accounting financial-experts on board are found on firms 
with high governance needs, firms with CEO duality and high E-Index measure. 
4.8.2. Financial experience on board and the value of cash holding 
This study extends the analysis to measure not only the effect of board financial 
experience on firm cash holding but also to measure their impact on the value of cash 
holding. According to Opler et al. (1999) and Kim et al. (1998), there is an optimal 
level of firm cash holding based on the trade-off between the benefits and costs of 
holding cash. However, left to their device, managers would exceed the optimal level 
of cash holding, avoiding control and monitoring related to external financing. This 
analysis is motivated by papers Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith (2007). Faulkender and Wang (2006) investigate the value of cash holding and 
how firm excess cash holding can affect firm stock retune. They examine the marginal 
value of cash as well as the impact of financial constraints and raise the question of 
why holding cash may distort firm value. Building on their argument, Dittmar and 
Mahrt-Smith (2007) linked the firm corporate governance to cash holding valuation. 
They show that the value of cash, and therefore, firm value, is partly determined by 
how shareholders expect the cash to be used in the presence of agency problems. Their 
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results show that good corporate governance enhances value of cash holding. Thus, if 
the fraction of financial-experts on board mitigates the firm agency problem, it should 
be expected that the market would value cash holding more in the presence of more 
financial-experts on board.  
To investigate the impact of the fraction of financial-experts on board on the 
value of cash holding, the study applies Faulkender and Wang (2006) method:  
!!,# − #!,#$ = %% +	%& ∆(!,#)!,#$% +	%* ∆+!,#)!,#$% +	%, ∆-.!,#)!,#$% +	%/ ∆01!,#)!,#$% +	%2 ∆3!,#)!,#$% +	%4 ∆1!,#)!,#$% +	%5 (!,#$%)!,#$% + %6(!,# +	%7 -8!,#)!,#$% +	%&% (!,#)!,#$% ×	 ∆(!,#)!,#$% + %&&(!,# ×	 ∆(!,#)!,#$% +%&**!+,-./0	/*	*.0+0,.+1	2342!-5	/0	6+/!7!,# +%&,*!+,-./0	/*	*.0+0,.+1	2342!-5	/0	6+/!7!,# ×	 ∆(!,#)!,#$% + 8!,#                                      (13) 
Where ∆" represent the change in " from year t-1 to t. #!,# is the firm return 
over year t-1 to t. $!,#$  is Fama and French size and book-to-market match portfolio 
return over year t-1 to t. %!,# is the firm market value measured as firm share price at 
the end of fiscal year times shares. &!,# is the firm cash holding measured as the firm 
cash and cash equivariant. '!,# is firm earnings before extradentary items. ()!,#	is the 
firm net assets, measured as the firms total assets net of cash. $+!,# is the firm research 
and development (the study set RD to 0 if missing). ,!,# is the firm interest expense. +!,# represent the firm common dividends. -!,# is the firm leverage measured as the 
firm debt divided by debt plus market value. Firm debt is measured as the firm long 
and short debt. (.!,# is the firm new finance measured as the firm net new equity issues 
plus net new debt issues. *!+,-./0	/*	*.0+0,.+1	2342!-5	/0	6+/!7!,# is the firm 
fraction of financial-experts on board measures. The fraction of financial-experts on 
board is measured as the accounting financial-experts on board or the fraction of non-
accounting financial-experts on board.  
 Firm value is measured following Daniel and Titman (1997), Grinblatt and 
Moskowitz (2004) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) as the excess return for firm 
i for fiscal year t minus the firm benchmark portfolio return for year t. The firm 
benchmark portfolio is measured based on Fama and French (1993) size and book-to-
market portfolios. The study used the return in surplus of the portfolio benchmark to 
control for factors related to firm risk that could hinder the firm return and discount 
rate. For each firm-year observation, a firm is categorised into one of Fama and French 
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25 size and book-to-market portfolios based on the firm size and book-to market ratio. 
To determine which size and book-to-market group each firm falls into, the Fama and 
French 25 size and book-to-market yearly breakpoint was used. Then the matching 
return of Fama and French portfolio for a specific year is considered as the firm 
benchmark return for the matching year.  
The model control variables are identical to those used in Faulkender and 
Wang (2006) and other studies that followed it (i.e. Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007). 
The study control for firm-specific factors may have an effect on firm cash holding 
and return. These factors include the change in profitability, investments and finances. 
In addition to Faulkender and Wang (2006), this study adds year dummies to capture 
macroeconomic and time trend effects. It also adds industry fixed effect to capture 
undetected heterogeneity and industry effect.  
Table 4.13 shows the results on the effect of the fraction of financial exports 
on board on the FF25 adjusted return. Model 1 shows the regression results on the 
fraction of accounting financial-experts on board and the integration between the 
fraction of accounting financial-experts on board and firm change in cash holding on 
firm adjusted return. The results show that, although the fraction of accounting 
financial-experts on board has a significant positive effect on firm adjusted return (at 
1% level) and the change in firm cash holding has a significant positive effect on firm 
adjusted return (at 5% level), the interaction between the fraction of accounting 
financial-experts on board and the change in firm cash holding has an insignificant 
negative relationship to firm adjusted return. These results suggest that investors’ 
value of cash holding is not determined by the presence of accounting financial-
experts on board. 
Model 2 shows the impact of financial-experts on board, measured as the 
fraction of non-accounting financial-experts on board, integration to firm change in 
cash holding effect on from adjusted return. Similar to Model 1 results, the regression 
indicates no relationship between the interaction of non-accounting financial-experts. 
However, the regression shows that the fraction of non-accounting financial-experts 
on board affects the firm adjusted return positively (at 5% level) and the change in 
cash holding remains positively related to the firm adjusted return (at 1% level of 
significance). Model 3 shows the regression results combining the different 
accounting financial-experts on the same regression. The main explanatory variables 
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remain at the same level of significance and the same magnitude with a slight change 
in the coefficients.
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Table 4. 13 The impact of financial-experts on value of cash using return regression 
 
This table motivated by Faulkender and Wang (2006) uses OLS return regression. The dependent variable is firm yearly Fama-
French (1993) 25 size and book-to-market portfolio industry adjusted return. ∆ indicates the change from previous year. C is firm 
cash and marketable securities. The independent variables including board financial experience, are measures as the percentage 
of accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.) and the percentage of non-accounting financial-experts on 
board (Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.). All other independent variables are normalised by the market value of equity (MV) of 
firm at the beginning of the year. These include interaction between financial experience variables and change in cash (Frac. of 
Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.*∆C/MV and Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.*∆C/MV), lagged cash (C), change in earnings (E) (earnings measured 
as earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, differed tax and investment tax credit), assets net of cash (NA), R&D 
expenditure (RD), interest expenditure (I), common dividend (D), leverage (L) (long term debt plus current debt normalised by 
market value of equity plus long term debt plus current debt) and new financing (NF) (measured as net equity issued plus net debt 
issued). Standard error is estimated with clustered error at firm level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 FF25 adj. Return FF25 adj. Return FF25 adj. Return 
 (1) (2) (3) 
        
∆C/MV 1.041** 1.163*** 1.186*** 
 (0.443) (0.363) (0.406) 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. 0.0927***  0.0892*** 
 (0.0245)  (0.0246) 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.*∆C/MV -0.274  -0.0799 
 (0.706)  (0.687) 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.   0.0655** 0.0628** 
  (0.0314) (0.0314) 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. *∆C/MV  -1.337 -1.307 
  (1.065) (1.045) 
∆E/MV 1.192*** 1.191*** 1.190*** 
 (0.130) (0.129) (0.129) 
∆NA/MV 0.0938* 0.0935* 0.0941* 
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 (0.0518) (0.0517) (0.0520) 
∆RD/MV 2.246* 2.323* 2.274* 
 (1.359) (1.363) (1.356) 
∆I/MV -3.960** -3.971** -3.910** 
 (1.762) (1.733) (1.739) 
∆D/MV 0.683 0.676 0.671 
 (0.444) (0.440) (0.441) 
lagged C/MV 0.603*** 0.596*** 0.603*** 
 (0.0739) (0.0735) (0.0734) 
L -0.326*** -0.314*** -0.324*** 
 (0.0421) (0.0414) (0.0419) 
NF/MV 0.0472 0.0439 0.0444 
 (0.145) (0.144) (0.145) 
lagged C/MV*∆C/MV 2.413* 2.392* 2.377* 
 (1.310) (1.295) (1.291) 
L*∆C/MV -0.804 -0.844 -0.829 
 (0.933) (0.928) (0.919) 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 11,258 11,258 11,258 
R-squared 0.191 0.191 0.192 
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In summary, the results on the impact of financial-experts on the value of cash 
holdings show that different measures of the fraction of financial-experts on board 
(accounting and non-accounting) do not affect the value of cash holding; this implies 
that there is insufficient evidence that shareholders would value cash any differently 
if the board were in the presence of financial-experts on board. However, the results 
show that the fraction of accounting financial-experts and the fraction of non-
accounting financial-experts both have a significantly positive effect on firm adjusted 
return. 
4.8.3. Financial experience on board and the value of excess cash 
The previous model mainly concentrates on the value effect due to the change in total 
cash and results indicate that the fraction of financial experts on board does not change 
investors’ value of cash. Following Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), this section 
extends the analysis to focus on change in the level of cash rather than the total cash. 
In addition, it adds to the analysis of cash to reflect on the value of financial-experts 
on board through their influence on excess cash. Following previous literature, excess 
cash is defined as cash held beyond the expected “optimal” level of cash as the 
difference between actual cash held and predicted cash (Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 
2007; Xu et al. 2016). This study estimates the level of excess cash as the residual of 
cash holding regression. Following previous literature on the main determinants of the 
corporate level of cash holding (Opler et al. 1999; Harford et al. 2008; Frésard and 
Salva 2010), the cash holding regression control for firm size measured by firm total 
assets, leverage, growth opportunity, profitability, working capital to total assets, cash 
flow volatility, R&D to sale, capital expenditure to assets and acquisition to sale, the 
regression also accounts for year and industry fixed effect.  
To determine the effect of financial-experts on the value of excess cash 
reserves, the study used value regression similar to the one used by Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith (2007) following the Fama and French (1998) model. For the control variables, 
the study used exactly the same control values employed by the Dittmar and Mahrt-
Smith (2007) study, which was used to determine the impact of corporate governance 
on firm excess cash reserve value. A similar model was also used in other value of 
cash papers (Pinkowitz and Williamson 2004; Pinkowitz et al. 2006; Chan et al. 
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2013a). The model dependent variable is the firm value measured by the firm market-
to-book ratio. As used by Fama and French (1998), the control variables are measures 
that mainly influence shareholders’ prediction of future cash flow, which defines the 
firm value. These controls include current value and past and future changes of 
Earnings, R&D Expenses, Dividends, Interest Expense, in addition to past and future 
changes of firm assets and future changes of firm market value. To capture 
macroeconomic and time trend, the study adds the year dummy, and to control for 
undetected heterogeneity the study control for firm fixed effect. For each financial 
experience measure, the study regresses the following model: 
   !"!,##$!,# 	= #% +	#& '!,##$!,# 	+ 	#( )'!,##$!,# 	+ 	#* )'!,#$%#$!,# 	+ 	#+ ,-!,##$!,# 	+ 	#. ),-!,##$!,# 	+ 	#/ ),-!,#$%#$!,# 	+	#0 -!,##$!,# 	+ #1 )-!,##$!,# 	+ 	#2 )-!,#$%#$!,# 	+ 	#&% 3!,##$!,# 	+ 	#&& )3!,##$!,# 	+ 	#&( )3!,#$%#$!,# 	+ 	#&* )#$!,##$!,# 	+#&+ )#$!,#$%#$!,# 	+ 	#&. )!"!,#$%#$!,# 	+ 	#&/%%&'()*+,+%	%*,',(*'-	./0.&)1	2*&.()+&1!,# +	#&034'1ℎ4,6 	+ 	#&1%&'()*+,+%	%*,',(*'-	./0.&)1	2*&.()+&1!,# 	× 789:;!,##$!,# +7.'&	89::*.1 + ;*&:	;*/.2	<%%.()1	 + =4,6                                                                 (14) 
From the model above, dX signifies the change in X from t-2 to t. !"$,% is the 
firm market value measured as firm share price at the end of fiscal year times shares. #$$,%	is the firm net assets, measured as the firm’s total assets net of cash. &$,% is firm 
earnings before extradentary items. '($,% is the firm research and development (the 
study set RD to 0 if missing). ($,% represent the firm common dividends. )$,% is the firm 
interest expense. *$,% is the firm cash holding measured as the firm cash and cash 
equivariant. %&'()*+,+%	%*,',(*'-	./0.&)1	2*&.()+&1$,% is the firm fraction of 
financial-experts on board measures. The fraction of financial-experts on board is 
measured as the accounting financial-experts on board or the fraction of non-
accounting financial-experts on board. &'()*!,#+,!,# 	is the firm excess cash measured as the 
main cash regression residuals; however, cash is measured as cash holding to net 
assets.  
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Table 4. 14 The impact of financial-experts on excess cash using market-to-book regression 
 
This table shows the result for the value regression. The dependent variable is the market to assets ratio. Independent variables include board financial experience 
measured as the percentage of accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.) and the percentage of non-accounting financial-experts on 
board (Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.). Firm cash position is the unexplained cash holding and the change in their cash position. That is, the residual from 
regressing cash holding on firm specific characteristics representing the firm excess cash holding. The cash holding regression control for firm size, leverage, 
growth option, profitability, ratio of working capital to assets, four years cash flow volatility, R&D to sale, capital expenditure to assets, and acquisition to sale. 
The cash holding regression also controls for industry and year effects. ∆2 indicates the two-year future change. Where ∆L2 is two years lagged change. CH is 
firm cash and marketable securities. All other independent variables are normalised by the firm net asset (NA) measured as firm assets net of cash. These include 
interaction between financial experience variables and cash residuals Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.*CH-residual and Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.*CH-residual), 
change in earnings (E) (earnings measured as earnings before extraordinary items plus interest, differing tax and investment tax credit), assets net of cash (NA), 
R&D expenditure (RD), interest expenditure (I), common dividend (D) and leverage (L) (long term debt plus current debt normalised by market value of equity 
plus long term debt plus current debt). Standard error is estimated with clustered error at firm level. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
 MV/NA MV/NA MV/NA MV/NA MV/NA MV/NA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
CH-residual 0.0736** 0.0208 0.0527 0.0774** 0.0191 0.0446 
 (0.0306) (0.0339) (0.0378) (0.0337) (0.0293) (0.0386) 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. 0.274  0.266 0.00630  -0.00679 
 (0.176)  (0.176) (0.163)  (0.163) 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.*CH-residual -0.103  -0.124 -0.0535  -0.103 
 (0.0883)  (0.0913) (0.106)  (0.108) 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.   0.187 0.168  0.319 0.322 
  (0.216) (0.216)  (0.197) (0.197) 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. *CH-residual  0.176 0.194  0.315* 0.336** 
  (0.156) (0.159)  (0.165) (0.166) 
E/NA 5.041*** 5.050*** 5.045*** 6.095*** 6.083*** 6.084*** 
 (0.515) (0.516) (0.516) (0.581) (0.581) (0.581) 
∆2 E/NA -0.0537 -0.0540 -0.0547 0.0943 0.0947 0.0923 
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 (0.231) (0.231) (0.231) (0.260) (0.259) (0.259) 
∆L2 E/NA 2.358*** 2.358*** 2.359*** 3.001*** 2.998*** 2.996*** 
 (0.300) (0.300) (0.300) (0.356) (0.355) (0.355) 
RD/NA 8.396*** 8.414*** 8.414*** 7.494*** 7.484*** 7.477*** 
 (1.105) (1.107) (1.106) (0.855) (0.854) (0.856) 
∆2 RD/NA 2.866 2.891 2.900 4.851*** 4.905*** 4.908*** 
 (1.777) (1.776) (1.777) (1.643) (1.636) (1.638) 
∆L2 RD/NA 7.974*** 7.981*** 7.973*** 8.863*** 8.850*** 8.844*** 
 (1.112) (1.112) (1.109) (1.437) (1.432) (1.432) 
D/NA 5.673*** 5.653*** 5.688*** 11.11*** 11.13*** 11.12*** 
 (1.612) (1.616) (1.612) (1.573) (1.582) (1.579) 
∆2 D/NA 0.0158 0.0194 -0.00115 -0.188 -0.219 -0.197 
 (1.419) (1.425) (1.422) (1.495) (1.501) (1.497) 
∆L2 D/NA 3.148*** 3.150*** 3.146*** 6.798*** 6.768*** 6.767*** 
 (1.091) (1.095) (1.091) (1.386) (1.386) (1.386) 
I/NA -18.19*** -18.07*** -18.20*** -21.73*** -21.62*** -21.59*** 
 (4.170) (4.155) (4.155) (3.008) (2.980) (2.989) 
∆2 I/NA -1.692 -1.881 -1.687 -0.169 -0.263 -0.287 
 (2.214) (2.243) (2.208) (2.868) (2.853) (2.864) 
∆L2 I/NA -14.24*** -14.27*** -14.23*** -13.07*** -13.04*** -13.05*** 
 (2.647) (2.660) (2.650) (3.217) (3.226) (3.226) 
∆2 NA/NA 0.0483 0.0514 0.0465 0.221** 0.221** 0.220** 
 (0.0734) (0.0736) (0.0734) (0.0915) (0.0915) (0.0917) 
∆L2 NA/NA 0.607*** 0.607*** 0.606*** 0.494*** 0.494*** 0.495*** 
 (0.0570) (0.0571) (0.0569) (0.0752) (0.0753) (0.0752) 
∆2 MV/NA -0.201*** -0.201*** -0.201*** -0.0193 -0.0201 -0.0199 
 (0.0209) (0.0208) (0.0209) (0.0272) (0.0272) (0.0272) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes No No No 
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Firm FE No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,994 8,994 8,994 9,014 9,014 9,014 
R-squared 0.828 0.827 0.828 0.597 0.598 0.598 
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Table 4.14 shows the impact of the fraction of financial-experts on board on 
the market value of excess cash holding. Model 1 shows the effect of the fraction of 
accounting financial-experts on board on the value of firm excess cash holding and to 
be consistent with previous analysis. This analysis starts with year and industry fixed 
effects. The regression shows that firm CH-residual has a positive and significant (at 
5% level) effect on firm MV/NA. However, the Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. and the 
integration between the Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. and firm CH-residual has no 
significant effect on firm MV/NA. Moving to Model 2, the results of the non-fraction 
of accounting financial-experts on board effect on the value of firm excess cash 
holding also indicate no significant relationship between the Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. 
Exp. Dir. on board and the firm MV/NA and no relationship between the integration 
between the Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. and firm CH-residual and firm MV/NA. 
However, when controlling for financial-experts measured by the Frac. of Non-Acc. 
Fin. Exp. Dir. (Model 2) rather than Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (Model 1), the CH-
residual became insignificant to firm MV/NA. Model 3 combines the two fractions of 
financial-experts’ measures (accounting and non-accounting financial-experts) and 
found similar results to Model 1 and Model 2 with an insignificant effect of CH-
residual on firm MV/NA. 
Models 4, 5 and 6 duplicate Models 1, 2 and 3, respectively, but followed 
Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) use of fixed effect (year and firm fixed effect). Even 
though Model 4 shows a similar result to Model 1, Model 5, the Frac. of Non-Acc. 
Fin. Exp. Dir interaction with firm CH-residual appears to be positively significant to 
firm MV/NA at 10% level. When combining the two financial-experience measures in 
Model 6, the relationship between the interaction between Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. 
Dir. and CH-residual and firm MV/NA is significant at 5% where the interaction 
between Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. and CH-residua remain insignificant. The Frac. 
of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. and Frac. Of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. variables show an 
insignificant relation to firm MV/NA in all models. 
In sum, when measuring the effect of fraction of accounting financial-experts 
on board effect on the market value of excess cash holding, the results show no 
significant effect for the fraction accounting and non-accounting financial-experts on 
board. Interestingly, when controlling for firm fixed effect instead of industry fixed 
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effect, the fraction of non-accounting financial-experts appears to be positively 
significant on market valuation of excess cash holding, suggesting that there is no 
substantial evidence to support the argument that investors would value excess cash 
holding any differently in the presence of accounting financial-experts on board and 
very weak evidence to support the argument that investors would value excess cash 
more in the presence of non-accounting financial-experts on board. 
4.9. Conclusion 
As the trend on the level of cash holding shows increasingly worldwide, firm top 
management make daily strategic decisions about the appropriate way to manage firm 
cash reserves and whether to distribute it to shareholders, use it internally, use it for 
external acquisition or continue holding their extra cash. The presence of a conflict of 
interest between managers and investors renders the board of directors a crucial 
corporate governance mechanism to ensure managers make their cash holding 
decision in line with shareholders’ interest. Following previous studies on the role of 
corporate governance mechanism on firm level of cash holding, this study investigates 
the dynamics of the effect of different board directors’ financial expertise on the level 
of firm cash holding. The study then expands its investigation by undertaking several 
additional analyses as to how the relationship between board financial experience and 
firm cash holding affect firm investment decisions, payout policies, firm profitability, 
the value of cash holding and the value of excess cash holding. 
 The main results of this part of the study shows that the fraction of accounting 
financial-experts has an inverse relationship to firm level of cash holding. After testing 
the linearity of the relationship, results show that the relationship was driven from the 
high fraction of accounting financial-experts decreasing the firm level of cash holding 
but not from a low fraction of accounting financial-experts on board increasing firm 
cash holding. This finding is in line with the study hypothesis, driven from the 
traditional financial theory flexibility hypothesis on managers preference to retain firm 
earnings to have the flexibility of financing investments without the need to raise 
money from the capital market, which employs its external monitory over managers. 
The study finding denotes the role of the fraction of accounting financial-experts on 
board on enhancing firm monitoring over managers’ decisions related to cash 
management. However, the results do not hold when financial-experience is measured 
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by the directors’ non-accounting financial experience. The main findings of the study 
are robust to controlling for additional board characteristics and different cash holding 
measures.  
On a cross-section analysis based on board financial constraint level and 
corporate governance strength, the study shows that firms financial constraint effect 
on the relationship between the fraction of financial-experts on board on firm cash 
holding is inconsistent and varies based on the based on financial constraint measure. 
Based on firm size and payout ratio, the result shows that the effect of director 
financial-experts on limiting firm cash holding appears in financial constraint firms 
(small firm size and low payout ratio). However, using KZ Index, the effect of 
financial-experts on firm cash holding appears in financially unconstraint firm (low 
KZ Index). Regarding corporate governance effect on the relationship between the 
fraction of financial-experts on board and firm cash holding, the results for board of 
directors’ characteristics (independence and size) shows that the fraction of 
accounting financial-experts is more effective in reducing firm cash holding when the 
board characteristics are in line with strong governance (more independent small 
boards). However, for CEO duality and E-Index measure, the result of the fraction of 
accounting financial-experts on board is found in firms with high governance needs 
(firms with CEO duality and high E-Index measure).  
Further analysis on how the fraction of financial-experts on board influences 
investment and payout decision in relation to firm excess cash holding suggests that 
there is insufficient evidence that the fraction of accounting and non-accounting 
financial-experts has an effect on the firm industry adjusted capital expenditure, R&D 
or acquisition. Results also suggest that the interaction between different financial 
experiences and excess cash holding has no effect on firm industry-adjusted 
investment decisions. Moreover, results suggest that firms do not differ in their payout 
policies based on the fraction of financial-expert directors on board. However, the 
fraction of accounting financial-experts explains a great deal of the increase in 
dividend payments from firm excess cash holding. Moreover, the study tested the 
effect of the interaction between financial-experts on board and firm change in excess 
cash holding on firm profitability and market-to-book ratio and found the accounting 
financial-experts’ ability to enhance firm profitability and market-to-book ratio from 
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the firm changes in excess cash holding. Moreover, following the Faulkender and 
Wang (2006) model on the value of cash holding, results suggest that shareholders 
would not value cash holding any differently in the presence of financial-experts on 
board. Moreover, applying the Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) model on the value 
of excess cash holding shows that there is no evidence to support the argument that 
investors would value excess cash holding any differently in the presence of 
accounting financial-experts on board and very weak evidence to support the argument 
that investors would value excess cash more in the presence of non-accounting 
financial-experts on board. The next chapter, however, provides an empirical 
examination and discussion of the effect of financial expertise of directors on firm 
payout policy.  
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Chapter 5: Financial experience and payout policy 
5.1. Introduction 
Ever since Miller and Modigliani (1961) established the ground of their famous 
“irrelevance of dividend” theory, studies have shown a deep interest in firms’ payout 
policies. Since Miller and Modigliani’s theory was based on the assumption of a 
perfect market, researchers have attempted to ease this assumption through the 
introduction of many market imperfections. According to the agency theory, the 
agency problem is one major market imperfection where managers and investors share 
a conflict of interest and thus, managers may adopt a payout policy that not necessarily 
maximises shareholders’ wealth. To alleviate the agency problem, firms apply 
appropriate corporate governance mechanism. The role of effective internal corporate 
governance on applying a disciplinary mechanism through influencing firm payout 
policy has drawn full attention in the literature. According to previous studies, the 
board of directors is considered one of the most effective corporate governance 
mechanisms and therefore, the board of directors’ attributes plays a primary role in 
mitigating agency problem. This chapter addresses the effect of financial-experts on 
board on firm payout policy in the US market. 
According to prior literature, one of the main determinants of firm payout 
policy is their internal governance applied by the effectiveness of the board of 
directors’ dynamic. Chen et al. (2017) found that the fraction of gender on board 
influences firms to pay more dividends. Other researchers, such as Hu and Kumar 
(2004), Setia-Atmaja (2010) and Yarram and Dollery (2015) found that highly 
independent boards would influence the distribution of the free cash flow in the form 
of dividends. Other studies also highlighted a positive relationship between board size 
and dividend payout (Jiraporn and Ning 2006; Abor and Fiador 2013; Yarram and 
Dollery 2015). This study investigates the board demography, focusing on directors’ 
financial experience, to influence the firm payout policy. 
Given that payout policy is a strategic plan used by directors where they decide 
on whether to distribute cash to shareholders or accrue it for future investment. 
According to agency theory, dividend policy can be used as a mechanism to mitigate 
agency problem. According to Jensen (1986), dividend limits managers’ ability to 
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misuse excess cash. Moreover, Easterbrook (1984) argues that dividend payment 
reduces managers and shareholders’ agency problem through subjecting the firm to 
external market analysis. According to Jiraporn et al. (2011), dividend payment is 
positively associated with governance quality. 
Board of directors is another governance mechanism to control agency 
problem. According to Boumosleh and Cline (2015), to maximise firm value, a control 
system of combining governance mechanism and dividend policy is needed. 
According to John and Knyazeva (2006), a firm with strong internal and external 
government are found to pay less dividend. Moreover, Hu and Kumar (2004) studied 
management entrenchment and payout policy and found that firms with less control 
over managers pay more dividend. Additionally, Jiraporn and Ning (2006) propose 
that firms pay higher dividends when shareholder rights are more suppressed. 
However, other studies argue based on a positive relationship between firm corporate 
governance strength and payout policies. For example, Adjaoud and Ben‐Amar (2010) 
found that firms with stronger corporate governance pay more dividend. Moreover, 
Jiraporn et al. (2011) findings imply that investors in firms with strong corporate 
governance are more able to force managers to distribute cash through dividend 
payout. Considering the conflicted result on the dynamic of the relationship between 
firm corporate governance and payout policy, this study aims to shed light on the role 
played by financial experts on board on firm payout policy. 
Literature on corporate governance shows that directors with financial 
experience on board can affect board monitoring and control (McMullen and 
Raghunandan 1996; Xie et al. 2003; Abbott et al. 2004; Agrawal and Chadha 2005; 
DeFond et al. 2005; Güner et al. 2008; Fernandes and Fich 2009; Huang et al. 2014). 
In this matter, previous studies show that directors with financial experience provide 
better financial reporting (McDaniel et al. 2002; Mangena and Pike 2005; Mangena 
and Tauringana 2007), forecasting (Karamanou and Vafeas 2005), earning 
management (Klein 2002; Bédard et al. 2004), finance and investment policies (Güner 
et al. 2008) and firm performances (Davidson et al. 2004; Fernandes and Fich 2009; 
Minton et al. 2011; Francis et al. 2012a; Minton et al. 2014). Thus, given the 
significance of financial-experts on corporate finance and investment decisions and 
the role played by them in corporate governance (Güner et al. 2008), unwrapping how 
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financial-experts on board affect dividend policy is undoubtedly necessary. This study 
aims to contribute to the growing literature on the role of financial-experts on firm 
corporate decisions; mainly, how financial-experts affect the firm decisions related to 
firm payout policy. The research question highlighted in this chapter asks whether 
directors’ financial experience affects firm monitoring policy. Specifically, it explores 
whether having financial-expert directors affects firm long-term payout policy. 
This part of the study empirically test the impact of the fraction of financial 
experts (i.e. the fraction of accounting financial-experts and the fraction of non-
accounting financial-experts) on board on payout policy using three different payout 
measures (payout to assets ratio, payout to net income and payout per share). This 
chapter also explores the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the relation in question 
across firms with different firm setting based on their corporate governance strength 
and financial constraints position. To further understand the dimension of financial-
experts’ effect on firm payouts, this study investigates the effect of financial-experts 
on different payout policies (dividend or repurchase). Firms make the decision on the 
firm payout structure. The reasoning behind why firms pay dividend has been a puzzle 
for more than five decades. Miller and Modigliani (1961) argue that in a perfect capital 
market (assuming the absence of tax) the dividend should have no effect on investors 
and firms. However, according to Black (1976), it is difficult to justify why firms pay 
dividends in the presence of firm tax. Moreover, stock repurchase offers firms and 
investors considerable flexibility and tax advantages (Guay and Harford 2000; Skinner 
2008). When comparing payout policies, John and Knyazeva (2006) found that, when 
corporate governance is weak, firms are less likely to adopt a repurchase policy. 
Instead, firms are more likely to adopt dividend policy or mixed dividend-repurchase 
policy. Bhabra and Luu (2015) argue that, as repurchases are not mandatory in nature 
when compared to dividends, enchanted managers pay shareholders in the pre-commit 
payout policy rather than repurchasing stocks. Following the rise of firm repurchase 
activities at the expense of dividend policy (Fama and French 2001; Hsieh and Wang 
2009), this study investigates the effect of financial-experts on the firm payout policy 
chosen. 
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 Based on a sample of 952 firms (10,060 firm-year observations) for the period 
between 1999 and 2017, this part of the study finds that, in the case of enhanced 
corporate governance, through the appointment of financial-experts on board, 
financial-experts show their ability to influence managers to payout more to 
shareholders. However, this effect was found for financial-experts with accounting-
related financial-experience and not found for financial-experts that obtained their 
experience through supervising accounting financial-experts (CEO and presidents). 
The study’s main findings are robust to controlling for board composition and 
excluding utility firms. This study’s main result is in line with the complement 
hypothesis. In particular, stronger corporate governance allows shareholders to 
minimise the amount of cash available to managers to minimise the misuse of free 
cash flow through the form of payouts.  
The results also show that the effect of accounting financial-experts on 
increasing firms payout is more prominent in firms with weak corporate governance 
mechanism regarding high E-Index, CEO duality and large board size measures. 
However, the results are mixed based on board independence depending on the payout 
measure. Moreover, results show that high financially constrained firms, where top 
management tend to hold more cash, accounting financial-experts on board play a 
significant role in increasing the firm payout level. This is in line with the study main 
argument that directors’ financial experience enhances board monitoring, reducing 
agency conflict of interest.  
This study shows that the fraction of accounting financial-experts on board not 
only increases firm payout level, but is more likely to pay shareholders in the form of 
repurchase. Given the investors’ expectation of cumulative dividend payments, stock 
repurchase offers firms and investors significant flexibility and tax advantages. 
However, the flexibility of the firm repurchase option, arguably, cause self-interested 
managers to be driven to avoid repurchasing stocks. The financial-expert directors’ 
influence on distributing free cash flow via non-pre-committed shareholder payments 
emphasises their role as financial-experts on board in enhancing board effectiveness.  
The study contributes to the finance literature on the effectiveness of financial-
expert directors on board in numerous ways. First, this study adds to the literature on 
the effect of board composition on firm payout. Previous literature mainly focuses on 
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the role of board independence, board gender diversity, the board size, and CEO 
duality (Schellenger et al. 1989; Al-Najjar and Hussainey 2009; Byoun et al. 2016; 
Chen et al. 2017). To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this study is the first to 
link the financial experience of directors to the firm’s payout level and different payout 
policies (dividend and repurchase). Second, results challenge the SOX Act definition 
of financial experience21, which includes “supervising” employees with financial 
reporting responsibilities. Directors with non-accounting financial experience failed 
to have a similarly positive effect when compared to directors with prior accounting 
financial experience. Finally, the study results offer empirical justification to the 
increasing calls by policymakers and academics for more financial-expert directors on 
boards to improve the monitoring role in board of directors. 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. Succeeding this introduction, the 
second section describes the theoretical background. The third section describes the 
study literature review and hypothesis development. The fourth section describes the 
sample, the variables used in this study and the empirical model. The fifth section 
reports the study findings. The final section concludes the chapter. 
5.2. Hypothesis development 
Determining firm payout policy has long held the interest of economic scholars due to 
several market imperfections. Modern corporations face the existence of information 
asymmetry and agency conflict of interest between managers and investors. Thus, the 
topic of what determines the firm payout policy remains a puzzle. 
Also, the main purpose of corporate governance is to provide financial profit 
to firm investors. Firm shareholders acquire financial gain through dividend payments 
or capital gain. Previous literature mainly focuses on agency theory when explaining 
dividend policy behaviour in the presence of an organisational conflict of interest 
(Rozeff 1982; Easterbrook 1984; Jensen 1986). The agency theory argues that 
shareholder prefers payments when the conflict of interest is high. Agency theory 
emphasise the need to unite the interest of shareholders to managers, which could be 
affected by board financial-expertise. Board of directors makes the final decisions 
 
21 This study financial experience measured were taken according to the SOX Act 
definitions of financial experience (see section 2.2.3.) 
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regarding investment of the firm extra fund. Financial-experts on board have received 
growing attention within corporate governance literature. According to Güner et al. 
(2008), there is a direct impact of directors’ financial-experience on the firm’s 
financial and investment policies. Financial-experts on board can help mitigate agency 
problem by easing the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders through 
improving their monitoring role (Byrd and Mizruchi 2005; Harris and Raviv 2008), 
improve the quality of information provides to board (Kirkpatrick 2009) and enhance 
their ability to advise on their investment decisions (Dionne and Triki 2005; Huang et 
al. 2014). 
According to Rozeff (1982), firm agency cost is the main determinant of firm 
payout policy, arguing that managers may not always approve payout policy as alien 
to shareholders’ value maximisation; instead, managers prefer to retain earnings to 
avoid external financial cost and additional monitoring. Thus, in the presence of the 
conflict of interest between managers and investors, to avoid managers’ misuse of 
retained earnings, investors value payout more (White 1996). The main elements 
within the agency cost are the cost of monitoring managers, the cost of information 
asymmetry between shareholders and managers, and the cost of managers’ risk-averse 
behaviour. In the presence of wide ownership structure, the cost of monitoring 
managers increases. To avoid monitor shareholders bearing all the cost of monitoring 
while other investors benefit from the monitoring cost, shareholders prefer to apply 
internal (board of directors) together with external monitoring mechanism through the 
payments of dividend. Increasing dividend payments expose managers to capital 
market monitoring, which managers attempt to avoid (Baker 2009). 
Other agency costs arise from information asymmetry between shareholders 
and managers. Literature shows that financial-experts on board have a direct link to 
firm information environment. Agrawal and Chadha (2005) found that the probability 
of restating earning is lower in firms with financial-expert directors on their board of 
directors or audit committee. Harris and Raviv (2008) claim that, among independent 
directors, those with financial experience have a lower cost in obtaining information 
relating to the complexity of a financial transaction and risk-taking and are, thus, more 
capable of effectively monitoring executive management. The corporate board is often 
criticised for lacking financial-experts on board (Kirkpatrick 2009). Financial-experts 
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on board can offer a better understanding of financial information (Kirkpatrick 2009) 
and better financial advisers to management (Francis et al. 2015). As La Porta et al. 
(2000) argue, enhancing firm information environment reduces agency cost between 
managers and shareholders. 
Additional agency cost arising from the conflict of interest between managers 
and shareholders is the managers’ risk-averse behaviour. Invested in their interest, 
managers’ wealth is entangled with the firm’s and, thus, unwilling to increase firm 
risk-taking for the benefit of maximising only shareholders’ wealth. Investing in a less 
risky project would hinder shareholders’ long-term investment profit (Easterbrook 
1984). According to Minton et al. (2011), financial expertise on board is related to 
firm risk-taking. They argue that independent financial-experts, with a fiduciary 
responsibility to shareholders, understand the nature of the residual equity claims and 
will commonly prefer additional risk-taking. They add that financial-experts’ 
familiarity and understanding of complex financial instruments allow them to 
participate in higher-risk activities. The results of Minton et al. (2014) have come to 
support these findings. It suggests that the presence of financial-experts on board could 
influence the amount of retained earnings encouraging the firm to undertake more 
investments reducing dividend payments. Study findings by Casey and Theis (1997) 
and Dickens et al. (2002) support the idea that firm risk-taking is a determinant to the 
firm dividend payments.  
In line with the managers’ risk-averse behaviour, to avoid additional risk, 
managers would also reduce the debt-to-equity ratio, relying mainly on firm internal 
financing, reducing firm dividend payments (Easterbrook 1984). In line with the 
resource dependence theory, the board has the primary role of provision resource, 
which implies the board ability to add resources to the firm (Hillman and Dalziel 
2003). Previous studies showed that directors’ financial-experience have a direct 
influence on the firm debt ratio. Stearns and Mizruchi (1993) found that money 
investors, bankers, and money market bankers on board are related to firm short 
borrowing. Byrd and Mizruchi (2005) show that bankers on board affect increasing 
firm debt ratio, enhancing firm external financing to ease the need for internal 
financing. Thus, it can be argued that financial experts would increase firm payouts.  
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In their prominent study, La Porta et al. (2000) presented two agency models 
of dividend, the “outcome” and the “substitute” agency dividend models. The outcome 
agency dividend model argues that dividends are the result of strong monitoring to 
shareholders’ right. However, according to the “substitute” agency dividend model, 
dividends are a substitute mechanism for mitigating relatively more pronounced 
agency problem and a higher risk of expropriating by insiders. In respect of the second 
model, firms pay dividends to establish their reputation. In a country comparison level, 
La Porta et al. (2000) findings support the agency dividend outcome model, showing 
that countries with high shareholders’ protection are associated with high dividend 
payments. Moreover, Hwang et al. (2013) study shows that corporate governance has 
a significant positive relationship with the firm dividend payout ratio. Kumar (2006) 
maintained that corporate governance mechanism has a direct effect on the firm 
dividend policy measured by ownership structure. Whilst, Hwang et al. (2013) 
documented that enhancing firm corporate governance improves payment policy over 
time. Jiraporn et al. (2011) tested the firm overall corporate governance quality 
influence on dividend policy. They found that firms with better corporate governance 
face a higher propensity to pay dividends and, moreover, dividend payer firms tend to 
have higher dividend payment. They argue that investors of strong corporate 
governance firms can influence managers to release more cash through dividend 
payments; thus, cutting the amount of cash to be misused by opportunistic managers. 
In support of the outcome hypothesis, this study proposes the following two 
hypotheses:  
However, through the literature, some studies show results contradicting the 
outcome model. In support of the substitute model, according to Baker (2009), in 
regard to the agency problem, different firm setting affects shareholders’ expectations 
of firm payouts. He shows that strong corporate governance and investment 
opportunity eases shareholder pressure over managers to pay dividends. Chae et al. 
(2009) finding illustrates that improving firm corporate governance results in dividend 
payments’ reduction when external financial constraint is high. According to findings 
by Jiraporn et al. (2011) and Renneboog and Szilagyi (2008), there is a negative 
relationship between firm corporate governance and dividend payments. They argue 
that weak corporate governance pays higher dividends to attract investors, confirming 
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substitution theory. Following the substitute view, the study proposes two potential 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a relationship between the fraction of accounting 
financial-expert directors on board and payout policy.  
Hypothesis 2: There is a relationship between the fraction of non-accounting 
financial-expert directors on board and payout policy. 
5.3. Data and variables construction 
5.3.1. Sample and scope 
This study analyses a sample of publicly-traded non-financial companies of Standard 
& Poor’s (S&P) 500 (LargeCap), S&P 400 (MidCaps), S&P 600 (SmallCap) for the 
period between 1999 and 2017. The period was chosen based on BoardEx 
availability data. 
 
Table 5. 1 Selection criteria for the sample 
 
Analysis of sample attrition at different stages of sample.  
Criterion # of firms 
All firms in the S&P 1500 1500 
Financial and Utilities firms 208 
Missing data firms  340 
Sample (excluding finance and Utilities firms and missing data firms) 952 
Board attributes and directors’ education and characteristics were retrieved 
from the BoardEx database, a business intelligence dataset that includes over 350,000 
business leaders’ profiles across 19 countries. All financial information used to 
calculate dividend policy and other financial variables from COMPUSTAT North 
America. Industry classification is formed based on Fama-French 48 industry 
classification. To reduce the effect of outliers, all continuous variables are winsorised 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The end sample size, after excluding financial- and 
missing-firms is 952 firms and 10,060 firm-year observations. 
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5.3.2. Variable definition  
This section presents the study’s dependent and control variables. The discussion 
focusses first on the firm dividend policy measures, followed by the definitions of 
control variables measures providing information about all the variables used in this 
study.  
5.3.2.1. Payout policy measures 
This study uses different variables to measure firms’ payout policy to be consistent 
with early literature. Motivated by Chae et al. (2009) and Grullon and Michaely (2002) 
payout measures, other than payments in the form of dividends, firms can pay their 
earnings to shareholders in the form of share repurchase. Therefore, to measure the 
real amount of firms' payout, the study uses the sum of share repurchase and cash 
dividends paid in a year. Following Bagwell and Shoven (1989), Berger et al. (1997), 
Dittmar (2000) and Chae et al. (2009), firm repurchase dollar volume is measured 
using COMPUSTAT Purchase of Stock item. The study uses three different payout 
ratios: first, the sum of repurchase and dividend divided by firm total assets (RDA); 
second, the sum of repurchase and dividend scaled by the firm net income (RDNI); 
third, the sum of repurchase and dividend per share. 
5.3.2.2. Control variables 
This study controls for factors that have been proved in the literature to influence firm 
dividend payment. These factors include growth opportunity, profitability, firm size, 
firm risk, firm leverage and firm free cash flow. 
Market-to-book (M/B): Firm finance requirement for growth opportunity is 
one factor seen to influence dividend payout. Firms with higher growth opportunity 
are able to retain their earning (Chang and Rhee 1990) and pay lower dividend 
compared to firms with low-growth opportunity (Rozeff 1982; Lloyd et al. 1985; 
Dempsey and Laber 1992; Jensen et al. 1992; Moh'd et al. 1995; Holder et al. 1998; 
Ho 2003). Following other studies (Harford 1999; Wu 2004; Chae et al. 2009), the 
study uses the M/B ratio as a proxy for growth opportunity. M/B ratio measured as the 
firm market value divided by firm assets net of cash. 
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Profitability (PRO): profitability has a positive effect on payouts. As 
profitability increases, the amount of free cash flow rises. Investors will then demand 
higher dividend payment to reduce the amount of free cash flow in management hands, 
reducing agency cost (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Firm profitability is measured as 
the firm return on equity ratio, computed as net income dividend by firm total equity. 
Firm Size (SIZE): firm size has a negative relationship with growth 
opportunity. Thus, free cash flow is disgorged as dividend to decrease agency cost 
(Lloyd et al. 1985). Studies show that, compared to small firms, large firms distribute 
higher amount of dividend (Eddy and Seifert 1988; Jensen et al. 1992; Redding 1997; 
Fama and French 2001). Therefore, it is expected firm size would have a positive 
effect on dividend payout. SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of the firm total 
assets.  
Firm Leverage (LEV): According to Ferreira and Vilela (2004), highly levered 
firms are monitored more than low levered firms and highly pressured to distribute 
free cash flow. However, other studies contradict this finding and establish a negative 
effect between leverage and dividend payment, concluding that low leveraged firms 
tend to have high dividend payment (Al‐Najjar and Belghitar 2011). This study 
measures LEV as total debt/shareholder equity. 
Free cash flow (FCF): the firm ability to pay dividend mainly relies on the 
availability of free cashflow. Previous studies establish a positive effect free cash flow 
had on firm payouts (i.e. Bradley et al. (1998); La Porta et al. (2000). This study 
measures FCF as the amount of cash a company hold for current activities and growth 
after deducting its liabilities. FCF is calculated as (net profit-change in fixed assets – 
change in net-working capital)/ total assets.  
Cash flow volatility (CFVOL): a firm cash flow sensitivity was found to be a 
major determinant for firm payout policy. According to Bradley et al. (1998) found 
payout ratios are lower for firms with higher cash-flow volatility. Moreover, Chay and 
Suh (2009), found, using worldwide firm-level data, that cash-flow uncertainty is a 
critical cross-sectional determinant of corporate payout policy. They also argue that 
the impact of cash-flow uncertainty on dividends is generally stronger than the impact 
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of other potential determinants of payout policy. The measure used in the study 
for CFVOL is the standard deviation of the cash flow for the past 10 years. 
Research and development (R&D): according to Bah and Dumontier (2001) as 
firm research and development intensive rise, firms exhibit significant lower dividend 
payment levels. The study control for R&D expenses computed at firm research and 
development expenses to firm total sale.  
Cash holding (CH): the decision of payout depends mainly on the level of cash 
held by the company. Dobetz and Grüninger (2006) and Al‐Najjar and Belghitar 
(2011) documented a positive relationship between firm cash holding and firm 
payment. CH is calculated as firm cash and short term investment divided by assets 
net of cash and short term investment.  
Financial constraint (KZ): literature shows the firms’ ability to finance 
investment affects their payout decision. Studies found a negative relationship 
between the firm financial constraints measured and level of payout (Deangelo and 
Deangelo 1990; Chae et al. 2009; Chen and Wang 2012; Pathan et al. 2016). As firm 
financial constraint rises, the firms are less likely to pay dividends in order to invest 
in financial value-creating investments. To measure firms’ financial constraint level, 
the study applies the KZ index measure (Kaplan and Zingales 1997). Based on five 
factors that arguably correlate with financial constraint firms (cash flow to total capital 
(negative effect), market-to-book ratio (positive effect), debt to total capital (positive 
effect), dividends to total capital (negative effect) and cash holdings to capital 
(negative effect)), the KZ index is measured using the following equation: 
!"	$%&'( = (−1.001909 ∗	!"#$	&'()#* 	) + (	0.2826389 ∗ 	7) + (	3.139193 ∗	 +,-./(."'	!"01."'	) + (−39.3678 ∗	+1213,43#* 	) + (−1.314759	(	 !"#$* )                               (15) 
Where is: Cash flow is the end of the year income before extradentary items plus total 
depreciation and amortisation. K is the beginning of the year property plant and 
equipment. Q is the beginning of the year market capitalisation plus total shareholder's 
equity minus book value of common equity minus deferred tax assets, all normalised 
by total shareholder's equity. Debt is the beginning of the year total long term debt 
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plus notes payable plus the current portion of long term debt. Dividends is the 
beginning of the year total cash dividends paid. 
Corporate governance strength (E-Index): the relationship between corporate 
governance and dividend payment is strongly established in the literature. As 
corporate governance strength and firm shareholder protection increases induce, firm 
are forced to pay more dividend (outcome hypothesis) (Mitton 2004; Bae et al. 2012). 
However, other studies argue that firms with weak corporate governance pay more 
dividend to establish their reputation and compensate minority shareholders 
(substitute hypothesis) (Knyazeva 2008; Jiraporn et al. 2011). This study measures 
firm corporate governance strength using the firm E-Index of Bebchuk et al. (2009). 
E-Index was measured using the sum of six binary variables indicating whether the 
firm has the following: staggered board, limitation on amending byelaws, limitation 
on amending the charter, supermajority, golden parachute and poison pill22. 
Tangible assets (PPE): the study also controls for tangible assets measures as 
property, plant and equipment scaled by firm total assets. According to Harris and 
Raviv (1991), tangible assets tend to be easier for outside investors to value. Leary 
and Michaely (2011) argue that firm tangible assets reduce firm external finance costs, 
increasing their dividend payments. 
Other control variables: the study variables may change over the study period. 
To control for the unobserved heterogeneity effect of time and firm, the study controls 
for year and industry. Year fixed effect controls for the time trends of financial 
expertise on board and firm payouts, where the industry fixed effect reflects factors 
related to a specific industry that could influence the determinants of both; appointing 
directors with financial experience and firm payouts. Industry fixed effect is added 
based on Fama-French 48 industry classification.  
 
22 The E-Index is taken from the website of Lucian Bebchuk for sample until 2006 and 
calculated following Bebchuk, L. et al. 2009. What Matters in Corporate Governance? The 
Review of Financial Studies 22(2), pp. 783-827. for the rest of the years. 
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5.4. Methodology 
5.4.1. Empirical model 
To empirically test the impact of the fraction of financial experts on board on payout 
policy, the study estimates the following model:  ;<=>?@1,. = A6 +	A7	BC<D@E>%	>F	FE%<%DE<G	'(H'C@I	&EC'D@>CI1,.87 	+	J	K>%@C>GI1,.87 + L'<C	M?NN= + $%&?I@C=	M?NN= + O1,.                                         (16) 
Where "#$%&'!,#is the firm payout dependent variables (payout to assets ratio, payout 
to net income and payout per share). BC<D@E>%	>F	FE%<%DE<G	'(H'C@I	&EC'D@>CI1,.	is 
represented by two financial expertise measures (the fraction of accounting financial-
experts on board and the fraction of non-accounting financial-experts on board. (%)'*%+,!,# is the study set of control variables. The model also includes year and 
industry dummies to control for the unobserved heterogeneity effect of time and firm. 
Given that the study variables may change over the study period, the year fixed effect 
controls for the trends of financial expertise on board and dividend policy where the 
industry fixed effect to control for factors related to the specific industry that could 
influence the determinants of the firm dividend policy and the fraction of financial 
experts on board.   
5.6. Descriptive analysis 
This section provides the study descriptive analysis through a summary of the sample 
characteristics and the study variable summary statistics and correlation matrix. 
5.6.1. Sample characteristic 
Table 5.2 shows the number of firm observations spread through the years and 
industry. Panel A shows the number of firms appearing in each year and the fraction 
of yearly observations from the whole sample. Based on data availability, the table 
shows that firm observation numbers increase through the years until 2016. Firm 
observations start with only 2 firms in year 1999 with a dramatic increase the 
following years, 54 firms in year 2000 (0.5% of the sample size) and 291 firms in year 
2001 (2.9% of the sample size) until it reaches 889 firms in the year 2016 (8.8% of the 
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sample size). At the time of the study, the data available for the year 2017 were only 
30 firms (only 0.3% of the sample size)23. 
 
Table 5. 2 Descriptive statistics 
 
The sample contains 952 firms from S&P 1500 non-financial. There are 10,060 firm-year 
observations over the period from 1999 to 2017. The Fama-French 10-industry 
classification is used for Panel B.   
Panel A: number of observations spread through the years 
Year  Number of firm obs. % of firm obs. from the total sample. 
1999 2 0.0% 
2000 54 0.5% 
2001 291 2.9% 
2002 348 3.5% 
2003 372 3.7% 
2004 456 4.5% 
2005 487 4.8% 
2006 575 5.7% 
2007 610 6.1% 
2008 642 6.4% 
2009 684 6.8% 
2010 707 7.0% 
2011 720 7.2% 
2012 759 7.5% 
2013 780 7.8% 
2014 809 8.0% 
2015 845 8.4% 
2016 889 8.8% 
2017 30 0.3% 
Total 10060 100% 
On Table 5.3 Panel B shows the sample firms and firm-year observations 
spread through industries using the Fama-French 10 industry classification. The table 
shows that the manufacturing and technology industries have the most firm 
appearances in the sample with 177 firms for each industry, representing 18% of all 
firms in the sample. The least number of industries with firms in the sample are durable 
 
23 The sample start in 1999 based on BoardEx data availability. Even though year 1999 and 
2017 have a substantial lower firm observations excluding this year have no effect on the 
study main results or robust checks. However, these results are not reported in this study. 
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and telecommunications with only 31 firms, respectively (3% of sample firms) and 21 
(2% of sample firms). A similar distribution is also seen in the firm-year observations. 
Manufacturing and technology industry appears to have the most firm-year 
observations with 17% and 15% of all sample firms; correspondingly where firm-year 
observations from durable and telecommunications remain at the sample fraction of 
the sample, durable at 3% and telecommunications at 2%. Other industries’ firm-year 
observation rank as following: others, shops, health, utility and energy. A similar 
ranking was also seen in the number of firms in the sample. 
5.6.2. Summary statistic and correlation 
This section provides the study variable summary statistic and correlation matrix. 
Table 5.4 shows the study dependent, independent and control variables mean, 
median, standard deviation and the 5th, 25th, 75th and 95th percentile. The study 
employs three different payout measures. The RDA mean is 5.1% (median 2.6%) with 
a standard deviation of 0.065; the RDNI mean 65.1% (median 51.4%) with a standard 
deviation of 1.226; and RDPS mean $1.672 (median $0.96) with a standard deviation 
of 2.146. As the dependent variables are ratios, scaled by firm assets, net income and 
total shares, they may have an extensively large value when demonstration is low. For 
example, a firm might pay a large amount of cash when its assets are low. As justified  
 
Table 5. 3 Descriptive statistic (continue) 
 
Panel B:  Sample industry firm distribution based on  Fama-French 10 industry 
classification.  
Industry No. of firms obs. %of firms No of firm-year obs. % of firms 
Durables 31 3% 327 3% 
Energy 47 5% 544 5% 
High Tech 177 18% 1,746 15% 
Healthcare 92 10% 862 7% 
Manufacturing 177 18% 1,966 17% 
Non-Durables 69 7% 814 7% 
Other 142 15% 1,455 13% 
Shops 139 14% 1,356 12% 
Telecom 21 2% 197 2% 
Utilities 57 6% 793 7% 
Total 952 99% 10,060 87% 
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Table 5. 4 Summary statistics 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of the relation between financial-experts and firm payout. The dependent variables are the firm payout variables; 
repurchase and dividend to total assets (RDA), repurchase and dividend to net income (RDNI) and repurchase and dividend per share. The main independent 
variables are the percentage of accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.) and the percentage of non-accounting financial-experts on 
board (Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.). SIZE: firm size measured as the log of the firm total assets. LEV: is the firm leverage: measured as firm long term debt 
divided by assets net of cash. R&D: is the firm research and development expenses divided by sale. M/B: is the firm market-to-book ratio, measured as the firm 
market value divided by firm assets net of cash. CFVOL: is the firm cash flow volatility measured as is measured as the standard deviation of cash flow-to-assets 
net of cash for the past 10 years. PPE: is the net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. E-Index: is the entrenchment index. KZ: is the Kaplan-
Zingales Index. ROE: return on equity measured as firm net income divided by market value of equity. CH is the firm cash holding measured as cash and short 
term investment divided by assets net of cash and short term investments. All continues variables are winsorised at the bottom and top 1 % levels.  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev 5% 25% Median 75% 95% 
Panel A: Payout (dependent variables) 
RDA 10,060 0.051 0.065 0.000 0.008 0.026 0.070 0.188 
RDNI 10,060 0.651 1.226 -0.197 0.065 0.514 0.977 2.290 
RDPS 10,060 1.672 2.146 0.000 0.251 0.960 2.166 5.987 
Panel B: Financial Experience measures (independent variables) 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. 10,060 0.317 0.182 0.077 0.182 0.300 0.429 0.667 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.  10,060 0.153 0.131 0.000 0.071 0.125 0.222 0.400 
Panel C: Firm financial information (control variables) 
SIZE 10,060 8.035 1.583 5.750 6.817 7.877 9.079 10.775 
CH 10,060 0.208 0.344 0.004 0.028 0.089 0.233 0.812 
LEV 10,060 0.227 0.169 0.000 0.089 0.223 0.335 0.523 
R&D 10,060 0.035 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.183 
M/B 10,060 3.238 3.669 0.881 1.598 2.400 3.776 8.872 
PPE 10,060 0.302 0.237 0.034 0.112 0.226 0.453 0.777 
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E-Index 10,060 3.597 1.276 1.000 3.000 4.000 4.000 5.000 
KZ 10,060 -6.212 14.209 -26.533 -6.803 -1.903 0.397 1.761 
CFVOL 10,060 0.045 0.054 0.008 0.017 0.029 0.051 0.142 
ROE 10,060 0.033 0.093 -0.086 0.030 0.048 0.065 0.110 
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by Chae et al. (2009), this could be the reason for why payout variables have a higher 
measure of mean than median.  
Moving on to the study explanatory variables (fraction of directors with 
financial experience), Table 5.4 Panel B shows that on average, firm in the sample has 
31.7% of Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. starting at 7.7% at 5th percentile reaching 66.7% 
at 95th percentile. For the Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir., on average, firms in the 
sample have 15.3% of their directors on board with previous non-accounting financial-
experience starting at 0% at 5th percentile reaching 40% at 95th percentile. Accounting 
and non-accounting financial-experience on board variables have a median (standard 
deviation) of 30% (0.182) and 12.5% (0.131) respectively. Data implies that on 
average firms have more directors with financial experience related to accounting than 
financial experience related to previous CEO or president role. 
Panel C on Table 5.4 presents a list of the sample firms financial information 
(control variables) summary static. Sample firms on average have a SIZE of 8.035 
standard deviation of 1.583) a slightly higher than the US firms reported by Chen et 
al. (2017) which might be due to sampling period difference. On average, the ample 
firms CH is 20.8%, 22.7% LEV, 3.5% R&D, 30.2% PPE very similarly to variables 
reported by Chen et al. (2017). However, the study sample firms have a higher TobinQ 
(mean 3.238) and weaker corporate governance with higher E-Index (3.597). On 
average, the sample firms have -6,.212 KZ, 0.045 CFVOL and 3.3% ROE. 
Table 5.4 and Table 5.5 reports the study variable correlation matrix. The 
correlation matrix provides an understanding of the relationship between the study 
dependent and independent variables. It also identifies a potential multicollinearity 
problem that might lead to an incorrect estimate. Spearman (Pearson) correlation 
coefficients are shown below (above) the diagonal. Several features of the data are 
worth highlighting. The relationship between the Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. and 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. with the study dependent variable (RDA, RDNI and RDPS) 
show a positive magnitude to and significant at 1% level, in line with the research 
hypothesis that the presence of financial-experts on board has a positive influence on 
their payout policy.  The  correlation  matrix also shows that  all  control variables are  
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Table 5. 5 Correlation matrix 
 
This table presents the study variables correlation matrix. Spearman (Pearson) correlation coefficients are shown on below (above) the 
diagonal. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
RDA 1 0.450*** 0.675*** 0.072*** 0.048*** 0.047*** -0.030*** 0.019** 
RDNI 0.768*** 1 0.401*** 0.065*** 0.038*** 0.097*** -0.090*** -0.045*** 
RDPS 0.853*** 0.749*** 1 0.185*** 0.073*** 0.330*** -0.148*** -0.107*** 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. 0.098*** 0.109*** 0.185*** 1 0.222*** 0.189*** -0.028*** -0.048*** 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.  0.044*** 0.047*** 0.065*** 0.246*** 1 0.020*** 0.009 -0.048*** 
SIZE 0.116*** 0.190*** 0.382*** 0.135*** -0.012 1 -0.259*** -0.189*** 
CFVOL -0.128*** -0.219*** -0.300*** -0.034*** 0.018* -0.282*** 1 0.379*** 
R&D 0.086*** -0.012 -0.052*** -0.007 -0.047*** -0.137*** 0.268*** 1 
LEV -0.116*** 0.024** 0.119*** 0.143*** 0.032*** 0.429*** -0.184*** -0.207*** 
CH 0.116*** -0.035*** -0.102*** -0.002 -0.007 -0.292*** 0.374*** 0.442*** 
ROE 0.212*** 0.233*** 0.326*** 0.009 -0.040*** 0.187*** -0.179*** -0.195*** 
KZ -0.422*** -0.259*** -0.231*** -0.053*** 0.005 0.178*** -0.118*** -0.399*** 
E-Index -0.011 0.001 0.050*** 0.270*** 0.100*** -0.037*** 0.009 0.050*** 
M/B 0.363*** 0.223*** 0.224*** 0.045*** 0.026*** 0.018* 0.006 0.216*** 
PPE -0.079*** 0.002 0.054*** -0.060*** 0.021* 0.227*** -0.208*** -0.450*** 
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Table 5. 6 Correlation matrix (continue) 
 
  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
RDA -0.046*** 0.052*** 0.131*** -0.252*** -0.019** 0.241*** -0.099*** 
RDNI 0.063*** -0.036*** 0.135*** -0.096*** 0.011 0.067*** -0.021*** 
RDPS 0.146*** -0.110*** 0.173*** -0.073*** 0.059*** 0.127*** 0.003 
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. 0.144*** -0.060*** 0.018** -0.020** 0.271*** 0.031*** -0.025*** 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.  0.058*** -0.012 0.014* -0.024*** 0.104*** 0.015* 0.027*** 
SIZE 0.359*** -0.316*** 0.081*** 0.155*** -0.045*** -0.013* 0.212*** 
CFVOL -0.115*** 0.371*** -0.134*** -0.170*** 0.032*** 0.038*** -0.164*** 
R&D -0.205*** 0.616*** -0.182*** -0.239*** 0.007 0.128*** -0.299*** 
LEV 1 -0.309*** -0.079*** 0.163*** 0.017** -0.026** 0.190*** 
CH -0.476*** 1 -0.095*** -0.384*** -0.028*** 0.119*** -0.302*** 
ROE 0.032*** -0.143*** 1 -0.039*** -0.003 0.035*** 0.011 
KZ 0.435*** -0.527*** -0.045*** 1 0.003 -0.138*** 0.394*** 
E-Index 0.031*** 0.007 -0.013 -0.014 1 -0.050*** -0.014* 
M/B -0.068*** 0.192*** -0.114*** -0.304*** -0.090*** 1 -0.104*** 
PPE 0.259*** -0.453*** 0.115*** 0.705*** -0.045*** -0.167*** 1 
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significantly correlated to   RDPS   dependent  variable at the 1% level.  However,  for  
RDA  all  explanatory variables, other than E-Index, are significantly rated at 1% level. 
Moreover, other than R&D, E-Index and PPE, RDNI also shows a significant 
relationship to the explanatory variable. Spearman (Pearson) correlation coefficients 
state that there is no multicollinearity problem between the study main variables of 
the study 24.  
5.7. Regression results 
In this section, the main regression results are provided on the relationship between 
the fraction of financial-experts on board and firm different payout measures to test 
the study main hypotheses using OLS regression with year and industry dummies. 
Table 5.6 contains the result for the regression explaining payout policy measured by 
repurchase and dividend over total assets, repurchase and dividend over net income 
and repurchase and dividend per share. The nine regressions vary in terms of financial 
expertise measure and payout policy measure. The first three regressions test different 
financial-expert measures (the fraction of accounting financial-expert directors and 
the fraction of non-accounting expert directors), measures to firm payout, measured 
by the sum of firm repurchase and dividend by firm total asset. Regressions 4, 5 and 
6 duplicate the first three regressions using the sum of firm repurchase and dividend 
divided by firm net income as the firm payout measure. The last three regressions 
repeat the first three regressions using the sum of firm repurchase and dividend per 
share as the firm payout measure. The study also considers endogeneity concerns. The 
relationship may be subject to reverse effect between dividend policy and financial-
experts on board. That is, high payout policy firms may appoint or attract more 
financial experts directors instead of financial-experts on board increase firm payouts. 
Alternatively, the results may be driven by unobservable variables that affect firm 
payout policy and the appointment of financial-experts on board. To control for 
endogeneity, consider the study lagged all explanatory variables (independent and 
 
24 Another way to assess multicollinearity problem is through calculating the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) for all independent variables. The VIF results show that the maximum VIF takes the value of 
1.83, where the lowest VIF is 1.05. These values are below the 10 rule of thumb threshold provided by 
Chatterjee, S. and Hadi, A. S. 2015. Regression analysis by example. John Wiley & Sons.. This 
indicated that multicollinearity issue is unlikely to be present in this study 
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controls) to ensure that the relationship appears in the regression as a result from 
previous year financial-experts on board to present year payout policy. 
Table 5.6 Model 1 tests the influence of the fraction of accounting financial-
experts on board and board payout ratio measured by the sum of firm repurchase and 
dividend by the firm assets controlling for firm financial information, financial 
constraint and corporate governance variables with year and industry dummy 
variables. After controlling for firm lagged financial information variables, financial 
constraint position and firm corporate governance strength, Table 5.6 shows that the 
fraction of accounting financial-experts appear to have a positive influence on firm 
payout to assets ratio. That is, higher fraction of accounting financial-experts on board 
would encourage firm to distribute more cash to shareholding minimising the amount 
of cash available to management. This finding is in line with the study main hypothesis 
that firm accounting financial-experts have a positive relationship to firm payout 
policy. 
Before moving to the second model, the first model shows that the fraction of 
firm payout to total assets is positively influenced by firm size. That is, the larger the 
firm size is, the more likely they will increase their payout. The relationship between 
firm size and payout were found to be statistically significant at 1% level. This is in 
line with the arguments of previous studies. Firm size has a negative relationship with 
growth opportunity. Thus, to decrease agency cost, free cash flow is disgorged as 
dividends (Lloyd et al. 1985). Moreover, studies also show that, compared to small 
firms, large firms distribute more payout (Eddy and Seifert 1988; Jensen et al. 1992; 
Redding 1997; Fama and French 2001). Consistent with previous literature of the 
Bradley et al. (1998) and Chay and Suh (2009) model shows that firm with high cash 
holding volatility, higher risk, reduces their payout. Higher cash flow uncertainty 
drives firms to reduce their level of payout to shareholders. Moreover, as predicted by 
the study and following previous studies (Bah and Dumontier 2001), R&D appear to 
have a negative coefficient to firm payout. However, the relationship is not statistically 
significant at any level. Additionally, it appears that LEV has a negative effect on 
payouts. The relationship between LEV and payout appear to be statistically 
significant at 1% level. This is consistent with previous literature showing that low 
levered firms tend to have high dividend payment (Fenn and Liang 2001; Deangelo et 
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al. 2004; Setia-Atmaja 2010; Al‐Najjar and Belghitar 2011; Jiraporn et al. 2011; 
Sharma 2011; Pucheta-Martínez and Bel-Oms 2015; Byoun et al. 2016). In respect of 
firms cash holding, as expected and argued by previous studies (Dobetz and Grüninger 
2006; Al‐Najjar and Belghitar 2011), firm CH has a positive coefficient in relation to 
firm payout. Moreover, the effect that CH has on payout appears to be statistically 
significant at 1% level.  
Table 5.6 Model 1 also reveals that firm profitability measured by ROE has a 
positive relationship with dividend payout. This relationship is significant at 1% level, 
as is in line with the findings of previous studies that as profitability increases the 
amount of free cash flow also increases. Investors will then demand higher dividend 
payment to reduce the amount of free cash flow in management hands, reducing 
agency cost (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Measured by firm M/B ratio, the table shows 
that firm growth opportunity is positive, and significant at 1% level, related to firm 
payout. This result is inconsistent with previous literature, arguing that firms with 
higher growth opportunity are able to retain their earning (Chang and Rhee 1990) and 
pay lower dividend (Rozeff 1982; Lloyd et al. 1985; Dempsey and Laber 1992; Jensen 
et al. 1992; Moh'd et al. 1995; Holder et al. 1998; Ho 2003). Moreover, Model 1 also 
shows a positive coefficient on PPE, which was in line with the study prediction. 
However, the relationship appears to be insignificant at any level. As for corporate 
governance strength and firm financial constraint variables, Model 1 shows a negative 
relationship between firm financial constraint level and payout and found a negative 
coefficient for both variables, in line with the study prediction. However, only the KZ 
index relationship is significant to 1% level. Almost all control variables remain at the 
same coefficient sign through all models and the same significance level. 
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Table 5. 7 Financial experience and firm payout 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of the relation between financial-experts and firm payout. The dependent variables are the firm payout 
variables; repurchase and dividend to total assets (RDA) , repurchase and dividend to net income (RDNI) and repurchase and dividend per share (RDPS). The 
main independent variables are the percentage of accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.) and the percentage of non-accounting 
financial-experts on board (Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.). SIZE: firm size measured as the log of the firm total assets. LEV: is the firm leverage: measured 
as firm long term debt divided by assets net of cash. R&D: is the firm research and development expenses divided by sale. M/B: is the firm market-to-book 
ratio, measured as the firm market value divided by firm assets net of cash. CFVOL: is the firm cash flow volatility measured as is measured as the standard 
deviation of cash flow-to-assets net of cash for the past 10 years. PPE: is the net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. E-Index: is the 
entrenchment index. KZ: is the Kaplan-Zingales Index. ROE: return on equity measured as firm net income divided by market value of equity. CH is the firm 
cash holding measured as cash and short term investment divided by assets net of cash and short term investments. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
  Expected 
signs 
RDA RDNI RDPS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
                     
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (t-1) + 0.0148** 
 
0.0146** 0.238** 
 
0.237** 0.778*** 
 
0.770*** 
 
 (0.0066) 
 
(0.0066) (0.0984) 
 
(0.0982) (0.245) 
 
(0.244) 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (t-1) + 
 
0.0077 0.0071 
 
0.0436 0.0337 
 
0.304 0.272 
 
 
 
(0.00998) (0.0099) 
 
(0.130) (0.129) 
 
(0.328) (0.324) 
SIZE (t-1) + 0.0054*** 0.0056*** 0.0055*** 0.0667*** 0.0690*** 0.0668*** 0.473*** 0.481*** 0.474*** 
 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0105) (0.0105) (0.0106) (0.0329) (0.0326) (0.0327) 
CFVOL (t-1) - -0.0519** -0.0526** -0.0524** -1.290*** -1.296*** -1.293*** -1.804*** -1.834*** -1.824*** 
 
 (0.0226) (0.0227) (0.0227) (0.328) (0.327) (0.328) (0.634) (0.639) (0.640) 
R&D (t-1) - -0.0362 -0.0360 -0.0361 -0.276 -0.273 -0.276 -1.646** -1.637** -1.645** 
 
 (0.0343) (0.0344) (0.0344) (0.418) (0.418) (0.418) (0.741) (0.747) (0.743) 
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LEV (t-1) (-/+) -0.0612*** -0.0594*** -0.0611*** -0.494*** -0.465*** -0.493*** -0.812*** -0.715** -0.806*** 
 
 (0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0084) (0.0966) (0.0973) (0.0964) (0.301) (0.307) (0.302) 
CH (t-1) + 0.0178*** 0.0177*** 0.0178*** 0.160** 0.160** 0.160** 0.251* 0.250* 0.250* 
 
 (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0066) (0.0807) (0.0810) (0.0806) (0.142) (0.144) (0.142) 
ROE (t-1) + 0.0422*** 0.0425*** 0.0421*** 0.8460*** 0.8520*** 0.8460*** 2.4820*** 2.4970*** 2.4790*** 
 
 (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0992) (0.0998) (0.0991) (0.242) (0.242) (0.241) 
KZ (t-1) - -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0036*** -0.0036*** -0.0036*** -0.0069** -0.0070** -0.0070** 
 
 (0.00013) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
E-Index (t-1) (-/+) -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0011 0.0033 0.0043 0.0035 0.0240 0.0278 0.0250 
 
 (0.000996) (0.0001) (0.0010) (0.0128) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0335) (0.0333) (0.0333) 
M/B - 0.0040*** 0.0040*** 0.0040*** 0.0190*** 0.0194*** 0.0190*** 0.0698*** 0.0713*** 0.0698*** 
 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0119) 
PPE + 0.0022 0.0020 0.00205 0.0301 0.0284 0.0294 -0.393 -0.401 -0.398 
 
 (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.00745) (0.105) (0.106) (0.105) (0.255) (0.257) (0.254) 
 
 
         
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  10,060 10,060 10,060 10,060 10,060 10,060 10,060 10,060 10,060 
R-squared  0.257 0.256 0.257 0.065 0.064 0.065 0.239 0.236 0.239 
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Model 2 on Table 5.6 has the same set of variables and controls as Model 1. 
However, it tests the effect of non-accounting financial-experts’ relationship to payout 
policy. The results show that the fraction of non-accounting financial-experts has no 
significant effect on firm payout policy with a minor drop on R-squared compared to 
Model 1(from 0.257 to 0.256). The third regression combines the two financial 
experience variables (the fraction of accounting financial-experts and the fraction of 
non-accounting financial-experts on board) and found similar results to regressions 1 
and 2 in terms of coefficient signs, values and significance level. R-squared increase 
slightly to 0.257, matching the first regression R-squared.  
Table 5.6 regressions 4 to 6 replicate the first three regressions from the table. 
However, the fraction of financial-experts on board was regressed to the firm payout 
policy measured by the sum of firm repurchase and dividend scaled by firm net 
income. Both accounting and non-accounting financial-experts’ coefficients increase 
(from 0.0148 to 0.238 and from 0.0077 to 0.0436, respectively) with the same 
significance level. However, regressions R-squared drops from 0.257 to 0.065, which 
indicates that when the payout is scaled by total assets instead of net income, the 
regression shows a better fit. Moreover, regressions 7 to 9 replicated the previous 
regressions; however, using payout per share. Results also hold in terms of coefficient 
sign and significance. However, the significance level increases for accounting 
financial-experts from 5% to 1% showing a stronger relationship. The model R-
squared came closer to when scaling payout by firm total assets (0.236 compared to 
0.257), signifying a similar model fit. 
The positive relationship between the fraction of accounting financial-experts 
on firm and firm payout policy indicates that, in the case of enhanced corporate 
governance, through the appointment of accounting financial-experts on board, 
accounting financial-experts compel managers to pay more dividend to shareholders. 
This result is in line with the compliment hypothesis, which argues that stronger 
corporate governance allows shareholders to minimise the amount of cash available 
to managers preventing the misuse of excess cash. These findings are in line with La 
Porta et al.’s (2000) findings that better firm corporate governance enhances 
shareholder protection. However, when measuring board financial experience by the 
fraction of non-accounting financial experts on board, results show no indication of 
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any influence on firm payout policy. This finding suggests that enhancing board of 
directors’ composition through the appointment of non-accounting financial-experts 
does not have the same efficiency as the appointment of accounting financial-experts. 
5.8. Robustness checks 
In addition to using different payout measures to ensure the robustness of the study 
results, this section provides two additional robustness tests. First, the study adds some 
extra controls to control for other board characteristics that were proven in the 
literature to affect board monitoring. Second, the study adjusts the sample used in the 
main regression and exclude utility firms (SIC codes 4900–4999), as these firms are 
subject to regulations and have different characteristics of their accounting 
information, their payout policies and the access to external financing. 
Table 5.7 shows the results to main regression robust tests. The first three 
regressions use the same set of the study main regressions on Table 5.6; however, the 
regressions also control for other board of directors’ characteristics; that is, board size, 
board independence and CEO duality. Previous studies widely investigate the 
relationship between the board of directors and payout policy and found that the board 
of directors’ composition affects firm payout policy (Schellenger et al. 1989; Adjaoud 
and Ben‐Amar 2010; Abor and Fiador 2013; Pucheta-Martínez and Bel-Oms 2015; 
Yarram and Dollery 2015; Chen et al. 2017). Models 1, 2 and 3 show the effect of the 
fraction for financial-experts on board to the firm payout decision after controlling for 
board composition. For the first three regressions, sample size drops from 10,060 to 
9,403. Regression 1 shows that even when board composition is controlled, the 
fraction on accounting financial-experts has a significant positive relationship to firm 
payout scaled by total assets and coefficient slightly increases from 0.0146 to 0.0167 
with the same level of significance, whereas the non-accounting financial-experts 
remain insignificant with the same coefficient sign. The model R-squared slightly 
increases from 0.257 to 0.264, indicating a better model fit. Regression 2 also shows 
that when testing the relationship between board fraction of financial exerts with 
payout policy scaled by net income, controlling for board composition, the results 
stand with a slight increase with model R-squared from 0.065 to 0.069 and accounting 
financial-experts’ coefficient from 0.237 to 0.263. Moreover, the non-accounting 
experts also remain insignificant with the same coefficient sign. Regression 3 shows 
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the relationship between the fraction of financial-experts on board and firm payout per 
share after controlling for board composition and the main results stand. The 
accounting financial-experts’ coefficient slightly rises from 0.77 to 0.792 and the R-
squared went from 0.239 to 0.244, indicating a slightly better fit model.  
Regressions 4, 5 and 6 show the robustness checks after excluding Utilities industry. 
After excluding utility firms, the sample size drops from 10,060 to 9,267. Replicating 
the study main regressions, regression 4 shows similar results to the study main  
findings  on  the  relationship  between  the  fraction of financial-experts on firm payout 
to total assets. However, the accounting financial-experts’ coefficient rises from 
0.0146 to 0.0175 and the model R-squared slightly decreases to 0.247, from 0.257. 
The non-accounting financial-experts remain insignificant. Regression 5 also shows 
similar results to the study main regression on the fraction of financial-experts’ effect 
on firm payout to net income. The fraction of accounting financial-experts’ coefficient 
rises from 0.257 to 0.275 and the model R-squared also increased slightly from 0.065 
to 0.068. The non-accounting financial-experts remain insignificant. Final regression 
on the study robust test also confirms the study main results showing a strong 
relationship between board accounting financial-experts and firm payout per share. 
After excluding utility firms, the accounting financial-experts’ coefficient increases 
from 0.77 to 0.866 indicating that when utility firms are excluded from the sample, 
accounting financial-experts on board appear to have a greater influence on firm 
payout decisions.  
 To summarise the study’s robustness tests, the study main findings are robust 
to controlling for board composition and excluding Utilities firms. Models show a 
higher relationship between accounting financial-experts and payout decisions and 
better model fits when controlling for board composition. Moreover, when excluding 
utility firms from the sample, models show a very similar fit with slight increase when 
testing the relationship using payout to net income and payout per share. Also, when 
excluding utility firms, the relationship between the fraction of accounting financial-
experts and payout appears to be stronger. Regarding the fraction on non-accounting 
financial-experts, the robust tests are in line with the main study regression results, as 
the non-significant relationship between non-accounting financial-experts and firm 
payout decision appears in all robust measures. 
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Table 5. 8 Financial experience and firm payout (Robustness checks)   
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of the relation between financial-experts and firm payout robust test. The dependent variables are 
the firm payout variables; repurchase and dividend to total assets (RDA), repurchase and dividend to net income (RDNI) and repurchase and dividend 
per share (RDPS). The main independent variables are the percentage of accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.) and the 
percentage of non-accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.). SIZE: firm size measured as the log of the firm total 
assets. LEV: is the firm leverage: measured as firm long term debt divided by assets net of cash. R&D: is the firm research and development expenses 
divided by sale. M/B: is the firm market-to-book ratio, measured as the firm market value divided by firm assets net of cash. CFVOL: is the firm cash 
flow volatility measured as is measured as the standard deviation of cash flow-to-assets net of cash for the past 10 years. PPE: is the net property, 
plant and equipment divided by total assets. E-Index: is the entrenchment index. KZ: is the Kaplan-Zingales Index. ROE: return on equity measured 
as firm net income divided by market value of equity. CH: is the firm cash holding measured as cash and short term investment divided by assets net 
of cash and short term investments. BoardSize: in the log of sum of directors on board. Indep: is board independence, measured as the fraction on 
independent directors to the sum of directors on board. Duality: is the CEO duality, a dummy variable that takes 1 if the firm CEO and chairman 
positions are held by the same person and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
Board Characteristics ExUtility  
RDA RDNI RDPS RDA RDNI RDPS 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
              
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (t-1) 0.0167** 0.263*** 0.792*** 0.0175** 0.275** 0.866***  
(0.00664) (0.0985) (0.240) (0.00731) (0.108) (0.268) 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (t-1) 0.0108 0.127 0.313 0.00744 0.0289 0.322  
(0.00979) (0.133) (0.330) (0.0108) (0.141) (0.351) 
SIZE (t-1) 0.00330*** 0.0278** 0.397*** 0.00582*** 0.0695*** 0.488***  
(0.00103) (0.0138) (0.0356) (0.000922) (0.0110) (0.0345) 
CFVOL (t-1) -0.0487** -1.363*** -1.658*** -0.0510** -1.295*** -1.724***  
(0.0236) (0.281) (0.627) (0.0230) (0.332) (0.645) 
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R&D (t-1) -0.0436 -0.298 -1.790** -0.0359 -0.268 -1.670**  
(0.0352) (0.429) (0.754) (0.0344) (0.419) (0.747) 
LEV (t-1) -0.0624*** -0.512*** -0.795*** -0.0642*** -0.546*** -0.885***  
(0.00852) (0.0992) (0.301) (0.00860) (0.0982) (0.308) 
CH (t-1) 0.0199*** 0.206** 0.299** 0.0179*** 0.162** 0.264*  
(0.00688) (0.0806) (0.147) (0.00665) (0.0807) (0.143) 
ROE (t-1) 0.0405*** 0.824*** 2.454*** 0.0416*** 0.815*** 2.412***  
(0.00595) (0.103) (0.243) (0.00620) (0.102) (0.250) 
KZ (t-1) -0.000673*** -0.00317*** -0.00631** -0.000679*** -0.00358*** -0.00654**  
(0.000128) (0.00121) (0.00293) (0.000128) (0.00123) (0.00289) 
E-Index (t-1) -0.00183* -0.00730 -0.00223 -0.00131 0.00221 0.0187  
(0.000993) (0.0130) (0.0336) (0.00107) (0.0136) (0.0354) 
M/B (t-1) 0.00401*** 0.0192*** 0.0705*** 0.00397*** 0.0191*** 0.0705***  
(0.000465) (0.00349) (0.0121) (0.000466) (0.00340) (0.0120) 
PPE (t-1) 0.00151 0.0465 -0.434* 0.00295 0.0710 -0.351  
(0.00745) (0.105) (0.251) (0.00814) (0.112) (0.276) 
BoardSize (t-1) 0.0221*** 0.409*** 0.671*** 
   
 
(0.00512) (0.0796) (0.181) 
   
Indep (t-1) 0.00723 0.0137 0.530*** 
   
 
(0.00572) (0.0973) (0.200) 
   
Duality (t-1) -0.000400 0.0360 0.164** 
   
 
(0.00228) (0.0355) (0.0711) 
   
       
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,403 9,403 9,403 9,267 9,267 9,267 
R-squared 0.264 0.069 0.244 0.247 0.068 0.245 
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5.9. Additional analysis 
To attain a further insight on financial-experts’ effect on firm payout policy, this 
section explores the cross-sectional heterogeneity in the relation in question across 
firms with different governance characteristics and financial constraint. Additionally, 
the study investigated the effect of financial expert directors on the different types of 
payout policies (dividend and repurchase).  
5.9.1. Cross-section variation in financial-experts’ payout 
This section investigates whether the relationship between the fraction of financial-
experts and dividend payout stand in a different firm setting based on their corporate 
governance strength (measured by the firm E-Index, CEO duality board size and board 
independence) and financial constraint (measured by firm size and KZ Index).  
5.9.1.1. Corporate governance: 
If financial-experts increase dividends by enhancing firm corporate governance and 
mitigating agency problems, it should be expected that the positive relationship 
between the fraction of financial-experts on board and payout to be stronger among 
firms with low corporate governance strength, in support of the outcome hypothesis. 
This study focuses on four main corporate governance measures that have been widely 
searched in the literature. These are; firm E-Index, CEO duality, board size and board 
independence.  
Table 5.8 shows the firm main regression after separating the sample based on 
the firm E-Index. E-Index is the entrenchment index constructed by Bebchuk et al. 
(2009) related to the firm economic fundamentals and decision making. Bebchuk et 
al. (2009) design the E-Index based on the six out of 24 provisions in the IRRC 
database that, according to them, are the most important ones leading to managerial 
entrenchment. E-Index can be any number between 1 and 6, counting the number of 
provisions these firms has. The sample is split based on firms with  E-Index equal or 
less than 3 (high shareholders right, thus strong corporate governance) and firms with 
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E-Index equal or more than 4 (low shareholders right, thus weak corporate 
governance)25.   
The first three regressions in Table 5.8 show the main study regression on the sample 
size for firm with high E-Index. For the three main variables; RDA, RDNI and RDPS, 
the accounting financial-experts appear to be significant at 5% level for the first two 
and 1% level for the third measure. Where the non-accounting financial-experts appear 
to be insignificant at all levels for all payout measures, this shows that the study main 
finding, non-accounting financial-experts positive effect on firm payout policy, appear 
in weak governed firms. However, Table 5.8 under low E-Index sample  regression,  
results  show  no  significance  level  of the two financial-experts’ variables 
(accounting and non-accounting) to all firm payout measures; this shows that 
financial-experts use increased firm dividend payments on weakly governed firms 
with weak shareholders’ rights and not in strongly governed firms with strong 
shareholders’ rights; this indicates that accounting financial-experts use payout as a 
monitoring instrument to control top management.  
The second corporate measure used in this study is the CEO duality. CEO 
duality is when the same person holds the CEO and chairman position, which gives 
extreme power to one person only, which has been considered in the literature to 
weaken firm corporate governance. According to Brickley et al. (1997), the attribute 
of board monitoring can be measured through the board of directors’ leadership 
structure. In favour of agency theory, researchers argue that combining the CEO and 
chairman roles negatively affects the scope to which board members can execute their 
monitoring responsibility (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen 1993). Previous studies 
related to CEO duality report substantial evidence that combining the roles of CEO 
and chairman weakens the board’s monitoring role, hindering their firm value (Kim et 
al. 2009) and information disclosure policy (Gul and Leung 2004). 
  
 
25 E-index is an integer number. 
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Table 5. 9 Sub-sample based on firm corporate governance – E-Index 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of the relation between financial-experts and firm cash holding after splitting the 
sample based on the firm corporate governance level. The dependent variables are the firm payout variables; repurchase and dividend 
to total assets (RDA), repurchase and dividend to net income (RDNI) and repurchase and dividend per share (RDPS). The main 
independent variables are the percentage of accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.) and the percentage 
of non-accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.). SIZE: firm size measured as the log of the firm total 
assets. LEV: is the firm leverage: measured as firm long term debt divided by assets net of cash. R&D: is the firm research and 
development expenses divided by sale. M/B: is the firm market-to-book ratio, measured as the firm market value divided by firm 
assets net of cash. CFVOL: is the firm cash flow volatility measured as is measured as the standard deviation of cash flow-to-assets 
net of cash for the past 10 years. PPE: is the net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. E-Index: is the entrenchment 
index. KZ: is the Kaplan-Zingales Index. ROE: return on equity measured as firm net income divided by market value of equity. CH 
is the firm cash holding measured as cash and short term investment divided by assets net of cash and short term investments. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
 High E-Index  Low E-Index  
 RDA RDNI RDPS RDA RDNI RDPS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (t-1) 0.0147** 0.295** 0.757*** 0.0167 0.197 0.925** 
 (0.00743) (0.124) (0.277) (0.0109) (0.149) (0.392) 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (t-1) 0.00155 -0.0922 0.0464 0.0124 0.166 0.394 
 (0.0105) (0.160) (0.362) (0.0156) (0.195) (0.514) 
SIZE (t-1) 0.00504*** 0.0575*** 0.582*** 0.00603*** 0.0798*** 0.401*** 
 (0.00109) (0.0155) (0.0390) (0.00110) (0.0138) (0.0415) 
CFVOL (t-1) -0.0576* -1.924*** -1.767** -0.0545* -0.439 -1.670* 
 (0.0308) (0.454) (0.863) (0.0303) (0.516) (0.975) 
R&D (t-1) -0.0258 -0.123 -2.211** -0.0375 -0.415 -1.346* 
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 (0.0487) (0.518) (1.042) (0.0370) (0.586) (0.785) 
LEV (t-1) -0.0555*** -0.460*** -1.312*** -0.0674*** -0.515*** -0.321 
 (0.0118) (0.134) (0.329) (0.0108) (0.137) (0.473) 
CH (t-1) 0.0232** 0.286** 0.536** 0.0129* 0.0554 0.0138 
 (0.0111) (0.131) (0.239) (0.00687) (0.0935) (0.130) 
ROE (t-1) 0.0414*** 1.013*** 2.222*** 0.0411*** 0.645*** 2.427*** 
 (0.00656) (0.140) (0.268) (0.00986) (0.134) (0.369) 
KZ (t-1) -0.000746*** -0.00279 -0.00868** -0.000591*** -0.00411*** -0.00385 
 (0.000165) (0.00185) (0.00400) (0.000156) (0.00131) (0.00331) 
E-Index (t-1) -0.000768 0.00957 0.0945 9.16e-05 0.0251 0.143*** 
 (0.00186) (0.0361) (0.0680) (0.00179) (0.0246) (0.0494) 
M/B 0.00341*** 0.0205*** 0.0658*** 0.00450*** 0.0173*** 0.0778*** 
 (0.000581) (0.00463) (0.0137) (0.000633) (0.00514) (0.0178) 
PPE 0.000607 0.0688 -0.594* 0.00157 -0.0694 -0.0945 
 (0.00921) (0.144) (0.322) (0.0106) (0.154) (0.346) 
       
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,667 5,667 5,667 4,393 4,393 4,393 
R-squared 0.267 0.066 0.252 0.268 0.083 0.268 
 
 184 
Table 5.9 shows the study main regression results after splitting the sample 
based on CEO duality. The three regressions of firms with CEO and chairman role 
held by the same person shows that the fraction accounting financial-experts on board 
has a positive effect on all firm payout variables. However, fraction accounting 
financial-experts were only significant at 10% level for RDA and RDNI where they 
were significant at 5% level with RDPS. 
Moving to the same regressions on the firm sample with CEO and chairman position 
held by different people, results found that for RDA and RDNI, accounting and non-
accounting financial-experts have no significant relationship with payout. However, 
for the RDPS, it appears to have a significant relationship at 5% level with accounting 
financial-experts. When comparing the two samples RDPS relationship to accounting 
financial-experts, there is a higher coefficient for the sample of firms with non-CEO 
duality than firms with CEO duality (0.840 and 0.674 correspondingly) indicating  a  
higher  relationship;  this shows  that  even  though accounting financial-experts 
increase payout per share in firms with non-CEO duality, this effect is not found when 
payouts scaled by firm assets or net income.   
The second corporate governance measure used in this cross-section analysis 
is board size. Firms’ effectiveness of monitoring is determined by the ease of 
communication and coordination between directors on board (Boubaker et al. 2015). 
According to Lipton and Lorsch (1992), small boards are more beneficial to 
monitoring responsibilities’ excellence due to results of better and more efficient 
coordination between fewer directors. In view of this argument, studies found an 
inverse relationship between board size and firm market valuation (Yermack 1996; 
Eisenberg et al. 1998; Mak and Kusnadi 2005). To the extent that small boards appear 
to restrain agency problems, enhanced shareholder control over firm corporate 
governance should be better in firms with a small board of directors.   
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Table 5. 10 Sub-sample based on firm corporate governance – CEO Duality 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of the relation between financial-experts and firm cash holding after splitting the 
sample based on the firm corporate governance level. The dependent variables are the firm payout variables; repurchase and dividend 
to total assets (RDA), repurchase and dividend to net income (RDNI) and repurchase and dividend per share (RDPS). The main 
independent variables are the percentage of accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.) and the percentage 
of non-accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.). SIZE: firm size measured as the log of the firm total 
assets. LEV: is the firm leverage: measured as firm long term debt divided by assets net of cash. R&D: is the firm research and 
development expenses divided by sale. M/B: is the firm market-to-book ratio, measured as the firm market value divided by firm 
assets net of cash. CFVOL: is the firm cash flow volatility measured as is measured as the standard deviation of cash flow-to-assets 
net of cash for the past 10 years. PPE: is the net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. E-Index: is the entrenchment 
index. KZ: is the Kaplan-Zingales Index. ROE: return on equity measured as firm net income divided by market value of equity. CH 
is the firm cash holding measured as cash and short term investment divided by assets net of cash and short term investments. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
 Duality Non-Duality 
 RDA RDNI RDPS RDA RDNI RDPS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (t-1) 0.0134* 0.217* 0.674** 0.0110 0.246 0.840** 
 (0.00790) (0.116) (0.311) (0.0112) (0.176) (0.365) 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (t-1) 0.00355 0.0393 0.194 0.0168 0.0268 0.424 
 (0.0127) (0.161) (0.401) (0.0136) (0.224) (0.441) 
SIZE (t-1) 0.00518*** 0.0637*** 0.487*** 0.00599*** 0.0533** 0.429*** 
 (0.000989) (0.0127) (0.0402) (0.00168) (0.0220) (0.0439) 
CFVOL (t-1) -0.0752*** -0.995*** -1.382 -0.0297 -1.536*** -2.220*** 
 (0.0283) (0.381) (0.928) (0.0306) (0.504) (0.639) 
 186 
R&D (t-1) -0.0769* -0.457 -3.276*** 0.0368 0.193 0.304 
 (0.0456) (0.561) (1.018) (0.0372) (0.600) (0.815) 
LEV (t-1) -0.0557*** -0.408*** -0.774* -0.0647*** -0.605*** -0.804** 
 (0.0108) (0.127) (0.409) (0.0128) (0.152) (0.401) 
CH (t-1) 0.0205** 0.111 0.287 0.0170** 0.276** 0.157 
 (0.00919) (0.103) (0.179) (0.00863) (0.120) (0.228) 
ROE (t-1) 0.0442*** 0.771*** 2.844*** 0.0428*** 0.895*** 2.033*** 
 (0.00756) (0.122) (0.341) (0.00909) (0.176) (0.286) 
KZ (t-1) -0.000697*** -0.00482*** -0.00529 -0.000668*** -0.00209 -0.00787** 
 (0.000169) (0.00149) (0.00350) (0.000171) (0.00184) (0.00379) 
E-Index (t-1) -0.00159 -0.00204 0.0416 0.000551 0.0139 0.0138 
 (0.00111) (0.0153) (0.0377) (0.00161) (0.0225) (0.0523) 
M/B 0.00431*** 0.0198*** 0.0739*** 0.00334*** 0.0170*** 0.0655*** 
 (0.000597) (0.00443) (0.0151) (0.000646) (0.00585) (0.0169) 
PPE -0.000293 0.0279 -0.467 0.00533 0.0586 -0.406 
 (0.00821) (0.122) (0.300) (0.0131) (0.241) (0.377) 
       
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,768 6,768 6,768 3,292 3,292 3,292 
R-squared 0.273 0.066 0.255 0.267 0.083 0.226 
 
 187 
Table 5.10 shows the study main regression for the split samples based on firm 
board size. The sample split was based on the yearly board of directors’ sample 
median. The results of firms with a small board of directors (strong corporate 
governance), the regressions show that there is no relationship between the portion of 
financial-experts on board variables and firm RDA and RDNI. However, there is a 
positive relationship between the fraction of accounting financial-experts and 
firm RDPS at 5% significance level. For the sample with a large board size (weak 
corporate governance), the table shows that the fraction of accounting experts has a 
positive and significant relationship with firm payout variables (a significance level of 
10% with RDA and 5% with RDNI and RDPS). However, the non-accounting 
financial-experts appear to be insignificant with all regressions in the two samples. 
For the sample spilt based on firm board size, even though accounting financial-
experts have a significant positive relationship to firm RDPS for both samples, 
accounting financial-experts appear to increase firm RDPS higher in firms with large 
board size with accounting financial-experts’ coefficient of 0.919 compared to 0.572. 
The last corporate governance measure used in this sub-sample analysis is firm 
board independence. Independent directors are assumed to have completely 
independent oversight of top management since these directors, apart from 
directorship fees, have no financial interests in the firm (Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990; 
Adams et al. 2010). According to the agency theory, independent directors on board 
are essential for board effectiveness on monitoring and decision making (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983). Thus, to reduce agency problem, independent 
directors act as good monitors pursuing shareholders’ interest (Yermack 2004; Sharma 
2011; Armstrong et al. 2014).  
Table 5.11 shows that, in respect of board independence, the fraction of 
financial-experts has mixed results for both samples (high and low board 
independence firm). For RDA the fraction of accounting financial-experts for firms 
with low board independence has a positive effect on firms’ payout in relation to firm 
assets. However, it has no effect on firms with high board independence. For the other 
firm payout measure, RDNI, the fraction of accounting financial-experts appear to 
have a relationship with payout in firms with high board independence but not in firms 
with low board independence.  For  RDPS,  firms with high  board  independence pay  
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Table 5. 11 Sub-sample based on firm corporate governance – Board Size 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of the relation between financial-experts and firm cash holding after splitting the sample 
based on the firm corporate governance level. The dependent variables are the firm payout variables; repurchase and dividend to total assets 
(RDA), repurchase and dividend to net income (RDNI) and repurchase and dividend per share (RDPS). The main independent variables are 
the percentage of accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.) and the percentage of non-accounting financial-experts 
on board (Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.). SIZE: firm size measured as the log of the firm total assets. LEV: is the firm leverage: measured 
as firm long term debt divided by assets net of cash. R&D: is the firm research and development expenses divided by sale. M/B: is the firm 
market-to-book ratio, measured as the firm market value divided by firm assets net of cash. CFVOL: is the firm cash flow volatility measured 
as is measured as the standard deviation of cash flow-to-assets net of cash for the past 10 years. PPE: is the net property, plant and equipment 
divided by total assets. E-Index: is the entrenchment index. KZ: is the Kaplan-Zingales Index. ROE: return on equity measured as firm net 
income divided by market value of equity. CH is the firm cash holding measured as cash and short term investment divided by assets net of 
cash and short term investments. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively.   
 Small Board Size Large Board Size 
 RDA RDNI RDPS RDA RDNI RDPS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (t-1) 0.0113 0.159 0.572** 0.0166* 0.331** 0.919** 
 (0.00840) (0.131) (0.262) (0.00924) (0.149) (0.432) 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (t-1) 0.0111 0.0621 0.158 0.00742 0.0477 0.872 
 (0.0124) (0.168) (0.332) (0.0133) (0.185) (0.552) 
SIZE (t-1) 0.00561*** 0.0469*** 0.425*** 0.00323*** 0.0422** 0.442*** 
 (0.00138) (0.0182) (0.0396) (0.00109) (0.0166) (0.0477) 
CFVOL (t-1) -0.0452 -1.266*** -1.510** -0.0548** -1.324*** -2.714* 
 (0.0301) (0.415) (0.637) (0.0272) (0.462) (1.389) 
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R&D (t-1) -0.0398 -0.432 -1.184 -0.0291 0.428 -4.551*** 
 (0.0397) (0.426) (0.771) (0.0540) (0.976) (1.744) 
LEV (t-1) -0.0554*** -0.548*** -0.479 -0.0668*** -0.352** -1.212** 
 (0.0112) (0.128) (0.320) (0.0111) (0.143) (0.477) 
CH (t-1) 0.0183** 0.204** 0.296* 0.0284*** 0.127 -0.0224 
 (0.00771) (0.0883) (0.157) (0.00953) (0.171) (0.346) 
ROE (t-1) 0.0465*** 0.810*** 2.149*** 0.0330*** 0.857*** 2.791*** 
 (0.00788) (0.124) (0.303) (0.00769) (0.157) (0.316) 
KZ (t-1) -0.000609*** -0.00366*** -0.00463* -0.000884*** -0.00239 -0.0179** 
 (0.000142) (0.00134) (0.00273) (0.000225) (0.00306) (0.00839) 
E-Index (t-1) -0.000144 0.0142 0.0461 -0.00356*** -0.0253 -0.0165 
 (0.00130) (0.0168) (0.0386) (0.00121) (0.0177) (0.0518) 
M/B 0.00460*** 0.0215*** 0.0872*** 0.00332*** 0.0152*** 0.0504*** 
 (0.000689) (0.00515) (0.0185) (0.000510) (0.00389) (0.0166) 
PPE -0.00151 0.0282 -0.377 0.0111 -0.00455 -0.373 
 (0.0102) (0.134) (0.268) (0.00890) (0.174) (0.398) 
       
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,577 5,577 5,577 4,480 4,480 4,480 
R-squared 0.241 0.073 0.198 0.321 0.062 0.246 
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Table 5. 12 Sub-sample based on firm corporate governance – Board independence 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of the relation between financial-experts and firm cash holding after splitting the sample 
based on the firm corporate governance level. The dependent variables are the firm payout variables; repurchase and dividend to total 
assets (RDA), repurchase and dividend to net income (RDNI) and repurchase and dividend per share (RDPS). The main independent 
variables are the percentage of accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.) and the percentage of non-accounting 
financial-experts on board (Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.). SIZE: firm size measured as the log of the firm total assets. LEV: is the 
firm leverage: measured as firm long term debt divided by assets net of cash. R&D: is the firm research and development expenses 
divided by sale. M/B: is the firm market-to-book ratio, measured as the firm market value divided by firm assets net of cash. CFVOL: 
is the firm cash flow volatility measured as is measured as the standard deviation of cash flow-to-assets net of cash for the past 10 years. 
PPE: is the net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. E-Index: is the entrenchment index. KZ: is the Kaplan-Zingales 
Index. ROE: return on equity measured as firm net income divided by market value of equity. CH is the firm cash holding measured as 
cash and short term investment divided by assets net of cash and short term investments. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
 Low Board Independence High Board Independence 
 RDA RDNI RDPS RDA RDNI RDPS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (t-1) 0.0179** 0.185 0.580** 0.0110 0.329** 0.906*** 
 (0.00841) (0.116) (0.288) (0.00787) (0.143) (0.303) 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (t-1) 0.0165 0.132 0.449 -0.00222 -0.0446 0.105 
 (0.0126) (0.173) (0.378) (0.0114) (0.162) (0.377) 
SIZE (t-1) 0.00552*** 0.0764*** 0.405*** 0.00519*** 0.0537*** 0.530*** 
 (0.00102) (0.0141) (0.0330) (0.00108) (0.0145) (0.0393) 
CFVOL (t-1) -0.0699*** -1.292*** -1.980*** -0.0393 -1.378*** -1.587* 
 (0.0235) (0.313) (0.736) (0.0313) (0.492) (0.852) 
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R&D (t-1) -0.0527 -0.615 -1.197 -0.0127 0.154 -2.058** 
 (0.0351) (0.409) (0.730) (0.0441) (0.627) (1.022) 
LEV (t-1) -0.0701*** -0.570*** -0.948*** -0.0496*** -0.451*** -0.602 
 (0.00890) (0.123) (0.328) (0.0112) (0.144) (0.366) 
CH (t-1) 0.0207*** 0.277*** 0.262* 0.0151 0.0388 0.240 
 (0.00634) (0.0790) (0.135) (0.00951) (0.131) (0.198) 
ROE (t-1) 0.0357*** 0.748*** 2.339*** 0.0484*** 0.992*** 2.576*** 
 (0.00813) (0.128) (0.325) (0.00686) (0.146) (0.266) 
KZ (t-1) -0.000671*** -0.00318*** -0.00458 -0.000679*** -0.00400 -0.0100** 
 (0.000134) (0.00118) (0.00304) (0.000180) (0.00245) (0.00440) 
E-Index (t-1) -0.00209 -0.00232 0.0235 -1.93e-05 0.00366 0.00513 
 (0.00131) (0.0172) (0.0423) (0.00112) (0.0165) (0.0368) 
M/B 0.00410*** 0.0187*** 0.0669*** 0.00378*** 0.0193*** 0.0722*** 
 (0.000618) (0.00474) (0.0166) (0.000506) (0.00419) (0.0137) 
PPE -0.00217 -0.0903 -0.439 0.00381 0.172 -0.459 
 (0.00951) (0.126) (0.289) (0.00845) (0.142) (0.308) 
       
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,962 4,962 4,962 5,095 5,095 5,095 
R-squared 0.260 0.077 0.218 0.271 0.069 0.271 
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more per share than firms with low board independence (0.906 compared to 0.580, 
respectively). The significance level of the relationship between the fraction of 
accounting financial-experts and payout per share is 5% for firm with low board 
independence and 1% for firms with high board independence, indicating a stronger 
relationship in firms with high board independence. 
All in all, measured by E-Index, CEO Duality and board size, the results show 
that the fraction of accounting financial experts appears mainly in firms with weak 
corporate governance; this is in line with the outcome theory, financial-experts play a 
significant role in enhancing board monitoring in firms with enchanted managers. This 
appears in the significant increase in payout for firms with high E-Index, CEO duality 
role and large board size. However, for board independence, the results are 
inconclusive. The results vary based on board independence and payout measure.  
5.9.1.2. Financial constraints: 
If financial-experts increase dividends to mitigate agency problem, then the 
relationship between the fraction of financial-experts on board effect on dividend 
policy should be more pronounced in financially constrained firms. According to Chae 
et al. (2009), the relationship between corporate governance and firm payout depends 
on the firm size of agency conflict and the level of financial constraints. According to 
the agency theory, in the presence of agency conflict of interest, stronger corporate 
governance increases firm dividend payment to minimise top management misconduct 
of free cash flow (Easterbrook 1984; Jensen 1986; Zwiebel 1996). Managers in 
financially constrained firms tend to increase their cash holding due to the higher cost 
of raising external finances (Myers and Majluf 1984). If the agency theory holds, the 
study expects that the fraction of financial-expert directors’ influence on firm payout 
to be shown more in financial constraint firms.    
There are a variety of ways to measure financial constraints in the literature. 
This study employs two different proxies, suggested in previous studies. First, 
following previous studies (Faulkender and Wang 2006; Nguyen et al. 2018), the study 
uses firm size (measured by firm total assets). Large firms are assumed to be well-
known in the market and therefore face fewer financial constraints when raising 
money externally to fund their investments. Second, following previous studies 
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(Lamont et al. 2001; Baker et al. 2003; Malmendier and Tate 2005; Güner et al. 2008; 
Li 2011; Florackis and Sainani 2018) the study constructs the KZ Index as explained 
in the previous section. According to the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) argument, single 
variable proxies (e.g. firm size) does not capture the real status of firm financial 
constraint. The higher KZ Index indicates more constrained firms. The study split the 
sample based on the sample constraint variable yearly median into constrained firms 
(small size firms or firms with high KZ Index) and unconstrained firms (large size 
firms or firms with low KZ Index). 
 Table 5.12 shows the main regressions based on the sample split of firm size. 
The first three columns show the fraction of financial-experts on board relation to firm 
payout variables for the small firms’ sample. Results show a positive and significant 
relationship between the fraction of accounting financial-expert directors and firm 
payout (significant at 5%, 10% and 1% for RDA, RDNI and RDPS correspondingly). 
However, columns 4, 5 and 6 show different results for the firms with large firm size. 
It appears that for large firms, only RDPS have a positive and significant relationship 
to the fraction of accounting financial-experts, These results suggest that even though 
accounting financial-experts on board increases the firm payout per share for large 
firms, they do not affect payouts in relation to form assets or net income. For non-
accounting financial-expert directors, the results show no significant relationship to 
firm payout variables in both samples.  
Measuring firm financial constraint level based on firm KZ Index, Table 5.13 
shows results on sample split based on firm KZ Index level. Columns 1, 2 and 3 show 
the study’s main regression results for high KZ Index firms (constraint firms). It 
appears that other than RDA, accounting financial-experts have a positive and 
significant relationship to firm payout at 1% for RDNI and 10% for RDPS. For 
unconstrained firms based on low KZ Index measure, results show that other than 
RDPS, there is no relationship between the fraction of accounting financial-experts 
and firm payout. Moreover, for non-accounting financial-experts on board, the results 
for high and low KZ Index firms show no significant relationship to firm payout 
variables.  
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Table 5. 13 Sub-sample based on firm financial constrain – Firm size 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of the relation between financial-experts and firm cash holding after splitting the 
sample based on firm size. The dependent variables are the firm payout variables; repurchase and dividend to total assets (RDA), 
repurchase and dividend to net income (RDNI) and repurchase and dividend per share (RDPS). The main independent variables are the 
percentage of accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.) and the percentage of non-accounting financial-
experts on board (Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.). SIZE: firm size measured as the log of the firm total assets. LEV: is the firm 
leverage: measured as firm long term debt divided by assets net of cash. R&D: is the firm research and development expenses divided 
by sale. M/B: is the firm market-to-book ratio, measured as the firm market value divided by firm assets net of cash. CFVOL: is the 
firm cash flow volatility measured as is measured as the standard deviation of cash flow-to-assets net of cash for the past 10 years. 
PPE: is the net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. E-Index: is the entrenchment index. KZ: is the Kaplan-Zingales 
Index. ROE: return on equity measured as firm net income divided by market value of equity. CH is the firm cash holding measured 
as cash and short term investment divided by assets net of cash and short term investments. Robust standard errors in parentheses *, 
**, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively 
.  
 Small Firms  Large Firms 
 RDA RDNI RDPS RDA RDNI RDPS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (t-1) 0.0185** 0.253* 0.720*** 0.0119 0.194 1.019** 
 (0.00904) (0.150) (0.239) (0.00865) (0.134) (0.418) 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (t-1) 0.00742 -0.00584 -0.0379 0.00908 0.0531 0.712 
 (0.0131) (0.176) (0.312) (0.0135) (0.165) (0.664) 
SIZE (t-1) 0.00911*** 0.0739** 0.561*** 0.00186 0.0488** 0.449*** 
 (0.00259) (0.0325) (0.0657) (0.00132) (0.0206) (0.0756) 
CFVOL (t-1) -0.0344 -0.942** -0.841 -0.0617* -2.011*** -4.045*** 
 (0.0250) (0.413) (0.666) (0.0338) (0.688) (1.238) 
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R&D (t-1) -0.0825** -0.857* -2.005*** 0.112** 1.672* -3.053 
 (0.0395) (0.452) (0.750) (0.0523) (0.882) (2.095) 
LEV (t-1) -0.0615*** -0.586*** -0.880*** -0.0553*** -0.192 -0.784 
 (0.0112) (0.123) (0.274) (0.0110) (0.150) (0.598) 
CH (t-1) 0.0219*** 0.255*** 0.453*** 0.0137 -0.0579 -0.471 
 (0.00797) (0.0908) (0.147) (0.0117) (0.131) (0.333) 
ROE (t-1) 0.0353*** 0.743*** 1.614*** 0.0415*** 0.869*** 3.152*** 
 (0.00886) (0.146) (0.278) (0.00654) (0.137) (0.357) 
KZ (t-1) -0.000684*** -0.00330** -0.00796** -0.000646*** -0.00421 -0.00777 
 (0.000151) (0.00141) (0.00349) (0.000154) (0.00256) (0.00618) 
E-Index (t-1) -0.00138 0.000234 -0.0141 -0.00253** -0.00106 0.0389 
 (0.00143) (0.0183) (0.0362) (0.00117) (0.0178) (0.0587) 
M/B 0.00475*** 0.0213*** 0.0807*** 0.00282*** 0.0158*** 0.0558*** 
 (0.000684) (0.00478) (0.0170) (0.000505) (0.00439) (0.0150) 
PPE -0.00572 0.0844 -0.268 0.0121 -0.0960 -0.827** 
 (0.0113) (0.156) (0.284) (0.00874) (0.155) (0.417) 
       
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,409 5,409 5,409 4,649 4,649 4,649 
R-squared 0.228 0.065 0.186 0.381 0.094 0.253 
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Table 5. 14 Sub-sample based on firm financial constrain – KZ index 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of the relation between financial-experts and firm cash holding after splitting the sample 
based on the firm KZ index. The dependent variables are the firm payout variables; repurchase and dividend to total assets (RDA) , 
repurchase and dividend to net income (RDNI) and repurchase and dividend per share (RDPS). The main independent variables are the 
percentage of accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.) and the percentage of non-accounting financial-experts 
on board (Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.). SIZE: firm size measured as the log of the firm total assets. LEV: is the firm leverage: 
measured as firm long term debt divided by assets net of cash. R&D: is the firm research and development expenses divided by sale. M/B: 
is the firm market-to-book ratio, measured as the firm market value divided by firm assets net of cash. CFVOL: is the firm cash flow 
volatility measured as is measured as the standard deviation of cash flow-to-assets net of cash for the past 10 years. PPE: is the net property, 
plant and equipment divided by total assets. E-Index: is the entrenchment index. KZ: is the Kaplan-Zingales Index. ROE: return on equity 
measured as firm net income divided by market value of equity. CH is the firm cash holding measured as cash and short term investment 
divided by assets net of cash and short term investments. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively.   
 high KZ low KZ 
 RDA RDNI RDPS RDA RDNI RDPS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (t-1) 0.00775 0.343*** 0.515* 0.0160 0.0711 1.004*** 
 (0.00695) (0.118) (0.287) (0.0100) (0.155) (0.363) 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (t-1) 0.0124 0.103 0.618 -0.00518 -0.117 -0.261 
 (0.00970) (0.150) (0.442) (0.0160) (0.197) (0.435) 
SIZE (t-1) 0.00354*** 0.0558*** 0.402*** 0.00536*** 0.0714*** 0.517*** 
 (0.000862) (0.0140) (0.0359) (0.00132) (0.0151) (0.0449) 
CFVOL (t-1) -0.0424** -1.277*** -2.023** -0.0367 -1.028** -0.855 
 (0.0202) (0.390) (0.874) (0.0312) (0.456) (0.725) 
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R&D (t-1) -0.0587 0.466 -1.142 -0.0157 -0.522 -2.028** 
 (0.0515) (0.807) (1.204) (0.0368) (0.457) (0.834) 
LEV (t-1) -0.0296*** -0.176 -0.611 -0.0588*** -0.473*** -0.366 
 (0.00982) (0.127) (0.415) (0.0122) (0.146) (0.371) 
CH (t-1) 0.0325* -0.0210 0.213 0.0163** 0.171** 0.289** 
 (0.0184) (0.205) (0.455) (0.00642) (0.0870) (0.140) 
ROE (t-1) 0.0304*** 0.721*** 1.987*** 0.0866*** 1.030*** 3.204*** 
 (0.00528) (0.106) (0.218) (0.0196) (0.280) (0.773) 
E-Index (t-1) -0.000829 -0.00952 -0.00718 -0.00204 0.0181 0.0677 
 (0.000920) (0.0150) (0.0423) (0.00159) (0.0199) (0.0417) 
M/B 0.00207*** 0.0112** 0.0395** 0.00450*** 0.0163*** 0.0682*** 
 (0.000523) (0.00475) (0.0155) (0.000558) (0.00435) (0.0140) 
PPE 0.00390 0.170 0.102 0.0741*** 0.661*** 0.747 
 (0.00819) (0.135) (0.300) (0.0173) (0.220) (0.575) 
       
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5,025 5,025 5,025 5,024 5,024 5,024 
R-squared 0.230 0.077 0.220 0.227 0.062 0.294 
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All in all, results on the effect of firm financial constraint on the relationship 
between financial-experts on board and firm payout indicate that the relationship is 
driven by firm financial constraint level. In highly constrained firms, where top 
management tends to hold more cash, accounting financial-experts on board play a 
major role in increasing the firm payout level. This proposition is in line with the study 
main argument that directors’ financial-experience enhances board monitoring in 
reducing agency conflict of interest. 
5.9.2. Different payout policies  
To further understand the dimension of financial-experts’ effect on firm payouts, this 
section provides an additional analysis of the effect of financial-expert directors on 
different types of firm payout policies. Firms make the decisions on either pay 
investors dividend, repurchase stocks or do both. The reasoning behind why firms pay 
dividend has been a under a heated debate for more than five decades, since Lintner 
(1956) influential paper. According to Miller and Modigliani (1961), in a perfect 
capital market, assuming no tax, the dividend should have no effect on investors and 
firms. However, in the presence of firm tax, Black (1976) found it difficult to justify 
why firms pay dividends. Unlike dividend payment, stock repurchase offers firms and 
investors significant flexibility and tax advantages (Guay and Harford 2000; Skinner 
2008). Unlike dividend, payments in the form of repurchase is not related to investors’ 
future payout expectation, constructing it to be less costly than dividend (Grullon and 
Michaely 2002). According to Fama and French (2001), the tendency of US industrials 
to pay dividends occurred from the 1970s through the late 1990s. Hsieh and Wang 
(2009) show that, since 1996, corporate payout using repurchase exceeded dividend 
payments.    
Previous study findings show that, aside from firms’ payout level, firms’ 
choice of payout structure is also affected by their corporate governance strength. 
Bhabra and Luu (2015) argue that, as repurchases are not mandatory in nature when 
compared to dividends, enchanted managers will pass on repurchasing stocks and 
adopt a pre-commit payout policy. When comparing payout policies, John and 
Knyazeva (2006) found that, when corporate governance is weak, firms are less likely 
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to adopt a repurchase policy. Instead, firms are more likely to adopt dividend policy 
or mixture of dividend-repurchase policy.   
Table 5.14 uses six payout measures, in which three measures the level of firm 
payout through repurchase (repurchase asset ratio (RAR), repurchase to net income 
(RNI) and repurchase per share (RPS)) and three measures the firm payout through 
dividend (dividend assets ratio (DAR), dividend to net income (DNI) and dividend per 
share (DPS)). Columns 1 and 2 show the study main regression 
using RAR and DAR as the main variables, respectively. Results indicate that scaled 
by firm total assets, the fraction of accounting financial-experts on board have a 
positive and significant relationship at 10% level to the firm repurchase and not 
dividend. Moreover, columns 3 and 4 show the study main regression using 
the RNI and DNI as dependent variables. Consistent with the first two columns, 
accounting financial-experts have a positive and significant relationship to firm 
repurchase and not dividend (scaled by firm net income). When calculating payout per 
shares, column 5 and 6 shows that the fraction of financial-experts enhances the firm 
repurchase and dividend level. However, when comparing the two 
regressions, RPS has a higher coefficient (0.426) when compared to DPS (0.315), 
indicating that the fraction of accounting financial-experts on board has a stronger 
effect to firm repurchase.  
In summary, giving the flexibility of firm repurchase option, enchanted 
managers would be driven to drift from repurchasing stocks as a form of payout and 
adhere with pre-committed dividend payments only. This study shows that the fraction 
of accounting financial-experts on board would not only increase firm payout level, 
but would be more likely to pay shareholders in the form of repurchase than dividends. 
The results emphasise financial-experts’ role in enhancing board monitoring through 
the influence of distributing free cash flow in the form of non-pre-committed 
shareholders’ payments. 
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Table 5. 15 Financial Experience and firm payout policies 
 
This table reports the results of OLS regressions of the relation between financial-experts and firm different payout policies. The dependent 
variables are the firm payout variables; repurchase to assets ratio (RAR), dividend assets ratio (DAR), repurchase to net income (RNI), dividend 
to net income (DNI), repurchase per share (RPS) and dividend per share (DPS). The main independent variables are the percentage of accounting 
financial-experts on board (Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir.) and the percentage of non-accounting financial-experts on board (Frac. of Non-Acc. 
Fin. Exp. Dir.). SIZE: firm size measured as the log of the firm total assets. LEV: is the firm leverage: measured as firm long term debt divided 
by assets net of cash. R&D: is the firm research and development expenses divided by sale. M/B: is the firm market-to-book ratio, measured as 
the firm market value divided by firm assets net of cash. CFVOL: is the firm cash flow volatility measured as is measured as the standard 
deviation of cash flow-to-assets net of cash for the past 10 years. PPE: is the net property, plant and equipment divided by total assets. E-Index: 
is the entrenchment index. KZ: is the Kaplan-Zingales Index. ROE: return on equity measured as firm net income divided by market value of 
equity. CH is the firm cash holding measured as cash and short term investment divided by assets net of cash and short term investments. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.   
 RAR DAR RNI DNI RPS DPS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Frac. of Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (t-1) 0.0102* 0.00364 0.170** 0.0512 0.426** 0.315*** 
 (0.00583) (0.00288) (0.0679) (0.0457) (0.208) (0.0858) 
Frac. of Non-Acc. Fin. Exp. Dir. (t-1) 0.00475 0.00321 0.0443 0.0281 0.170 0.0962 
 (0.00864) (0.00383) (0.0953) (0.0567) (0.279) (0.0994) 
SIZE (t-1) 0.00439*** 0.00138*** 0.0546*** 0.0193*** 0.305*** 0.174*** 
 (0.000730) (0.000417) (0.00751) (0.00605) (0.0264) (0.0132) 
CFVOL (t-1) -0.00810 -0.0430*** -0.385 -0.750*** -0.657 -1.142*** 
 (0.0189) (0.00814) (0.236) (0.129) (0.493) (0.239) 
R&D (t-1) 0.00323 -0.0341*** 0.180 -0.372*** -0.961 -0.659*** 
 (0.0319) (0.0115) (0.321) (0.127) (0.661) (0.242) 
LEV (t-1) -0.0452*** -0.0143*** -0.379*** -0.0897* -0.531** -0.309*** 
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 (0.00723) (0.00323) (0.0699) (0.0502) (0.264) (0.0973) 
CH (t-1) 0.0161*** 9.50e-05 0.136** -0.000972 0.219* 0.0114 
 (0.00599) (0.00224) (0.0601) (0.0278) (0.128) (0.0485) 
ROE (t-1) 0.0335*** 0.00857*** 0.556*** 0.242*** 1.746*** 0.659*** 
 (0.00502) (0.00224) (0.0653) (0.0501) (0.198) (0.0734) 
KZ (t-1) 0.000110 -0.000748*** 0.00264*** -0.00665*** 0.00527** -0.0117*** 
 (0.000101) (7.64e-05) (0.000951) (0.000736) (0.00232) (0.00130) 
E-Index (t-1) 0.000363 -0.00101** 0.00898 -0.00352 0.0363 -0.0109 
 (0.000833) (0.000440) (0.00886) (0.00593) (0.0273) (0.0126) 
M/B 0.00275*** 0.00121*** 0.0138*** 0.00397** 0.0552*** 0.0154*** 
 (0.000367) (0.000171) (0.00261) (0.00165) (0.00972) (0.00405) 
PPE -0.0143** 0.0153*** -0.152** 0.163*** -0.680*** 0.248** 
 (0.00647) (0.00331) (0.0736) (0.0626) (0.214) (0.104) 
       
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 10,070 10,060 10,070 10,060 10,070 10,060 
R-squared 0.216 0.325 0.115 0.116 0.186 0.410 
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5.10. Conclusion  
Payout policy is a strategic plan used by directors when they decide on whether to 
distribute cash to shareholders or accumulate it for future investment. According to 
the agency theory, top management prefer retaining more cash for financial flexibility 
and to escape the external financing additional monitoring. Findings of prior studies 
on the influence of effective corporate governance mechanism on firm payout policy 
is mixed. Motivated by the high increase on financial-experts on board and based on 
the argument that financial-expert directors enhance board monitoring and advisory 
role, this study investigates, for the first time, the dynamic of the relationship between 
the fraction of financial-experts on board to one of the firms’ main financial decisions, 
payout policy.  
 Using a sample of 952 firms and 10060 firm-year observations for the period 
between 1999 and 2017, this study found that, in the case of enhanced corporate 
governance, through the appointment of accounting financial-experts on board, 
accounting financial-experts force managers to payout more to shareholders. This 
result is in line with the complement hypothesis. Stronger corporate governance 
allows shareholders to minimise the amount of cash available to managers to minimise 
the misuse of free cash flow. These findings are in line with the argument that better 
firm corporate governance enhances shareholder protection. However, when 
measuring financial-experts by directors’ non-accounting financial experience, the 
results show no indication of any influence on firm payout policy. This suggests that 
enhancing board of directors’ composition via the appointment of non-accounting 
financial-experts does not have the same efficiency as the appointment of accounting 
financial-experts. The study’s main findings are robust to controlling for board 
composition and exclusion of utility firms.  
 The additional undertaken in this study analysis investigates whether the 
relationship between the fraction of financial-experts and dividend payout stands in 
different firm settings based on their corporate governance strength and financial 
constraints position. Measured by firm E-Index, CEO duality, board size and board 
independence, the results show that the effect of accounting financial-experts on 
increasing firm payout is more prominent in firms with weak corporate governance 
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mechanism (firm with high E-Index, CEO duality and large board size). However, the 
results are mixed based on firm board independence and differ based on payout 
measure. Results on the effect of firm financial constraint on the relationship between 
financial-experts on board and firm payout show that the relationship is driven by firm 
financial constraint level. In highly financially constrained firms, where top 
management tend to retain more cash, accounting financial-experts on board play a 
significant role in increasing the firm payout level. These results are in line with the 
study’s main argument that directors’ financial experience enhances board 
monitoring, reducing agency conflict of interest. 
 In addition to the payout level, directors also decide on different payout 
policies (dividend or repurchase). Following the fall in dividend payment and the rise 
in firm repurchase activities, this study investigates the effect of financial-experts on 
the firm payout policy chosen. Given the investors' expectation of cumulative dividend 
payments, stock repurchase offers firms and investors considerable flexibility and tax 
advantages. However, considering the flexibility of firm repurchase option, arguably, 
enchanted managers would be driven to drift from repurchasing stocks as a form of 
payouts. This study shows that the fraction of accounting financial-experts on board 
would not only increase firm payout level, but might be more likely to pay 
shareholders in the form of repurchase. This result emphasises the role of financial-
experts on board in enhancing board monitoring through their influence on distributing 
free cash flow in the form of non-pre-committed shareholders’ payments. 
Nevertheless, the following chapter provides the thesis conclusion with an overview 
of the thesis main findings and contributions and the thesis implications, limitations 
and future research suggestions.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1. Introduction 
This thesis tests the possible link between directors on board financial experience and 
firm stock price synchronicity, cash holding and payout policy. Specifically, three 
empirical themes, tested empirically in individual empirical chapters of the thesis, 
follow. First, Chapter 3 tests the effect of the fraction of financial-experts on board on 
firm stock price synchronicity. Second, Chapter 4 tests the effect of the fraction of 
financial-experts on board on firm cash holding. Third, Chapter 5 tests the effect of 
the fraction of financial-experts on board on firm payout policy. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 summarises 
the first empirical chapter (Chapter 2), comprising main findings and contribution to 
literature of the relationship between directors’ financial experience and firm stock 
price synchronicity; Section 5.3 summarises the second empirical chapter (Chapter 3), 
comprising main findings and contribution to literature which investigate the 
relationship between directors’ financial experience and firm cash holding; Section 
5.4 summarises the second empirical chapter (Chapter 4), consisting of main findings 
and contribution to literature which examine the relationship between directors’ 
financial experience and firm payout policy; Section 5.5 outlines the research 
implications, limitations and future research.  
6.2. Financial experience on board and stock price synchronicity 
Chapter 3 empirically investigates the impact directors with financial experience have 
on firm information environment, measured by the firm stock price synchronicity. 
Further analysis tests the relationship between directors’ financial experience and firm 
cash risk, the effect of financial-experts’ demography on stock price synchronicity, a 
cross-section variation on the relationship between financial-experts and stock price 
synchronicity and finally tests the endogeneity of the relationship between directors’ 
financial experience and stock price synchronicity by difference-in-difference 
analysis. 
The main findings of this chapter can be summarised as follows. First, the 
study found that more financial experience on board results in reducing firm stock 
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price synchronicity. However, this relationship is only shown when financial 
experience measured by directors’ previous experience related to accounting; directors 
with non-accounting financial experience (as defined by the SOX, all directors with 
previous experience supervising financial-experts) have no effect on firms’ stock price 
synchronicity. This finding is consistent with the conjecture that directors with non-
accounting financial experience fail to obtain financial experience through only 
supervising financial-experts. The study than conducted different robustness tests on 
the study’s main results and found that the study’s main findings are robust to other 
board attributes, stringent sample (minimum of 50 weeks of observations per year 
instead of 30), the presence of top firms in the sample and the presence of unusual 
stock price behaviour due to the financial crisis.  
Second, to obtain valuable insight into the influence of financial experts on 
firm stock price synchronicity, the study investigated the effect of directors’ 
characteristics and found that for different directors’ characteristics, the fraction of 
accounting financial-experts’ effect on stock price synchronicity differs. Results show 
that only increasing the fraction of accounting financial-experts with busy, 
independent directors and male directors can improve the amount of information 
embedded in the share price. Third, the study tested the heterogeneity of the results 
and reported that the relationship between accounting financial-experts and stock price 
synchronicity is non-heterogeneous across different types of firms. The relationship is 
mainly found in firms with CEO duality, low institutional ownership and high E-
Index. Fourth, the study accounted for endogeneity concern of the result and found no 
concern arises from the endogeneity of the study’s main regression. This suggests that 
the relationship between directors’ financial experience was not driven by unobserved 
variables or reverse causality effect. Fifth, the study found no relationship between 
directors’ financial experience and firm crash risk. According to Kothari et al. (2009), 
managers tend to delay the disclosure of bad news to investors in the presence of a 
conflict of interest, which results in stock crash risk when all bad news is suddenly 
released (Jin and Myers 2006). They argue that better transparent environment reduces 
firm crash risk. However, the study failed to obtain any financial-experts’ effect on 
reducing the managers’ incentive on withholding bad news.  
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This study contributes to the financial literature on the effectiveness of 
financial-expert directors in several ways. First, the study’s main results indicate that 
financial directors play a significant role in improving the firm’s information 
environment. In particular, not all financial-expert directors are effective in this regard 
— only those with prior accounting experience matter. Second, results challenge the 
SOX Act definition of financial experience, which includes “supervising” employees 
with financial reporting responsibilities. Directors with CEO- and Chairman-
experiences failed to have the same positive influence. Third, as most recent studies 
considered the financial expertise of corporate audit committee (McDaniel et al. 2002; 
Davidson et al. 2004; Mangena and Pike 2005; Carcello et al. 2006b) or on banks’ 
boards (Fernandes and Fich 2009; Minton et al. 2014), the new trend for increasing 
financial expertise on the board of directors provides an opportunity to embed the 
financial expertise perspective into the corporate board of directors. Board of directors 
has the primary responsibility of supervising the firm’s financial reporting process. 
The board regularly meets the firm external auditors and accounting executive to 
assess firm financial statement, audit process and internal control mechanism (Klein 
2002). Given these responsibilities, this study’s evidence supports claims that when it 
comes to firms’ information environment, corporate board of directors’ accounting 
financial experience matters. Fourth, it adds to the literature on the effect of board 
compositions on stock price behaviour. The results of studies on the relationship 
between board composition and firm stock performance are inconsistent and the 
effectiveness of any board composition is vague (Byrd and Hickman 1992; Wen et al. 
2002; Dahya and McConnell 2005; Lien et al. 2005; Abor 2007; Harford et al. 2008; 
Agrawal and Nasser 2012) and mainly focused on board size, board independence, 
board gender diversity and CEO duality (Ferreira et al. 2011; Gul et al. 2011; Ntow-
Gyamfi et al. 2015; Sila et al. 2017). The study contributes to this field of literature by 
providing insight into the effect of directors’ financial expertise on stock price 
synchronicity and the possibility of reducing stock price synchronicity through 
policies supporting the increase of financial expertise on board. Fifth, a substantial 
amount of literature examining how stock price crash risk is subjected to the amount 
of voluntary disclosure (Haggard et al. 2008), financial statement transparency 
(Hutton et al. 2009), top management equity incentive (Kim et al. 2011a), institutional 
investors (Callen and Fang 2013), large controlling shareholders (Boubaker et al. 
2014) and CEO overconfidence (Kim et al. 2016), including other things. Thus, firm 
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crash risk is directly affected by firm corporate governance and informational 
environment. As promoted by new policies26 and literature, financial expertise can 
bring better firm governance and information environment. This study introduces new 
evidence that the board of directors’ financial sophistication has no effect on the firm 
crash risk. Finally, results offer empirical justification to the increasing calls by 
policymakers and academics for more financial-expert directors on boards to prevent 
accounting manipulations and frauds. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, this 
study is one of the few that have investigated the effect of financial-experts on firm 
information environment and the first to investigate the effect of financial-experts on 
firm stock price synchronicity 
6.3. Financial experience on board and cash holding 
Chapter 4 empirically analyses the impact directors with financial experience have on 
firms’ cash holding. Further, analysis tests how the interaction between financial-
expert directors and cash holding affects investment decisions, payout policies and 
firm profitability. Furthermore, the study analysed the effect financial-experts have on 
the value of cash holding. 
The main finding of this chapter can be summarised as follows. First, the 
fraction of financial-expert directors has an inverse relationship to firms’ cash holding. 
However, this relationship appears when the financial experience is defined as 
directors’ previous experience in accounting related field. Results also show that the 
relationship was driven from the high fraction of accounting financial-experts 
reducing the firm level of cash reserves but not from the low fraction of accounting 
financial-experts on board increasing firm cash holding. Second, the study main 
results were tested through different cross-sectional groups and found that the effect 
of director financial-experts on limiting firm cash holding appears in financial 
constraint firms (small firm size and low payout ratio). However, using KZ Index, the 
effect of financial-experts on firm cash holding appears in financially unconstraint 
firm (low KZ Index). Moreover, concerning firm corporate governance, the effect of 
accounting financial-experts is more pronounced in firms with better board structure 
in terms of independence and board size. However, for CEO duality and E-Index 
 
26 the Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) Act 
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measure, the result of the fraction of accounting financial-experts on board is found 
on firms with high governance needs (firms with CEO duality and high E-Index 
measure). Third, the study found insufficient evidence that the fraction financial-
experts on board affect firm investment decisions (capital expenditure, R&D or 
acquisition). However, the fraction of accounting financial-experts explains a large 
amount of the increase of firms’ dividend payments in relation to firm excess cash 
holding. Fourth, testing the effect of firm excess cash holding on firm market-to-book 
ratio shows accounting financial-experts’ ability to enhance firm profitability and 
market-to-book ratio from the firm change in excess cash holding. Fifth, the study 
tested the relationship of firm financial-experts on value of cash holding and, 
following Faulkender and Wang (2006) and Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007) models, 
results suggest that there is insufficient evidence to support the argument that investors 
would value excess cash holding any differently in the presence of accounting 
financial-experts on board and very weak evidence to support the argument that 
investors would value excess cash more in the presence of non-accounting financial-
experts on board. 
This part of the study also contributes to the finance literature on the 
effectiveness of board financial expertise in several ways. First, the study main results 
indicate that financial directors play a significant role in monitoring and reducing the 
amount of firm cash holding. Principally, not all financial-expert directors are 
effective in this matter — only those with prior accounting financial experience. 
Second, the study results question the SOX Act description of financial experience, 
which includes “supervising” employees with financial reporting responsibilities. 
Directors with supervisory experiences failed to have a similar influence. Third, this 
study adds to the literature on board financial expertise effectiveness as most literature 
focuses on financial-experts on corporate audit committee or banks’ boards (McDaniel 
et al. 2002; Davidson et al. 2004; Mangena and Pike 2005; Carcello et al. 2006b; 
Fernandes and Fich 2009; Minton et al. 2014), the new tendency towards increasing 
financial expertise on the board of directors allows the financial expertise perspective 
to become embedded into the corporate board of directors and adds to the growing 
literature on corporate board of directors’ financial experience. Fourth, it adds to the 
literature on the board of directors’ attributes effectiveness on cash holding. The 
results of existing studies on the relationship between board attributes and firm cash 
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holding focus on board independence, board size, CEO duality and board gender 
diversity (Chen 2008; Gill and Shah 2012; Boubaker et al. 2015; Atif et al. 2019). This 
study widens the range of board attributes effectiveness by adding the directors’ 
financial experience as a determinant on the level of firm cash holding. Fifth, this 
study adds to the traditional financial theory flexibility hypothesis claiming that 
managers prefer to retain firm earnings to have the flexibility of financing investments 
and to minimise the need to raise money externally, which employs additional 
monitoring to top management. This study shows that enhancing board of directors’ 
composition through the appointment of more financial-experts on board enhances 
shareholders’ power over managers, limiting their ability to retain more cash instead; 
they influence firm excess cash to be distributed to shareholders in the form of 
dividends. Finally, this study adds to the literature on board of directors’ effect on firm 
profitability. Previous literature shows the effective influence of board directors on 
firm performance mainly focused on board independence, board size, CEO duality 
and board gender diversity (Rechner and Dalton 1991; Erhardt et al. 2003; 
Krivogorsky 2006; Yan Lam and Kam Lee 2008; Belkhir 2009; Yang and Zhao 2014; 
Kakabadse et al. 2015). This study shows the ability of financial-experts on board to 
enhance firm profitability and market-to-book ratio from the firm excess cash holding. 
6.4.  Financial experience on board and payout policy 
Chapter 5 empirically studies the impact that directors with financial experience have 
on firm payout policy. Further analysis tested the study main findings against different 
firm settings based on their corporate governance strength and financial constraints 
position. Moreover, directors also decide on different types of payout policies. The 
study investigates the effect of financial-experts on board on the chosen payout policy 
(dividend payments or repurchase). 
The main finding of this chapter can be summarised as follows. First, in the 
case of enhanced corporate governance, through the appointment of financial-experts 
on board, using three different payout measures, financial-experts were found to have 
a positive effect on motivating managers to payout more to shareholders. However, 
this result only appears when the financial experience is measured by previous related 
accounting experience and not by supervising accounting experts. Second, a number 
of robustness checks were conducted: first, the main regression was repeated 
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controlling for other board of directors’ composition (which also affects board 
monitoring and payout policy); second, the main regression was repeated excluding 
utility firms as they are subject to different financial policies and different governance 
regulations which might affect their payout policy. The study main findings are robust 
to controlling for board composition and excluding utility firms. Third, the results 
show that the effect of accounting financial-experts on increasing firm payouts is more 
prominent in firms with weak corporate governance mechanism (firm with high E-
Index, CEO duality and large board size). However, the results are mixed based on 
firm board independence, depending on different payout measures. Moreover, in 
highly financially constrained firms, accounting financial-experts on board also play 
a major role in increasing the payout level of firms. This is in line with the study’s 
main argument that directors’ financial experience enhances board monitoring, 
reducing agency conflict of interest by increasing firm payouts when corporate 
governance in weak and financial constraint is high, particularly when managers’ 
incentive to retain more cash is high. Finally, the fraction of accounting financial-
experts on board would not only increase firm payout level, but would also be more 
likely to pay shareholders in the form of repurchase. This emphasises the financial-
experts’ role in enhancing board monitoring through the influence of distributing free 
cash flow through non-pre-committed shareholders payments.   
This chapter makes several some notable contributions to prior literature on 
the effectiveness of board of directors’ composition in a number of ways. First, the 
study’s main results indicate that financial directors play a significant role in 
monitoring managerial decisions on payout policy. Specifically, not all financial-
expert directors are useful in this matter — only those with prior accounting financial 
experience. Second, congruent with contributions in the previous two chapters, the 
study results challenge the financial-experts’ definition under the SOX Act, which 
includes “supervising” employees with financial reporting responsibilities. Directors 
with supervisory experiences failed to have a positive effect. Third, this study adds to 
the growing literature on corporate board financial expertise effectiveness, aside from 
previous studies mainly focusing on financial-experts on banks or audit committees 
(McDaniel et al. 2002; Davidson et al. 2004; Mangena and Pike 2005; Carcello et al. 
2006b; Fernandes and Fich 2009; Minton et al. 2014). Fourth, it adds to the literature 
on the board of directors’ composition effectiveness on firm payout policy. The results 
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of existing studies on the relationship between board composition and firm payout 
policy mainly focus on board independence, board size, CEO duality and board gender 
diversity (Schellenger et al. 1989; Al-Najjar and Hussainey 2009; Byoun et al. 2016; 
Chen et al. 2017). This study sheds light on board effectiveness, measured by board 
financial experience, and the effect on firm payout policy. Fifth, the study’s main 
results contribute to the compliment hypothesis, arguing that stronger corporate 
governance uses payout policy to mitigate agency conflict of interest by distributing 
free cash flow to shareholders minimising managers’ misuse of free cash flow. Finally, 
the study adds to the determinants of different payout policy decisions (dividend 
payout and repurchase) and partially justifies the increase in firm share repurchase 
trend (on the expense of dividend payouts) through the appointment of financial-
experts on board.  
6.5. Research implications, limitations and future research  
The main empirical findings of this thesis have several implications for research 
studies, corporations, investors and policymakers. For researchers’ prospective work, 
as studies on board composition effectiveness provide little attention to directors’ 
financial experience on corporate board, this study shows that financial experience 
plays a significant role in enhancing firm information environment and firm main 
financial decisions (cash holding and payout policy). Regarding corporate matter, 
firms make their daily decisions based on their going concern, taking under 
consideration the risk of bankrupts, fraud and accounting scandals. Chapter 3 results 
bring insight to firms on the possibility of improving their firm information 
environment through the appointment of financial-experts on board. Moreover, firms 
operate to increase their yearly profitability on investments. Chapter 4 shows that 
financial-experts on board extend the ability to enhance firm profitability from the 
firm excess cash holding. 
Moreover, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 results should be particularly relevant to 
shareholders. Given the separation of ownership and control, it is essential for 
shareholders to have effective corporate governance that ensures top management 
decisions are in line with their interest. The main results of this thesis indicate 
financial-experts on board provide ability to enhance board monitoring over managers, 
which was found in enhancing firm information environment, cash holding decisions, 
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the profitability of firm excess cash holding, the level of firm payout and their chosen 
payout policy. Thus, results offer a good insight into the monitor effectiveness of 
appointing more financial-experts on board. In respect of policymakers, the study’s 
empirical results challenge the SOX Act main definition of directors’ financial 
experience, which includes “supervising” employees with financial reporting 
responsibilities. The study found that directors with previous CEO- and/or President- 
responsibility fail to have the same effectiveness on improving firm information 
environment and board monitoring over cash holding and payout policy decision. 
Thus, firms responding to the SOX Act for appointing financial-experts on audit 
committee through non-accounting financial-experts might not reach the desired board 
effectiveness.  
On the limitation side of the study, some aspects should be noted. First, the 
study mainly focuses on two types of firm financial experience (accounting and non-
accounting). However, directors may acquire some financial knowledge through their 
educational background. Moreover, accounting financial-experts are identified by four 
previous types of related financial experience: (1) banking institution executive; (2) 
financial institution (non-bank) executive; (3) finance-related position of non-
financial firms (CFO, Accountant, Treasurer, Vice President for Finance. etc.); and 
(4) professional investor. It is worth investigating whether financial education 
background has a similar effect on financial experience and whether different types of 
accounting financial experience matter in effect on firm stock price synchronicity, 
cash holding and payout policy. Second, the study results on directors’ financial 
experience effect on stock price synchronicity and payout policy is limited to non-
financial firms and results on directors’ financial experience effect on firm cash 
holding are limited to non-financial and non-utility firms due to different financial 
policies and different governance regulations. Thus, to gain a broader insight into the 
effect of financial-experts on board, it would be worthwhile investigating, in a separate 
sample, the financial-experts’ effect on firm stock price synchronicity and payout 
policy in financial firms and financial-experts’ effect on firm cash holding in finance 
and utility firms. Third, literature illustrates different ways of measuring firm stock 
price informativeness. This study focuses solely on firm stock price synchronicity. For 
future research, it would be of benefit to investigate whether the relationship stands in 
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other stock price informativeness measures (e.g. firm-specific return variations 
measure). 
Finally, this study opens avenues for future research. First, the study mainly 
focuses on the US financial market, which is considered a developed market with high 
shareholder protection. Future study may test the financial-experts’ effect in emerging 
markets, where shareholder protection is low and corporate governance is weak. 
Second, the study mainly relies on secondary data. A better insight into directors’ 
financial experience might be detected through a questionnaire survey or an interview 
survey (or both) with firm board of directors’ members. Third, establishing the 
relationship between directors’ financial experience and firm information 
environment and financial decision opens a wide range of possibilities on what type 
of effects do financial-experts have on other firm decision-making processes.  
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